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A B S T  Rj^iCT
THIS STUDY ANALYZES THE NATURE AND PROVISIONS OF 
THE CODE OF CONDUCT IN ORDER TO KNOW THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES STATES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CODE. THIS STUDY IDENTIFIES THE PROBLEMS OF THE ASEAN 
COUNTRIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE. FOR EXAMPLE, 
NOT ALL THE ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE RATIFIED THE CODE OF 
CONDUCT. OF THE SIX MEMBER COUNTRIES, ONLY THREE HAVE 
RATIFIED THE CODE (INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND PHILIPPINES) 
WHILE THE OTHER THREE (BRUNEI, SINGAPORE, AND THAILAND) 
HAVE NOT. EVEN THE FIRST THREE COUNTRIES WHICH RATIFIED 
THE CODE OF CONDUCT HAVE NOT ADOPTED NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
OR OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE 'MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE CODE 
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 47. IT IS INDESPENSABLE THAT AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION THAT A COUNTRY HAS RATIFIED 
SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL. OTHERWISE, 
THE SAID INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT SHALL REMAIN IN PAPER. 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, WHEN A COUNTRY HAS RATIFIED A 
CONVENTION IT HAS A PARALLEL OBLIGATION TO ADOPT A 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE AT THE NATIONAL 
LEVEL. THE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE WOULD BE IN A COUNTRY 
IN WHOSE LEGAL SYSTEM THE CONVENTION BECOMES AUTOMATICAL­
LY A PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND ONCE THE STATE HAS RATI- 
FIED IT. THIS IS NOT THE CASE IN THE ASEAN REGION WHOSE 
LEGAL SYSTEM, PATTERNED AFTER THE DUTCH (INDONESIA), THE 
BRITISH (BRUNEI, MALAYSIA, AND SINGAPORE), THE AMERICAN 
(PHILIPPINES). THAILAND IS THE ONLY ASEAN COUNTRY NOT 
COLONIZED BY WESTERN POWERS AND HAS' NOT RATIFIED THE 
CODE.
THIS STUDY ATTEMPTS TO SHOW HOW REGIONAL COOPERAT­
ION MAY BE POSSIBLE IN SHIPPING ON THE ASEAN COUNTRIES 
FOR CODE-RELATED MATTERS. THERE ARE OPTIONS TO THE ASEAN
* '
COUNTRIES, TO IMPROVE INTRA-REGIONAL LINER TRADE AND
GRADUALLY EXPAND THIS COOPERATION ON AN INTERNATIONAL 
SCALE.
THIS STUDY CONTAINS CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH 
THE DECISION MAKERS IN THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD LIKE 
TO CONSIDER. FINALLY, THIS STUDY GIVES EMPHASIS TO THE 
PHILIPPINE SITUATION IN VIEW OF ITS EXPERIENCE IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARGO SHARING LAW PATTERNED AFTER 
THE CARGO SHARING FORMULA OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT.
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X r v I - T R O D U C T X O K i
The United Nations Convention on a Code for Liner 
Conferences (I)' had entered into force on October 6, 
1983, yet its implementation has been lagging either in 
the developed maritime countries or the developing 
countries of the world. Several factors may have
accounted for the hesitancy of these states to implement 
the Code. This study seeks to identify these factors and 
to examine the specific views of these countries as 
regards implementation of the Code.
Knowledge of these factors and the views of the dif­
ferent groups of countries is the key to an effective 
implementation of the Code. The Code is a new internatio­
nal instrument and its nature and provisions should be 
analyzed and examined to be able to implement it to the 
satisfaction of all shipping interests.
Similarly, a successful implementation of the Code 
requires adequate information about world shipping, the 
market forces that influence the world liner trade, and 
the expected response of the shipping market to variation 
of maritime policies in a region or country.
Above all, the success of the implementation and 
administration of the Code requires sufficient knowledge 
of the nature of the Code, the meanings of its provisions 
and the appropriate role of Governments in the whole ga­
mut of the Code implementation.
(1) The Convention is likewise known the UNCTAD Liner 
Code or Code of Conduct or simply " the Code ". This stu­
dy uses the term Code of Conduct.
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OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY
This study seeks to accomplish the following 
objectives, in light of the ASEAN needs, and in particu­
lar, the Philippines shipping interests:
(1) To determine the feasibility of implementing 
the Code on a regional basis in the ASEAN as a 
group, or on a country basis, on the Philippines;
(2) To identify such legislative or any other 
administrative measures as are necessary and ade­
quate to ensure that the national shipping lines 
of the ASEAN countries carry a fair share in the 
liner trade generated between their trading part­
ners' liner traffic;
C3) To study the feasibility of pooling the 
resources of the ASEAN group for the purpose of 
organizing and operating, on a cooperative basis, 
a "Super ASEAN Liner Service", or consortium, or 
other shipping services agreements that may be 
feasible within the ambit of the Code; and
(A) To identify the goals and maritime strategies 
of individual country in the ASEAN, and to seek 
for means on how to harmonize the individual 
country's interests, to optimally avail of the 
promotional provisions of the Code in internatio­
nal liner shipping.
METHODS OF ANALYSIS USED IN THE STUDY
The analyses in this study are calculated to
achieve the above objectives, such as:
Cl) Analysis and assessment of the existing and 
future trends of liner shipping industry, of 
the rapid changing structure of the liner 
trade, the intra-ASEAN liner trade, the 
volume and pattern of trade, the classes and 
types of commodities, the potential of the 
ASEAN countries, individually or collectively 
as centering load for transshipment cargoes 
for international long haul, and the feasibi­
lity of pooling the resources of the ASEAN 
Shippers' Council for cargo consolidation and 
for Code-related matters.
C2) Review of the present competitive structure 
of the shipping market, the sophistication 
and innovations introduced in the liner trade 
and the highl.y capital intensive liner 
shipping industry as well as new strategy 
such as the round-the-world-service, the 
pendulum service, the fixed-day-of-the-week 
service in liner service;
(3) Analysis and assessment of the emerging 
legal, institutional, and administrative 
infrastructure in the world shipping which 
may have an effect on the ASEAN countries;
It
t
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C4> Analysis of the specific provisions of the 
Code, the scope of the application of the 
Code, the approaches in the implementation of 
the Code, the administrative infrastructure 
needed to implement and administer the Code.
PREVIEW OF THE THESIS
This paper is a monograph work divided into six 
chapters.
Chapter 1 describes the goals and strategies of the 
ASEAN countries, and, for ease of discussion of the Code, 
identified the major Code areas considered to be of major 
concern to the ASEAN countries. Hence, the chapter deals 
with conference membership, the participation in the tra­
de, freight rates determination, conference decision-ma­
king and consultation, and dispute settlement.
Chapter 2 deals with the development of the world 
liner trade and conferences. It discusses the share of 
liner trade in the whole seaborne trade in the world and 
it tries to determine the share of the liner fleet in the 
world fleet. This chapter lays down the characteristics 
of liner conferences, the criticisms by countries of the 
practices of the liner conferences, the advantages of the 
liner conference system, and the factors that led to the 
institution of international control and regulations of 
the conferences.
Chapter 3 identifies the objectives and the princip­
les underlying the Code. It also analyses the Code as to 
its structure, the status of ratifications of the Code, 
the impact of reservations made by EEC and the Eastern
A
the attitudes and theSocialist countries,  problems in 
implementation of the Code in the ASEAN countries. Final­
ly, the aspects of cargo allocation, reallocation, and 
redistribution are described to better guide the ASEAN 
countries in acting as a group in shipping under the Code 
provisions.
Chapter 4 analyses the present situation in ASEAM 
as regards liner trade, conferences, and the Code. The 
present development in the liner trade, port infrastruc­
ture, container traffic, and economic indicators of the 
individual country and the region as a whole are presen­
ted, Efforts have been made-to make the delta on the ASEAN 
up-to-date, and some of the latest statistics are not 
available even on new editions of reference materials 
that this study has made use of. ^
Chapter 5 attempts to formulate the recommended 
strategy for the ASEAN. This strategy is not all -
encompassing, and this study tries to clairify this 
strategy, tat king into Account the legal, administrative, 
and social differences of the ASEAN peoples.
Chapter 6 is devoted to the Philippines. Emphasis 
has been done on the Philippine case, in view of the fol­
lowing reasons:
Cl) The Philippines had an experience in the imp­
lementation of the cargo sharing law based on 
the 40-40-20 provisions of the Code;
(2) The author of this research had been directly 
responsible in the implementation of the law,
which was better known as "The Cargo Sharing
C
Law" of the Philippines, embodied in Presiden­
tial Executive Order Mo. 769 promulgated on 
January 19, 1982;
(3) The Philippines is an example of a developing 
country which is dependent on foreign flag 
carriers in the carriage of its foreign 
seaborne trade. Attempts will be made to find 
out why this situation was allowed to exist in 
a country whose physical configuration as an 
archipelagic state has to rely on sea 
transportation.
6
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This chapter discusses the goals, means, and stra­
tegies of the ASEAN group.
1.1 SHIPPING SERVICES IN GENERAL (ASEAN)
Shipping services, the ownership, and control of 
liner services in the ASEAN are provided by the developed 
ma^ritime nations and there is haxrdly any substantial 
tonnage owned and operated by ASEAN countries. The 
exception is Singapore which owns andoperates one of the 
modern containerships. Singapore is considered the most- 
advanced country in the ASEAN region. Its importance in 
the grouping is very evident.
1.2 TRADE SITUATION IN GENERAL (ASEAN)
Exports are dominantly of raw materials.Manufactures 
and semi-manufactures constitute only a small percentage 
of exports. Shipping 'services to developed trading part­
ners are still dominantly provided by multinational and 
international shipping services of developed maritime 
countries. Imports have grown. There is a’ change in the 
overall pattern and structure of trade, in the relative 
proportions of liquid qargoes, bulk cargoes, and general 
liner cargoes. Intra-regional trade has grown only 
marginally.
1.3 MERCHANT FLEET IN GENERAL (ASEAN)
7
There is discernible growth in liner tonnage owned 
by some developing countries in the Far East.
The so-called new industrialising countries CNICs), 
such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore have 
succeeded in their industrialisation, diversification and 
integration. They have modern liner cargo ships, fully 
cellular ships. They have strong export markets to US and 
Europe. For the rest in the South East Asia, there is a 
growing impatience for increased participation by deve­
loping countries in the ASEAN, primarily in the carriage 
at. their own trades, to improve the worsening balance of 
payments situation, debt crises, and to save the much 
needed foreign currency. There is a growing consciousness 
of the importance in the economy of freight payments and 
insurance as components in the balance of payments; app­
rehensions regarding overwhelming dependence on foreign 
flag tonnage for servicing the trade. The ASEAN countries 
do not aspire to be world leader in liner shipping so as 
to compete in world liner trade against the liner fleet 
of the traditional maritime countries of the world. They 
intend to carry only a fair share in the liner traffic 
generated by their seaborne trade. And, this opportunity 
is open to them under the new maritime international 
order as envisioned by the United Nations General Assemb­
ly Cl). The governments of the ASEAN countries are "ac­
tive" in shipping although the developed maritime nations 
called this activism in shipping and other sectors as a 
protectionist policy.
1.4 GOALS OF ASEAN SHIPPING
Considering the historical development of the ASEAN 
countries, impact of cont,aineri2ation and of technology
8
on ports facilities, and the pressing difficultties for 
increasing exports and achieving a greater degree of nar­
rowing the gap in the balamce of payments deficits, pre­
sent trained manpower, administrative competence, it 
would appear that the goals of both national and regional 
shipping policies in the ASEAN would be the following;
(a!) Establishment of trained and efficient maritime 
infrastructure to include not only of the mer­
chant marine of the country but also the effec­
tive introduction of computer system for 
collection of daxta, monitoring the developments 
in the market, and watching national interests, 
implementing and enforcing international 
conventions of great importance to shipping, 
especially those convention^ adopted under the 
auspices of the International Maritime Organi­
zation CIMO), the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD!), the Internatio­
nal Labour Organization CILO), and other multi­
lateral intergovermental agreements.
Cb) Gradual expansion of tonnage suitable to the 
country's general cargo liner trade. It is 
obvious that the ASEAN countries do not have 
the needed capital resources to invest in 
full-fledged containerization. Participation in 
international container consortia, space
chartering, joint venture, may be one way out. 
Besides carriage in fully containerized vessels 
a more rudimentary methods of unitizing, e.g., 
palletization and preslinging should be
followed.
9
Cc) Cooperation with other countries of the region 
in the establishment and operation of intra- 
regional shipping services to carry not only 
the intra-regional trade, but also, transship­
ped cargoes from the way port, to the long line 
haul, and maximum participation in the liner 
cargo generated by their foreign trade.
Cd) Strengthening the organization of the ASEAN 
Shippers' Council, to deal with the shipping 
conferences in the region, and to be an organi­
zation for consol idciting the liner cargoes 
shipped by sma11'shippers in the region and as 
focal point in data gathering, information, and 
analsysis, to ensure that the shippers get the 
benefits of rationalization and economy of 
scale.
While it is possible to define the goals of the 
ASEAN countries, it is not so simple to define the means 
to achieve it. The above goals are by no means exhaust­
ive, but what this study attempts is to explore the ave­
nue for cooperation in shipping since it is only in this 
context that the strategy will yield better result.
In order to develop a maritime strategy for the 
region, it is most important to know the features of 
existing shipping services in the region.- First of all, 
it is to be stated that the exports of ASEAN countries 
have increased in volume and in value. The rate of growth 
is, however, very poor compared to the growth rate of the 
trade between developed nations. There has also been very 
little growth i-n intraregional trade.
■10
•1.5 FEATURES OF SHIPPING SERVICES IN THE REGION
The mos'b disturbing features of existing services 
in the region may be stated briefly as follows:
First, the services between the two developing 
countries in the region is usually a cross—trade 
for foreign flag vessels as part of the service on 
a major international trade route more commonly to 
another developed country, or
Secondly, a way-port on an international trade 
route, or
Third, a transshipment 
orgaviised transshipment 
touched at in the service 
route.
at one of the 
ports^ around the 
on an international
major
world
trade
Certain consequences flow from this pattern. The 
regularity and frequency of such services is contingent 
on the nature and volume of cargo offered on each occa­
sion and the capacity or willingness of the ship to lift 
it.
While freight rates in direct services between 
developed nations or even between a developed nation and 
a developing country of the region may be largely gover­
ned by round-the-voyage economics, the rate in crosstra­
des or way port trade appear to be determined wholly on 
the principle of what the commodity can bear.
Furthermore, the freight rates are 
the lines or conferences with lack of
•11
determined by 
consultation or
eveninadequate consultation with the shippers. This is 
more so in the impact of overall costs when transship” 
ment is involved. Briefly, the pattern is not intended to 
serve in the true sense of the word - the intraregional 
trade - but as a factor contributing to the commercial 
viability of the .major service. It is not primarily based 
on the rate between the countries of the region. The 
conferences or rate agreements confined to those engaged 
in the service are not fully responsive to the needs of 
the trade.
In the context of shipping services encompassing 
the region, there are broadly speaking four regions in 
Asia and the Pacific:C2)
Cl) The countries in the region bordering on the 
Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, e.g. 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and 
Burma;
(2) The countries in West—Asia Gulf connected 
with the ASEAN region directly, or touch­
ing the region described in Cl);
C3) The ASEAN countries connected by shipping 
services to the countries described in Cl) 
and C 4);.
C4) The Pacific region touching Japan, Australia, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, and 
New Zealand regions.
In terms of shipping services, these regions are 
not necessarily exclusive. They are indicative of the
region in which intra ~ regional services need to be 
oraanized. Or, in the case of the implementation of the 
Code, the region is indicative of the extent of coopera­
tion as regards allocation, real location, and redistribu­
tion of cargoes under the Code.
For the effective implementation of the Code, the 
appropriate geographical region for cooperation would be 
the zone covered by the conferences.
For example, the conferences serving the routes 
had organized the so-called "super conferences," called 
the Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement CTWRA) and the 
Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement CANERA), for 
the transportation of liner cargoes on the US foreign 
trade. ^
•1.6 ASEAN WITHIN CONFERENCE GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE
The geographical scope of the TWRA, as defined in 
the Agreement, covers ' points in the US and Canada to 
points and ports in the ASEAN, viz;
"The trade covered by this Agreement consists 
of the transportation of cargo moving on. liner 
vessels and which originates at points and ports 
in the United States and Canada, which moves from 
or via ports on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific 
Coasts (including Alaska!) of the United States or 
via ports on the Atlantic and-Pacific Coasts pf 
Canada, and which is destined to points and ports 
in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Siberia USSR, the 
People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, 
Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia!), Thailand, Laos, 
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of
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Singapore, the Federation of Malaysia, the Sulta- 
naite of Brunei, and the Republic of Indonesia (the 
"trade"). (Article 4, TWRA).
TWRA was filed with the Federal Maritime Commis­
sion (FMC) in 19S5, as FMC Agreement No. 202-010689, with 
21 Liner Operators on the route as original signatory 
parties.
These parties who signed the Agreement include: 
American President Lines, Ltd., Barber Blue Sea, The East 
Asiatic Company operating as EAC Lines Transpacific Ser­
vice, Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan), Ltd., Hanjin Con­
tainer Lines, Ltd., Hapag-Lloyd Trans-Pacific Service, 
Japan Line, Ltd., Kawasaki Kusen Kaisha, Ltd., Korea 
Marine Transport Co., Ltd., Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 
Inc., A.P. Moller-Maersk Line, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., 
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd., NYK Line, Sea-Land Service, 
Inc., Seawinds Ltd., Showa Line, Ltd., United States 
Lines, Inc. Yamashitai-Shinnihon Steamship Co., Ltd., Ori­
ent Overseas Container Line, Ivic. , Zim Israel Navigation 
Co., Ltd .
Following the resignations of some of the contrac­
ting parties in the TWRA, the remaining members of the 
Agreement totalled thirteen (13). The following shipping 
lines had resigned from the TWRA; Barber Blue Sea, The 
East Asiatic Company operating as Eac Lines Transpacific 
Service, Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan), Ltd., Hapag- 
Lloyd Trans-pacific and other lines.
As noted in the contracting parties, it is the 
Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. of Singapore only and none of 
the other ASEAN countries' national shipping lines became
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a party to the TWRA.
The second conference covering the liner cargoes 
from the Far East to US points and ports and Canada is 
called the "Asia North America Eastbound Rate Agreement" 
or briefly called the ANERA. This Agreement was filed 
with the Federal Maritime Commission as FMC No.202-010776 
effective August 15, 1985. The geographical range of this 
Agreement includes the ASEAN countries, vis:
"This Agreement covers the transportation of 
cargo on liner vessels, whether moving in all 
water or intermodal,service under through bills 
of lading or otherwise, direct or by transship­
ment, from <15 ports and points in Hong Kong, 
Macao, Korea, Taiwan, Siberia USSR, the People's 
Republic of China ("North Asia Range"), and (2) 
ports and points in Thailand, Vietnam, Democratic 
Kampuchea (Cambodia), Laos, Burma, the Republic 
of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, 
the Federation .of Mailaysia, the Sultanate of 
Brunei, and the Republic of Indonesia ("South 
Asia Range") to ports on the Atlantic, Gulf and 
Pacific Coasts of the United States (United Sta­
tes defined to include Alaska, Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands) and to ports on the 
Atlantic and Pacific Coasts of Canada and inte­
rior or coastal points in the United States and 
Canada via such ports (all- of the foregoing 
hereinafter referred to as the ("trade"). (Artic­
le A, ANERA).
The ANERA was signed by about 20 liner shipping 
companies as in the TWRA, less the EAC Lines Transpacific
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Service, NYK Line, and United States Line, which did not 
sign, but with one line, the Hong Kong Islands Line as 
the additional line to sign the ANERA.
It is to be pointed again that only Neptune 
Orient Lines is a member in the ANERA while the national 
shipping lines of other ASEAN countries had not become 
members to the Agreement.
The Code provides a clear definition of liner 
conferences, and generally it can be stated that "any" 
cooperative agreement, either denominated as Rate Agree­
ment like in the above agreements, or conferences, or 
freight agreements, which fulfill the conditions laid 
down in the Code would be subject to its provisions, 
irrespective of the organizational form of cooperation 
chosen. (3)
For example, a joint service arrangement of the 
TRIO group - three major operators in the Europe/Far East 
service have entered into joint service arrangement 
under this name - if operated outside the scope of the 
presently existing conferences would, for the purpose of 
determining the applicability of the Code, still fall 
under its provisions, as it does in fact fulfil the 
conditions stipulated in the Code definition, i.e. a 
group of two or more vessel-operating carriers, provides 
international liner services for the carriage of cargo on 
a particular route or routes within specified geographi­
cal limits, has an agreement or arrangement, whatever its 
nature, within the framework of which they operate under 
uniform or common freight rates.
The Code does, in fact, apply to consortia as well
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as to any other cooperative arrangements that fulfil the 
conditions of a liner conference stipulated in the Code 
definition.
•1.7 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The following problems are very relevant in imple­
menting the Code in the ASEAN context.The Code consists 
of fifty-four (54) articles, with annexes, but for 
purposes of this study, the following major areas are 
very substantial matters for the ASEAN countries to be 
concerned with:
•1. Conference membership;
2. Participation in the trade;""
3. Freight rates;
4. Conference decision—maiking and consultation; 
a-nd
5. Dispute settlement.
1. First, the right to membership in conferences 
serving the developing countries' trade, was of great 
importance. With the exception of conferences serving the 
United States trades which are open by law (5) to all 
shipping lines, liner conferences have been characterized 
as closed cartels, membership in which required the 
approval of those lines already members. Shipping lines 
of developing countries often experienced difficulty or 
met refusal as they sought to join the conferences ser­
ving the trades of their states. This is very true in
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ASEAN countries. The Code provides that any "national 
shipping line" is entitled by right to be a full member 
of a conference which serves the foreign trade of its 
country. This right is subject to some special criteria 
stated in Article 1, paragraph 2, as follows: "A shipping
line applying for membership of a conference shall fur­
nish evidence of its ability and intention, which may 
include the use of chartered tonnage, provided the crite­
ria of this paragraph are met to operate a regular, ade­
quate and efficient service on a long term basis as defi­
ned in the conference agreement within the framework of 
the conference, shall undertake to abide by all the terms 
and conditions of the conference agreement, and shall 
deposit a financial guarantee to cover any outstanding 
financial obligation in the event of subsequent withdra­
wal, suspension or expulsion from mem^Jership if so requi­
red under the conference agreement".
For a shipping line which is not a naitional line 
in any trade of the conference concerned, in addition to 
the above mentioned criteria (provisions of article 1, 
paragraph 2) the following criteria should be taken into 
account s
(a) The existing volume of the trade on the route 
or routes served by the conference and prospects for its 
growth.
<b) The adequacy of shipping space for the exist­
ing and prospective volume of trade' on the route or 
routes served by the conference.
Cc) Th-e probable effect of admission of the ship­
ping line into the conference on the efficiency and 
quality of the conference service.
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(d) The current participation of the shipping 
line on the same route or routes outside the framework of 
a conference.
(e) The current participation of the shipping 
line on the same route or routes within the framework of 
another conference.
2. Secondly, this refers to the participation in 
the carriage of Ccirgo. The Code provisions on this sub­
ject have been the most controversial and have been wide­
ly interpreted as giving to each of the trading states 
the right of carriage by the national lines of up to 40 
percent of liner conference cargo.
The problems that might be considered in the imp­
lementation of the Code is to what extent will the ASEAN 
as a group act to exercise their rights to participate in 
the carriage of the conference cargo which they generate? 
Are the ASEAN countries going to buy, build, charter 
ships or space? Can their rights to participate to the 
full maximum of 40 percent of their liner trades be sold?
Will the allocation of cargoes be pursued along 
bilateral lines or will schemes for regional cargo allo­
cation and cooperation, which may promise greater economy 
and efficiency, be pursued? How can the ASEAN (6) deal 
with their bilateral trading states which are not con^ 
tracting parties to the Code?
3. Thirdly, on the aspect of freight rates. The 
Code contains a number of provisions on freight rates, 
establishing the goal that they be "at as low a level as
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possible from the commercial point of view and ... permit 
a reasonable profit for shipowners." C7) Unless otherwise 
agreed upon, the 'minimum period between general rate 
increases would be 15 months. Mandatory consultations may 
be forced by shippers, and, where possible, conferences 
are to provide a report from an independent accounting 
firm analyzing conference costs and revenues. Should con­
sultations not lead to agreement, the matter would go to 
international mandatory conciliation.
The question on this aspect is whether the ASEAN 
countries, whose national liner fleets are fully or par­
tially state-owned, which elect to take advantage of 
their carriage rights, will, the emphasis be on trade pro­
motion with "reasonable rates" and good service charact­
eristics or on shipping sector revenue maximization? 
Given the virtual veto power of national lines of trading 
states within the conferences under the terms of the 
Code, such decision will be of great im.portance to the 
future of liner shipping.
A. Fourthly, relative to the conference decision—  
making and consultation, the Code requires that conferen­
ces' decisions be based on principle of equality of all 
full member lines. The Code further stipulates that deci­
sions relating to the conference agreement and to trade 
between countries cannot be made without the consent of 
the national shipping lines of the countries involved. 
This provision is seen by developing countries as greatly 
enhancing their influence in the transportation of cargo 
in their trade. The Code'provides for an elaborate system 
of consultation between.the conference, on the one hand, 
and the shippers' organizations and shippers' representa­
tives and individual shippers, on the other. "Appropriate
authorities" have the right to full participation in the 
consultations. (.&')
5. The major question which may arise in relation 
to the consultation process is the extent to which "ap­
propriate authorities", that is, government or semi-go­
vernmental bodies, will become involved in such consul­
tations. In some developing countries, much of the cargo 
imported and exported, is generated, owned, or financed, 
in some way by the government; the government may be 
expected to look after its interests as shipper in this 
context. Further, rising costs, the outflow of limited 
hard currency in payment- for shipping services, and 
dependence on foreign shipping lines are significant con­
cerns in developing countries and thus invite government 
intervention. ^
According to different articles of the Code 
(Articles 23—46 and annex I and resolution 3.! dispute’s 
are required to be settled first through direct negotia­
tions. Should such negotiations prove fruitless, any 
party to the dispute is entitled to refer the matter to 
international mandatory conciliation as outlined in the 
Code.
The question on this aspect is with regard to the 
extent to which governmental authorities will become 
directly involved in dispute settlement. The parties to a 
dispute empowered by the Code to initiate the concilia­
tion process are not states, but commercial eirtities, 
such as shipping lines, conferences, shippers, and ship­
pers' organisations.
The Code, however, in other provisions, stipul
ates for a considerable flexibility so that the parties 
may agree on alternative (and perhaps binding) methods of 
dispute settlement.
This study will attempt to answer the above- 
mentioned questions in the next chapters . This chapter 
aims only to provide the parameters for the discussion of 
the issues that may arise in the implementation of the 
Code.
It is pertinent to recall, however, that the Code 
provides for regional cooperation in dealing with cargo 
allocation, participation -in the trade, and redistribu­
tion of the cargoes in those cases where the contracting 
states decide not to carry the maximum share of up to 
40%, or where the contracting states^ have no national 
lines to carry their trades.
1,3 PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION IN ASEAN SHIPPING
While regional cooperation is specifically referred 
to in the Code only just once, the effective scope for 
such cooperation is large and covers cooperative 
arranaements among national lines, as well as among 
shippers' organisations, and should also involve 
governments. The specific reference in the Code to 
regional cooperation is in Article 2, paragraph 8, which 
provides for national shipping lines of a. region at one 
end of a trade covered by a conference to redistribute 
among themselves by mutual agreement the shares in the 
trades allocated to them. Under this provision, within 
conferences covering several countries at one end of the 
route, services can be rationalized by the redistribution 
of the cargo shares among the national lines at one end
of the route. Such redistribution may need to take into 
account in particular the interests and particular prob­
lems of national shipping lines of land-locked countries. 
Such redistribution arrangements would help to improve 
the economic viability of all the lines concerned and is 
particularly important in the context of the increase in 
the scale of shipping operations arising from containeri­
zation. C9)
Cooperation enabling a rationalization of servi­
ces and of loading and discharging ports can lead to 
im-proved load fsictors, speed up turn-round times and 
qenerally lead to more efficient and profitable services. 
Regional cooperation by national shipping lines in the 
use of common agencies at both ends of a trade can also 
yield substantial operational economises. CIO)
There are however some drawbacks that may lead to 
the difficulties of regional cooperation. Every act of 
cooperation requires that those cooperating are willing 
to make compromises and to cede a measure of their sover­
eignty in the area of cooperation.
It can, however, be argued that the positive 
factors can yet lead the ASEAN countries to greater coo­
peration in shipping. The comparative advantage of low 
labour costs, administrative overheads, and available 
skilled manpower are present in ASEAN countries. This 
will be significant and generally'favorable for liner 
shipping in the ASEAN countries, which must be considered 
to be intimately interested in the promotion of their 
countries' trades.
Regional cooperation in economic affairs, however,
h£\5 often been difficult to achieve and maintain. Natio­
nalism, a force which has motivated developing states to 
assert rights in the shipping field, also serves to 
undermine regional cooperation when decisions must be 
made, for example, as to cost sharing for common services 
and as to the locations of regional load centers and fee­
der ports, (ll) The Government of Indonesia, for inst­
ance, as a matter of policy, has sought to encourage 
direct line calls from its distant trading partners and 
has made clear its objection to the fact that most 
foreign-flag vessels serve Indonesia with feeder vessels 
from Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. (12) Within the 
ASEAN, the Federation of ASEAN Shippers Councils (.FASC.J 
has asserted that the way to take advantage of the Code 
is through the formation of an ASEAN "super-line" into 
which ASEAN cargoes would be pooled.
Reportedly, this matter was discussed by the__ ASEAN 
Economic Ministers' Meeting in Bangkok at the end of 
1983. t;i3>
1.9 CONCLUSION
Thouqh the Liner Code entered into force on Octo­
ber &, 1983, it will be some time before its consequences
are fully felt and understood. This chapter has attempted 
to show the importance of a maritime strategy of a coun­
try, and the relevance of the Code to the ASEAN coun­
tries.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
With the development of containerization in the 
19B0s and the 1960s, the shipping of general cargo began 
to take on an identity separate from that of dry bulk 
shipping. The concept of unitization has integrated and 
r£)volutionized carriage of general cargo throughout the 
whole transport chain over land and sea. The process of 
overtonnaging, which had began on many trades in the 19th 
century, has continued through the 20th century, main­
taining the need for conferences to regulate competition 
in order to provide efficient and economic services. Cl)
The first Section of this Study consists, there­
fore, of an explanation of the main features and inst­
itutions of world 1iner .shipping in the last decade, and 
the crisis environment in which the ocean-liner transport 
industry has operated for the last ID years as brought 
about by the on-going evolution of forces that are 
structurally transforming non-system, independent remote­
ly deployed liner companies into even more integrated 
distribution systems.
2.1.1 LINER SHIPPING
In the days when ships were powered by wind and 
sail, operators were not able to provide services at 
fixed time schedules. It was only with the invention of
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steamships that the vagaries of weather could be ignored 
sufficiently for services to be operated not just on 
specific routes but also, as technical advances were made 
in enqine performance and ship design, in accordance with 
pre-arranged timetables. Shipping services may be divi­
ded into three broad categories -liner, tramp, and indus­
trial - although these categories overlap between the 
others. C2) Industrial or private shipping services are 
owned by industrial companies to carry their products. 
These companies sometimes chartered vessels in cases whe­
re owned tonnage was not sufficient.
A Liner service is provided by a shipping line for 
the carriage of general cargo on behalf of anyone who 
wishes to make use of the service. It is normal for car­
goes to be booked on the service by the line's agent at 
each port of call or'at other ports in the region from 
which cargo can be fed into a port of call. The important 
point is that a liner service, unlike a tramp shipping 
operation, is open for all to use. In liner, the line 
deploys the same vessel, or vessels, along a specified 
route or routes, loading and/or discharging cargo at the 
same prearranged ports on each round voyage. The service 
is operated at a regular frequency in accordance with a 
published timetable. C3)
A tramp service is one which is offered by its 
owner for hire fcharter) on the open market for one or 
more voyages (voyage charter) or for a fixed period of 
time (timecharter). For the duration of the charter the 
vessel only carries cargoes, usually bulk commodities, 
designated by the charterer between any two or more ports 
specified by him. Once the charter has expired, the ves­
sel reverts to the owner who then offers it for hire
means whereas on aagain on the open market. (4) This 
single voyage the cargo on board a tramp 
the cargo owner, the cargo on board a line 
to several, perhaps fifty or a hundred, 
the shipping line provides its service as 
rier.
ship belongs to 
r ship belongs 
owners, because 
a common car-
2.1.2 LINER VESSELS
Looked at from an historical point of view, it is 
only in comparatively recent years that differences in 
design have developed within the fleet of dry cargo car­
rying ships. The total world fleet expanded rapidly—over 
300% between 1850 and 1900 - in order to meet the incr­
eased demand for seaborne transportation created by the 
development of mass production in Europe and North 
America. Yet in the one hundred years between 1850 and 
1950 virtually all dry cargo vessels were built to-broad- 
ly similar designs. The distinction between stowage of 
dry bulk cargo, which was shipped in average loads of 
10,000-15,000 tonnes, and general cargo, which was at 
that time all shipped in break—bulk form, was not suff­
icient to require different vessel design. (5)
This continued to be the case until the second half 
of the 1950s, by which time the large volumes of some dry 
bulk commodities being traded by sea created the need for 
vessels designed to carry massive tonnages of a single 
commodity in one voyage. In order to reduce handling 
costs as well, because they were rising sharply at this 
time, a vessel design was developed so that the cargo 
could literally be poured into a large open hold, and 
then discharged by high-capacity grabs or some form of 
continuous mechanical unloading equipment. C6)
27
1.3 CONTAINERIZATION
The traditional method of shipping general cargo in 
break-bulk form entailed a high degree of handling during 
the entire journey over land and sea from the consignor 
to the cargo's final destination. While labor was cheap 
there was no particular disadvantage in this, but during 
the 195.0s and 1960s shipping costs began to increase 
rapidly in the industrially developed countries and labor 
costs, including stevedoring, were rapidly taking up a 
larger share of the total. The two most promising app­
roaches to reducing this increase were firstly to inc­
rease cargo capacity, in particular the utilization of 
cargo space on a given vessel size, and secondly to red­
uce the amount of handling required during the cargo 
loading and discharging process. This led to the two 
major innovations in the shipping of cargo which have 
dominated thinking on cargo stowage ever since. One was 
the discovery of the advaiitages of bulk shipping and the 
other was the development of the concept of unitization 
of smaller-scale cargo.
This latter innovation has now advanced to the 
point where the most successful form of unitization, the 
twenty-foot container, is universally accepted and domi­
nates the general cargo market. C7)
2.1.4 LINER CONFERENCES
The development of.steam propulsion for ships meant 
that not only were they not so much at the mercy of 
weather conditions but they were also able to, travel at 
faster average speeds. Moreover, advances in design were 
continually enhancing cargo stowage capabilities. All of
these improvements, coupled with the growth of total 
fleet capacity at a faster rate than the volume of inter­
national trade, led to overtonnaging on many major trade 
routes. The shipowners began to lower freight rates in 
order to attract enough cargo to fill their vessels. Then 
other owners undercut them and the resulting chain re­
action brought rates down to less than voyage costs. No 
operation can survive long by charging less than cost 
price, unless it is subsidized somehow, and so the only 
course left open to shipowners was to co-ordinate their 
operations on particular routes. The first organized 
cooperation took place on the Great Britain—Calcutta 
route in 1875 when a group of shipowners working that 
trade got together to control competition amongst them­
selves and present a united front to fight off rival 
lines. They agreed upon a common tariff which- could give 
them reasonable profits and they alloted sailings on the 
route for each vessel belonging to the participating 
owners. This was the first liner shipping conference.<8) 
As the 20th century has progressed conferences have 
gained in strength on most routes. The overtonnaging 
which has become a feature of so many liner trades during 
the 1970s and 1980s has made the need for some system of 
controlling competition and the level of freight rates 
essential for the lines' survival.
There were of course -complaints against the 
operation of conferences right from the beginning. (9) 
Conference rates were at first applied to all shippers 
irrespective of cargo volume or past relations with the 
liner operators, which might have included the regular 
granting of concessionary rates. When conferences refused 
to give discounts CIO) to regular, large-volume shippers, 
the latter turned to operators outside the conferences
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who readily agreed to carry their cargoes ast a cheaper 
rate. Since the conferences could not afford to lose 
good, regular customers they agreed to give discounts on 
their published general rates in return for a guairantee 
that those shippers would send all their cargo on that 
route exclusively on conference vessels. The first- 
loyalty agreements was signed in 1877. Since then various 
forms of association and agreement have developed between 
liner conference operators and shippers. (11)
The Code of Conduct defines liner conference as:
"A group of two or more vessel-operating carriers 
which provides international liner services for 
the carriage of cargo on a particular route or 
routes within specified geographical limits and
ywhich has an agreement or arrangement, whatever 
its nature, within the framework of which they 
operate under uniform or common freight rates and 
any other agreed conditions with respect to the 
provision of liner service.” (12)
The organization and scope of the conferences, of 
which there are about 360, vary ranging from fairly in­
formal associations to a tightly and rigid structured 
organization with a permanent secretariat. The most 
tightly organized type of conference is -the "closed" con­
ference operating a rationalized service and pooling 
arrangement whereby the number of.sailings and vessel 
types and capacities are tailored to the expected traffic 
volumes and thus potentially, although not necessarily in 
practice, minimizing the costs of providing .the service 
but also greatly reducing the competition between member 
lines. On the other hand, weaker "open" conferences con-
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cerned mostly with establishing freight rates, while not 
reducing competition to the same extent, may tend to 
encourage overtonnaging, low profitability and steadily 
increasing freight rates; rates may be much higher thsin 
under an efficient system. This is particularly important 
to developing countries as these may often bear most of 
the freight cost of both their exports and imports. Howe­
ver, as far as is known, no study has been undertaken 
regarding the relative position of rationalised and unra­
tionalized conference operations. (13)
2-. 1.5 STRATEGIES ADOPTED BY LINES
Various strategies are being adopted by different 
lines for survivz^ l and maintenance of market share. These 
include:
- Acquisition of bigger vessels (for deep-sea 
trades - 2,500-3,000 ten) by ordering newbuildings, 
jumboising existing vessels, buying secondhand or 
chartering/leasing. This helps the line to achieve 
low costs/slot similar to those of Evergreen and 
DSL, and so to cut rates to match theirs.
- Joint operations with other lines by takeovers, 
joint ventures, joint sailing and slot chartering 
agreements. These help to improve cargo catchment 
area while spreading the risk and keeping capital 
outlay low.
- Building up intermodal lines between road, rail 
and sea so as to offer a total door-to-door service 
as efficient, rapid and cheap as possible. Land 
transport can represent as much as 75% of total 
door-to-door costs on some deep-sea routes. It has
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become essential for services to and from the US to 
offer intermodal links for containers moving 
inland.
- Rationalizing sea and land transport activities; 
sometimes diversifying investments into other 
activities not related to shipping or transport; 
sometimes selling off non-transport assets to re­
lease cash and ease capital loan repayments.(14)
2.1.6 RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN LINER CONFERENCES
At the same time as liner shipping services have 
been in a turmoil of change;, the Liner Conference 
System, which aims to regulate and safeguard the opera­
tion of efficient liner services, has been under severe 
pressure. During 1984-SB some significant changes have 
taken place within the conference system as conferences 
have tried to secure survival into the 21th century. 
Although the advent of the Round-The-World Service CRTWS) 
on the world liner shipping market has undoubtedly accen­
tuated some of the problems which conference members were 
already experiencing, the services themselves cannot be 
said to have been a primary cause of any of the recent 
developments within the conference system.
First, the most obvious development has been the 
formation of several large-scale new conferences, often 
by the effective amalgamation of two,or more old ones. In 
October 1984, even before the Evergreen and USL RTWS 
were effectively operating, the three conferences cover­
ing the Europe/Scandinavia/UK trades to USEC combined to­
gether to form the North Europe US Atlantic Conference 
(NEAC). At the same time the three conferences covering
the same trades eastwards out of USEC also combined to 
form one conference - the US Atlantic North Europe Covi- 
fg’rence. In both cases, however, the amalgamation was 
primarily for administrative reasons. On both east-bound 
and westbound trades, most of the membership of one 
conference had been the same as that of the other two. 
Rather than hold three separate discussions on the same 
subject with the same liner operators, it would be more 
efficient and effective to hold just one meeting. Other 
administrative savings and efficiencies can be achieved 
by this amalgamation. Not the least advantage of one 
large conference, compared with seversil small ones, is 
the greater strength of the.former and the more effect­
ive influence it can bring to bear upon the market.(1E5
Second factor which facilitated rationalisation 
was the US Shipping Act of 19SA. This Act relaKes the 
application of stringent anti-trust laws to liner" ship­
ping and recognized the benefits of the conference system 
for seaborne trade to/from the US. As far as future 
expansion is concerned, NEAC would welcome a merger with 
conferences governing the NW Europe/Scandinavia/US—US 
Gulf trade, and perhaps, eventua.lly, with conferences 
governing trade to the USWC so that all trade between NW 
Europe/Scandinavia/UK and the whole of the US could be 
covered by one conference. Many actual and potential 
problems and some legal difficulties would have to be 
sorted out before then, however, so the prospect of one 
"giant" conference for all Europe/US■trade is still very 
far off. (16)
It was the combination of the US Shipping Act of 
1984, severe overtonnaging exacerbated by the inaugur­
ation of the Evergreen and USL RTWS, and a fierce rate
war that led to the formation of two new "giant" confer­
ences on the transpacific trades between North America 
and the Far East. The first to be formed was the Trans­
pacific Westbound Rate Agreement CTWRA) which was set up 
in January 1985 to cover all westbound trades from the US 
to the Far East. At first its membership was believed to 
control about 75-80% of westbound traffic. Lines which 
joined TWRA when it was first set up included both Ever­
green and USL as well as most other major operators on 
the trade. Partly because of the US Shipping Act of 19SA, 
which gives conference members who serve the US trades 
the right to set up their own rates if they give their 
conference ten days' notice, and partly because of the 
difficulty of attracting a large number of members with 
conflicting ambitions, the constitution of the TWRA is 
much looser than that of the traditional liner confer- 
ences. Because of the lack of control over members, many 
TWRA member lines have made adjustments to their rates 
outside of conference recommendations during 1985, under­
cutting other conference members. (17)
It was probably the comparatively weak terms of 
reference and the freedom permitted to members which 
attracted a staunch conference opponent like Evergreen to 
TWRA. It may well be these same factors, considered from 
the opposite point of view, that prompted traditional 
conference lines such as BBS, EAC and ZIM to resign from 
TWRA within its first year of operation.
In June 1985 twenty lines operating across the 
Pacific from west to east set up a very similar "giant" 
conference called the "Asia North America Eastbound Rate 
Agreement (ANERA). Like the TWRA, ANERA included both 
Evergreen and USL, and the six major Japanese lines.
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OOCL, 4^0L, Han jin, Zim, BBS, APL, Sea-Land and Lykes. 
ANERA is also constituted upon a very loose agreement, 
allowing so much room for independent action, in accord­
ance with the provisions of the US Shipping Act of 1984, 
that it might be considered more as a forum for discus­
sion than a liner conference in the traditional sense 
with the purpose of regulating trade, setting rates which 
reflect liner operators' costs. CIS)
In mid-January 1986, Evergreen resigned from both 
transpacific conferences, to became effective in mid- 
March 1986. It was Evergreen's inability to acceept recent 
conference,decisions on rating and policy matters which 
was the immediaite cause of the resignation, but it may be 
supposed that the traditionally independent line was 
never a comfortable associate of some of the staunchly 
conference-oriented members. Evergreen's resignation from 
both the TWRA and ANERA means that the liner now ■ reverts 
to fully independent status on the transpacific trade. As 
such it poses a serious threat to rate stability and, 
therefore, to the very survival of some economically wea­
ker operators on the trade. C19)
2.1.7 STRUCTURE OF CARGO IN THE LINER TRADE
The cargoes transported in liner trade are called 
"general cargo". It is not possible to define "liner- 
type" cargoes in a clear and general manner; for example, 
cargoes such as jute, copra, palm oil, timber, grain, 
rubber, and wool were all once liner cargoes whereas 
today they are basically bulk cargoes, although if they 
travel in parcels they then become liner cargoes. What 
count is not the nature of the product but the commer­
cial transactions surrounding its sale and transport.(20)
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Each individual route needs to be studied in order to 
determine exactly which are the cargoes on that route 
which the liners transport. Liner cargo is usually a 
cargo shipped by mark or count (21), with the dis­
tinction depending not on the type of product but on the 
character of the shipment.(22) Further, it must be taken 
into account that, for example, at the harvest season a 
product may be loaded easily without mark or count, the 
characteristics of bulk cargoes, whereas in other periods 
of the year the products are loaded in parcels and are 
carried pursuant to regular (liner) service procedures. 
Though the Code of Conduct does not treat that kind of 
situation, it is obvious.that the cargo-sharing key is 
not applicable to the category of products loaded in bulk 
which are specifically excluded from the loyalty provi­
sions of the Code, although the same type of cargo car­
ried in small quantities in linear is subject to the Code. 
(23 )
2.1.8 THE CONCEPT OF GENERAL CARGO
The word "general cargo" stated above, covers two 
types of cargoes: (1) mixed (heterogeneous) cargoes, i.e.
different lots in different packages coming from differ­
ent shippers; and (2) homogeneous cargoes transported in 
relatively large quantities, sometimes filling completely 
the ship's space, being uniformly packed (e.g. sugar or 
flour in bags); they constitute complementary cargo for 
liner ships in cases when typical general cargoes are in 
short supply. Sometimes, these cargoes are called bulk 
cargo. (24)
2.1.9 TYPES OF CARGO CARRIED BY LINERS
36
ofThere exist a great number  types of cargoes 
carried by liner shipping. These cargoes may be in bags, 
bales, cartons, drums, cases, crates, etc. In the past 
two decades, there appeared unitized cargoes in the form 
of containers, pallets, and road trailers transported by 
roll-on-roll off <Ro/Ro) ships and others are barges of 
800 tonnes on board LASH ships. In some liner trades, the 
ratio of containerization is very high, particularly in 
the North Atlantic, and also on the Europe-Far East/ 
Australia run, US/Far East, as well as between developing 
countries. (25) Overall world container volumes increased 
five-fold during the period 1970 to 1985, rising rapidly 
from 47 million NT to almost 290 million MT, at an avera­
ge annual rate growth in excess of 16%; in developing 
countries from a low of just over one million MT, or 2.4% 
of world trade in 1970, to almost 100^mil lion MT, or 32% 
of world trade in the mid 1980s. (26)
2.1.10 SHARE OF LINER CARGOES IN WORLD SEABORNE TRADE
Transportation in international trade is over­
whelmingly dominated by shipping. In 1977 (27), shipping 
moved some 95% percent by weight of all international 
commerce and with a value over US 1.1 trillion dollars. 
In 1983 (28), the value of world trade was US 1.7 tril­
lion dollars, an increase of US dollars 0.6 trillion in 
six years. About 50% of that trade (US dollars 0.8 tril­
lion), was conducted among the industrial countries 
(approximately OECD countries); about US dollars 0.7 
trillion involved the industrial countries as shipper or 
receiver, but not both; and about US dollars 0.2 trillion 
involved only the centrally—planned economies (CPE) or 
the developing countries. (29) The estimated aggregate of 
all seaborne cargoes in 1983 was 3.2 billion tonnes and
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in 1987, was 3.39 billion tonnes, of which oil and major 
bulk cargoes (coal, iron ore, grain, posphate, bauxite) 
alone accounted for 2.0 billion tonnes in 1983, and 2.1 
billion tonnes in 1986, (30) In term of ton-kilometers,
seaborne trade can be broken down as follows: 60% of all 
ocean transport is accounted for by energy raw materials 
such as petroleum and coal; 15% mineral products; 5% 
grain and other foodstuffs; and 20% are carried by liner 
service. The 20% carried by liner service are high-value 
goods and consist of manufactured products and industrial 
intermediates. These high-value goods accounted for 70% 
of- the value of international trade - excluding the high 
volume trade in crude oil ahd liquid petroleum products. 
(31)
2.1.11 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SHARE. IN WORLD FLEET
Ownership of world merchant fleet which stood at 
664.8 million DWT in 1985 (32) concentrated on the
developed market-economy and open-registry countries, 
with combined tonnage' amounting to 73.1% of the total 
deadweight of the world merchant fleet in mid-1985. The 
share of developing countries was 17.1% in 1985 and 15.9% 
in 1984. Socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia 
owned 8.8% of the world merchant fleet. (33)
The participation of developing countries in the 
world merchant fleet continued to be considerably lower 
than their share of international Seaborne trade. For 
instance, in 1985, the developing countries generated 37% 
of world cargo moving in international seaborne trade 
(exports and imports .combined) but ownership was only 
17.1% or 113.4 million deadweight tons of the total world 
merchant fleet. On the other hand, developed marketecono-
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my countries, either directly or indirectly through open 
registry tonnage, owned 73.1% of world tonnage while 
generating 56% of world seaborne trade, and owned the 
largest share of each type of vessels. As is with other 
types of vessels, ownership of contciiner ships remained 
concentrated in the developed market-economy countries, 
which owned 53.2% of number of containerships and 61.2% 
of' their TED capacity which stood at 942,222 TEUs in 
1985. Open registry countries accounted for 18.1% and 13% 
in number of ships and the combined TEU capacity, respec­
tively. (34)
2.1.12 RELATIONSHIP OF TRADE AND SHIPPING
The relationship between trade and shipping (liner 
or tramp) services is somewhat circular. New shipping 
services are not likely to develop unless there is suff- 
ificient trade or trade potential to make the services 
profitable, but trade may not develop without reasonable 
shipping services. As the trade of developing countries 
has traditionally been conducted on developed countries, 
more extensive services are usually available on these 
trade routes. In some cases, trade between developing 
countries is carried as transshipped cargoes via'deve­
loped countries. In other cases, the trade between deve­
loping countries is carried only as part of a service 
linking a developing region with a developed region. In 
some of these and other trades, limited cargo volumes 
mean that advantage cannot be taken 'of the economy of 
scale from larger vessels or the high capacity utiliza­
tion achieved which could' reduce relatively high freight 
rates. There , is strong evidence that the "ad valorem" 
incidence of transport costs on trade among developing 
countries is higher than on trade with the developed
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world. (35) While it is often noted that the demand for 
shipping is dependent upon the demand for goods abroad, 
it is also true that the availability, reliability, ade­
quacy, and costs of transportation may be significant 
factors in the economic competitiveness of goods from a 
particular source, especially low-value basic commodities 
that account for a large segment of the exports of deve­
loping states. Shipping costs also add to the prices 
developing states must pay for the goods they must import 
and, in view of their worsening balance-of-payments prob­
lems, freight costs have become a growing matter of con­
cern. The proportion of freight costs to c.i.f. import 
values for developing countries continued to be approxi­
mately twice as high ats that for developed market-economy 
countries which is 9.8% and 5.1%, respectively. C36)
' ✓
Services such as shipping, insurance, and banking 
are referred to in the jargon of international trade as 
"invisibles" as distinguished from "visibles", which 
include tangible goods, products, or commodities. The 
term invisibles indicates that the costs of services 
needed to conduct international trade are less apparent 
to the novice than are costs associated with the purchase 
of visibles. As a Brazilian diplomat with experience in 
maritime affairs notes, the developing states intended to 
concentrate immediately after independence on increasing 
productivity, industrializing, and diversifying their 
export products. Little attention was pai-d to either the 
costs or the consequences of invisibles. (37)
Attention to shipping questions on the part of 
developing countries was stimulated by the problems these 
states confronted as they attempted to establish or ex­
pand their own merchant fleet. In so doing, they
AO
encQun-
tered the obstacles of closed liner conferences and the 
more general problems of acquiring cargoes and financing 
fleet acquisition and expansion, this despite the fact 
that third world states collectively generate a substan­
tial part of the world's cargo. (38)
2.1.13 DEVELOPING STATES' PERCEPTION OF LINER CONFERENCES
The developing countries' perception of liner 
conferences is quite different. While they see merit in 
the conference system, they also see some very signific­
ant deficiencies in the way in which the system operates 
in practice. Among the complaints of developing countries 
regarding conferences has been that conference rates and 
services are altered either without any consultation or 
without adequate consultation with the affected shippers.. 
The secrecy practiced by shipping lines and conferences 
in the?ir decision-making processes has been a major 
source of concern for developing countries. Because of 
the dominant role played by western shipowners in the 
liner trades of the developing states, conference 
practices are not seen merely as exploitative in natur^ 
but as a very important aspect of neocolonialism, -^or 
newly independent states, often marked by shaky economies 
and fragile political egos, this situation is intoler­
able. Intimately related to the general desire for con­
sultation is the substantive concern over freight rates. 
A small difference in shipping cost, other things being 
equal, can translate into a significant drop in demand 
for a state's commodities unless the exporting state 
itself absorbs that costs and accepts a lower price for 
what it sells. This is precisely what a number of devel­
oping countries must do. As aptly put by one writer (i9.>, 
"... the demand schedules facing a given developing
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country are likely to be very elastic unless the country 
is an important source of supply and the commodity has no' 
close substitutes. This, coupled with inelastic supply, 
means that developing country exporters normally bear the 
major burden of freight costs, and any increase in 
freight may be expected to produce equivalent declines in 
net export receipts."
The second concern has been that liner conferences 
have refused membership to the shipping lines of devel­
oping states whose trade is being served. Even when 
allowed to join, these lines sometimes were allocated so 
small a share of the trade for carriage that the develo­
ping country fleet could not operate profitably. General­
ly, developing states observed that the goods they sold 
to developed states were sold on a free on board Cf.o.b.) 
basis while the goods they bought were sold to them on 
costs, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) terms. Typically, 
the choice of the transporting vessel in both cases was 
out of the hands of the developing state, thus allowing 
continued developed country dominance of the transport 
network.(40)
Third, as a consequence of the first two concerns, 
and in the light of the relatively weak bargaining 
position of the majority of the shipping interests in 
Third World states, many such states have insisted on an 
important role for their governments in shipping matters. 
A governmental role is seen as imperative for the protec­
tion of vital national economic interests. This role en­
visages government participation in the consultation pro­
cess and '-the possibility of requiring, by governmental or 
intergovernmental action, the reservation to national 
shipping lines of some "fair" share of cargo generated by
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in thethat state. This latter action has implications 
matter of fleet acquisition by developing states for it 
is generally believed that once cargoes are assured the 
financing of a ship will be more easily secured. Initia­
tives by the devloping countries to reserve cargo for 
national-flag ships hinge mainly on cargo allocation 
schemes.
2.1.14 THE CONFERENCE SYSTEM.
Considering the very long history of shipping, 
conferences are of relatively recent developments, ori­
ginating about one hundred and twelve years old today. 
There are hundreds of conferences existing at present 
regulating the movements of general cargo on trade routes 
throughout the world. Since 1875 shipping lines have been 
coming together voluntarily as "Conferences" to provide 
regular cargo services in designated "liner trades", 
controlling through self-regulation such questions as 
membership, levels of freight, sailings, routes, division 
or pooling of cargoes/revenues, and "tying" loyalty 
arrangements with shippers at discounted and/or rebated 
rates to oust "non-conference" (outsiders) competition. A 
third of all conferences are, however, regulated by 
national statute: for example, in all US liner trades,
inwards and outwards. C41)
This Section of this Study outlines the charact- 
teristics, the organization, and the practices of the 
Conference System. The advantages and disadvantages of 
the Conference System are also listed. C42)
2.1.14.1 Characteristics:
Cl) General cargo. The conferences confined
their transport activity to what is known as "li­
ner trade in general cargo" alone, as opposed to 
tramp cargoes. The basic principle underlying the 
concept of "general cargo" as already been mentio­
ned above, is that it is carried in parcels and 
not in shiploads. Thus teak, jute, textiles and 
machinery are not bulk commodities, and cannot 
fill a ship, come under the'^  category of general 
cargo, along with parcels of iron ore, foodgrains, 
fertilizers, etc. which when carried in shiploads 
are essentially tramp cargoes.
C2) Fixed sailings and freight rates. The liner
service of a conference system works on a pre­
announced schedule of sailings and fixed freight 
rates, which are altered after due notice and 
after lapse of long periods, in contrast to tramp 
voyaging which works without a schedule and with 
freight rates changing from day to. day depending 
on each fixture.
(3) Organized monopoly.The conference works on a
close collaboration of all shipowners who are mem­
bers of this well-knit private international orga­
nization, which often resorts to pooling and rat­
ionalization of services and, to keep its monopol-
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istic position, works on deferred rebates and dual 
rates, which are unknown to the tramp world, 
remaining a special feature of the conference 
system.
(A-) Shippers' weak bargaining position. Since
conference trade is fully organised, the deter­
mination and regulation of its freight structure 
over periods is a matter of grave concern to ship­
pers, and for this reason, of export promotion the 
developing countries of the world are equally 
interested in conference fixing of freight rates. 
Thus a conference, though a non-governmental body 
comprising private interests, is nevertheless 
negotiating with shippers as at strong unbending 
monopoly, and also with sovereign Stattes, assuming 
a footing of equatlity. The tramps are in no such 
position, and in fatct no other mode or method of 
sea transport has been able to work up its way to 
a position of vanta^ ge in relation to the shipper 
and his State to -the same extent as has the confe­
rence machinery in the shipping world of today.
2.1.14.2 Organization:
The organizational structure of shipping confer­
ences varies from conference to conference, but 
there are certain similarities in the organization 
of many of them which may serve as a pattern for 
the purpose of this description.
(1) Source of employees. Since a conference is
an association of firms, its personnel must be 
authortized to act on behalf of the member firms.
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Same of these authorised persons are employees of 
the member lines while others are directly emp­
loyed by the conference. Each firm may appoint 
several employees to act in conference matters 
with varying degrees of employee responsibility. 
These representatives of the member lines and the 
conference employees direct the day-to-day affairs 
of the conference. Usually the traffic departments 
of the member lines provided for this represent­
ation .
(2) Administrative officer. Most of the confe­
rences appoint a permanent administrative officer, 
usually called a chairman, who directs the activi­
ties of the conference staff and who is generally 
responsible for managing and coordinating confe­
rence affairs. While the power and authority of 
the chairman vary from conference to conference 
there are common duties performed by virtually all 
permanent chairmen. The chairman directs the nor­
mal business operations of the conference and 
supervises the work of the conference employees. 
When the conference uses a dual rate and deferred 
rebate system, his staff usually administers the 
contracts. The magnitude of this task varies but 
in some trades the conference office may be admi­
nistering several thousand contracts. However, the 
most essential aspect of the ghairman's prerogati­
ve is the direction and coordination of the confe­
rence ratemaking. In this ratemaking capacity, the 
permanent chairman makes the agenda and calls the 
meeting at which representatives of the member 
lines discuss and vote on proposals for rate revi-
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sion. He presides at the meetings and often leads 
the discussion since he is the person to whom most 
of the proposals for rate changes are directed 
initially.
(3) Committees. Many conferences (especially
those having a large membership) delegate work to 
committees. These committees may be permanent fix­
tures in the conference organization, or may be 
constituted on an ad hoc basis to deal with
limited problem.s. The most common type of standing 
committee is a rate committee which is responsible 
for preliminary work'on proposals for change in 
rates. Membership on rate comm.ittees is normally 
rotated among the member lines. Special rate com­
mittee may also be used when a., conf erence determi­
nes that an upward revision of its rate structure 
should be made.
2.1.1A.3 PRACTICES.
(1) . Entry into conference. New lines can be
admitted to a conference on the unanimous vote of 
all members. Entry of a new member depends on his 
individual bargaining power. In the post-war 
situation, where developing nations have estab­
lished national shipping companies, conferences 
serving the trade of such nations have, as a gene­
ral rule, admitted to the conference. It is diffi­
cult to assess this policy because the meetings of 
conferences are never publicized.
(2) Voting Procedure. Conference rules on voting 
are usually stated in the basic conference agree-
A7
ment and may specify that a qualified majority is 
needed to approve a rate proposal Cor that a 
two-thirds or three-quarters majority is re­
quired) , and in some cases a unanimous vote is 
necessary to approve action on rates. Unanimity is 
also commonly required on non-rate matters such as 
admission of new members, amending the basic 
agreement, etc. If the required majority votes in 
favor of a proposal are obtained, the decision is 
generally binding on all the members. The vote it­
self may be a voice vote, or the chairman may call 
for a show of hands, or the matters may be resol­
ved by secret ballot. The manner in which votes 
arc cast depends on the matter under consideration 
and frequently on various inter-conference rela­
tionship.
(3) Inter-conference relations. A conference
chairman often maintains close relation with other 
conference chairmen, particularly the chairmen of 
conference operating out of competing gateways. 
They are aware of the relationship between the 
actions of their own conferences and the actions 
of other conferences. One aspect of this practice 
is the exchange of information on rate actions. 
For example, it is common for chairmen to exchange 
tariffs so that conferences can remain aware of 
the state of rates and practices in other confe­
rences .
(A) Deferred rebates and dual rates. Each confe­
rence has agreements with shippers. Such agree­
ments have usually a dual form, designed both to 
secure the continued customs of the shipper and to
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prevent the entry of OLitside competition. The 
first is known as the deferred rebate systefB. 
Under this system, the shipper who has not emp­
loyed a non-conference ship for a specified period 
of time receives, at the end of the period, a 
reftsnd of a percentage of his freight payments. In 
most cases, the deferred rebate system constitutes 
a more substantial tie than is desirable because 
the deferment of the rebate makes the entry of the 
new shipping line into service quite difficult. It 
should be noted that in the United States the 
system of deferred rebate was outlawed by the 
Shipping Act of 1916, as amended. The second and 
newer type of tie, is the contract or dual rate 
system.
Under this system the shipper enters into a< 
contract with the conference, under which he 
agrees to send all his shipments by the trade with 
lower rate. It is also noteworthy that the total 
liner fleet is about AQ% of the tonnage of the 
world fleet. The .importance and power of the ship­
ping conference as an effective instrumentality 
for the carriage of world seaborne trade cannot, 
therefore, be over-emphasized.
2.1.1A.4 ADVANTAGES:
(1) Stability. The conferences are- voluntary or­
ganizations of shipping lines which regulate com­
petition among their members serving a particular 
group of ports. The measure of stability provided, 
by establishing freight rates and uniform shipping 
practices, may improve the operating ability of
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individual lines. Through this type of organisa­
tion, shippers are assured of a regular scheduled 
service and rate stability.
( .'2 ') Security of investment. By limiting competi­
tion and preventing over-capacity of tonnage on 
shipping routes, conferences secure the large 
capital investment necessary for a successful ope­
ration of shipping lines, and are in a position to 
introduce modernization of fleets and new devices 
for the safe and efficient transport of cargoes.
C3> Quality of service. Under the conference
system, a contracting shipper is, as a rule, assu­
red by the conference of the carriage of his car­
goes, as compared with shippers not under contract 
with the conference.
The stability of rates and regularity of services 
permit shippers to serve their foreign markets 
more effectively. • In return, the conference 
carrier is assured of cargo on a more regular- 
basis than would be the case if he operated as an 
independent. Since the conference carrier is 
protected against rate competition from the other 
members of the conference, he is able to 
concentrate his efforts on furnishing a higher 
quality service to his shippers.
2.1.14.5 DISADVANTAGES:
<11 Higher rates. Within individual conferences,
competition among member lines may vary consid­
erably. If there is enough cargo for all to earn 
adequate returns, competition will not be as keen. 
On the other hand, if the conference agreement
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provides for •the pooling of earnings among mem­
bers, there may be little incentive to divert car­
goes from one member to another. When cargoes are 
scarce, the self-interest of individual members 
may cause them to violate the agreement through 
concealed rate cutting. (If competition becomes 
too intense the conference may disband.1 However, 
even though there may be some competition among 
and within shipping conferences, it is generally 
agreed that they often succeed in keeping the 
level of rates above what they would if there were 
price competition.
(2) Inefficiency. Critics of shipping conferen­
ces often attribute the growth of the conference 
system to their maintenance of rates at the high- 
est level that traffic will bear, in order to max­
imize profits. Also, the international shipping 
cartel device permits shipowners to minimize their 
commercial risks. The conference arrangement may 
in some trades reduce the incentive for efficien­
cy, modernization, and innovation.
(3) Rate disparities. Though shippers do gain
one type of advantage from stable rates, they lose 
another if they have to pay higher than competiti­
ve rates. The maximum rate depends upon what the 
trade can bear, moderated by the actual or poten­
tial competition conference members face from out­
side the conference. Since on some trade routes 
w there is much and others relatively little compe­
tition from independent operators, there may be 
different rates for shipping the same commodity 
over similar routes. The essential economic impli-
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cation of shipping conferences is that 
have no "raison de' etre" if they did 
in keeping the level of liner rates 
they would be under more competitive
they would 
not succeed 
above wh
conditions.
This Section of this Study will discuss the chang­
ing environment of the ocean liner shipping in the last 
five years. The changes were the result of severe compe­
tition in the liner service and the different methods of 
consolidation of liner operators either to maintain their 
market share or for survival. The present degree of over- 
tonnaging inevitably means rate-cutting in order to 
attract as much cargo as possible. Most liner operators 
feel that once customer loyalty is lost it is extremely 
difficult to win back. Many different methods of consoli­
dation and survival are being adopted by liner operators. 
These vary according to the character and background of 
the operating company and the nature and circumstances of 
the trade in which the service is provided. Section 1.6 
of this chapter had already mentioned them but some of 
the most significant ones are summarized below:
1) Intermodal ism; The utilization of different-
transport modes (by sea, rail and road) to form an ove­
rall transport operation has become increasingly impor­
tant during the mid-1980s. Many of the major lines on the 
transpacific and transatlantic trades are now investing 
as much, if not more, on land-based o'perations. These 
will link up with seaborne operations to provide a fully 
comprehensive door-to-door service.
During 1985 APL spent 60% of its 265 US mi 1.1 ion 
dollars capital development budget on improvements to its 
domestic rail and road services. Sea-Land has also been
investing heavily on inter—modal links within the US. 
Foreign lines such as NYK, MOL and Evergreen have also 
been securing agreements with US rail operaitors, for the 
provision of intermodal services connecting ports of call 
in USWC with the major industrial and consumer markets of 
the mid-west and eastern states.
The growth of intermodal services in Europe and 
other industrialized markets which have sophisticated 
inland transport systems is certain to follow.
As. it does so the relative importance within the 
transport chain of the seaborne leg will decline. Already 
it probably represents, for instance, only 25% of the 
door-to-door cost of transporting a container between 
Europe and US. (A3)
2) Joint Service Agreements: These can take a
variety of forms but the Chief purpose of all of them is 
to create a broader cargo catchment area for a compara­
tively low capital outlay. At the same time they spread 
the financial risk between two or more operators. 
Straightforward amalgamation of two services may involve 
the takeover of one by another or it may be achieved by 
less obvious means. The integration of the ScanCarriers 
N. Europe/ANZ•service into BBS' RTWS operation is in 
effect an amalgamation brought about by Wilh. Wilhelmsen, 
which is a major shareholder in both op'erations. OCL's 
purchase of 50% of TFL's shares is a discreet way of gai­
ning a place within the North Atlantic market, which OCL 
has wanted to do for a long time. CA4)
Joint venture and consortium agreements have 
existed between liner companies for many years, but there
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morehas been an increase in such deals in 19S5 and many 
can be expected in 19S6-S7. The formation of a joint ven­
ture or consortium, however, involves two or more compa­
nies combining to form a new operation with its own 
investments for the sake of which all differences in out­
look and conflicts of individual ambition must be resol­
ved. If this is too heavy a commitment, the less perma­
nent slot-chartering and joint sailing agreements will 
prove useful to each party, but can be ended without the 
upheaval and financial loss which the break-up of a con­
sortium or joint venture might involve, f.45)
A joint.sailing agreement is simply a decision by 
two or more operators to schedule the movements of their 
separate fleets as if they were one service fleet. A 
slot-chartering agreement is a device by which a liner 
service operator leases part of the capacity as his own. 
Usually the parties to such an agreement will each deploy 
their own vessels on the sarnie route under a joint sailing 
schedule, and slot-charter capacity on each other's 
vessels. Sometimes, however, a service operator may 
provide a service entirely by slot-chartering, without 
deploying any ships of his own on the route. Some example 
of the many joint ventures and slot-chartering agreements 
concluded in 1984-85 include those between 'K' Line and 
OOCL/NOL on the Japan/USEC trade; Y-S Line and OOCL/NOL 
on the Japan/FE/USWC route; Japan Line and Evergreen on 
both USEC and USWC routes; OCL and KMTC on the FE/US tra­
de; BBS and Nedlloyd on the USEC/Middle East trade; and 
CTE and Coasta Armatori on their new Med./US Gulf servi­
ce. There are so many other examples. (46)
3) High Capacity Vessels. One of the leading 
advantages which Evergreen and USL possess in the ope—
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ration of their RTWS is that all the vessels deployed 
are large. In fact the LISL vessels, at A, 258 teu each, 
are the largest containerships ever built. The operatio­
nal cost per box slot of these vessels is lower than that 
of most of the vessels deployed on competing services. 
This factor, together with other design features which 
reduce vessel operating and voyage costs, enables Ever­
green and USL to offer shippers rates which are signifi­
cantly lower than those of rival lines. OOCL, NOL, Lykes, 
Yangming, K^' Line, Y-S Line, MOL and Hanjin all have 
containerships of 2,5GD-3,0D0 teu on order at end 1985. 
Most of this new capacity is intended for deployment on 
the transpacific trades where the level of overtonnaging 
is worse than on any other deep-sea trade. High-capacity 
vessels with their low costs per slot are, in the opinion 
of many operators on the trade, becoming the key to sur­
vival. However, while freight rates are low and revenues 
depressed the burden of repayments of newbuilding Ioanns 
can be heavy. When there .is little prospect of improve­
ment in rate levels, and even a likelihood that they will 
fall lower, this burden may eventually prove too much to 
endure. Some liner operators are, therefore, pursuing the 
goal of higher capacity tonnage by other means. For ins­
tance, SeaLand and Hapag-Lloyd have not ordered series of 
large newbuiIdings, they have jumboized vessels which 
they have owned for several years. The cost of such an 
operation is slight for the extra capacity gained, by 
comparison with the cost of newbuiIdings.. An alternative 
way of acquiring larger tonnage is to charter or lease 
it. In the depressed market of end 1985/early 1986 this 
represents a much cheaper option. If the need for this 
tonnage is not urgent, .the operator might be well rewar­
ded for biding his time and waiting for charter rates to 
sink down further. (47) Developments in the liner ship-
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ping market have been taking place so rapidly. The 
world's shipping lines are figthing over a volume of car­
go which is insufficient to support them all.
2.1.15 THE EMERGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
This concluding part of this Chapter pertains 
to the emerging legal environment affecting the liner 
shipping industry. The emerging legal environment in the 
international liner shipping industry will have an impact 
on the ASEAN countries and in the Philippines.
In this context, the legal measures have been adopted by 
Cal developed countries, _ Cb) developing countries, and 
( , c ' ) jointly by developed and developing countries. (48)
(A) Measures adopted by developed countries. The
most important legislation adapted by developed countries 
for the ocean-1 ine;r industry are (1) the US Shipping Act 
of 1984 and (2) the decision to include liner shipping 
within the European Community's Treaty of Rome. There aire 
many other legal instruments such as (3) Lom^ III and (4) 
Note to Annex A of the Code of Liberalisation of Current 
Invisible Operations (CLIO), as well as (5) quasi-legal 
instruments which result from US/Consultative Group (CSG) 
discussions.
l.The US Shipping Act of 1984.
This Act is more than just another national law 
for four reasons: first, approximately two-thirds of all 
liner vessels call at US ports and, therefore, must comp­
ly with its requirements; second, the new tools it crea­
tes for the industry; service contracts, time-volume 
rates, independent action, extension of anti-trust immu-
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nity to intermoda1 combinations and rates, shippers nego­
tiating directly with lines, not via conferences, and 
shippers' associations - are supportive of the market, 
service and technological forces which are restructuring 
the industry; third, lines may now respond rapidly to 
changes in trade demand, as.all agreements filed with the 
Federal Maritime Commission CFMC) - other than assessment 
agreements - become effective 45 days after filing, un - 
less the FMC seeks injunctive relief; and fourth, many 
countries, such as Canada with the proposed revision of 
its Shipping Conferences Exemption Act, are studying the 
experiences of the Act in the light of modifications to 
their own legislation.
The specific provisions of US Maritime Legislation 
which are of interest to ocean-liner companies are Sec­
tions ISCblCBl of the US Shipping Act of 1984 and 19 of 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, respectively, providing 
the FMC with broad powers. -The regulations for these sec­
tions permit the FMC to institute proceedings on its own 
motion or upon the filing of a petition.
The regulations for section IStbltB) of the Ship­
ping Act of 1984 are found at 46 Code of Federal Regula­
tions CCFR) 587 and enumerate conditions which are consi­
dered to unduly impair access of US vessels to trades 
between non-US ports, including any intermodal movements 
related thereto, and establish procedures under which 
liner operators may apply to the FMC for relief. However, 
any limits, restrictions or requirements placed upon US 
vessels for participating in non-US trades will not be 
subject to FMC review unless a US liner operator is not 
commercially able to enter the trade in question.
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As was noted, the enforcement of section ISCbJCE) 
is limited by section 13(b)(6). Nonetheless, A6 CFR 587.2 
enumerates a wide range of conditions which a.re defined 
as unduly impairing the access of a US flag vessel to 
non-US trades. The two areas of fundame^ntal interest for 
the ASEAN and their liner operators are those related to 
subparagraph (b):
"Reservation of a substantial portion of the 
total cargo in the trade to national-flag or 
other vessels which results in a failure to pro­
vide reasonable competitive access to cargoes by 
U.S. flag vessels,".
and to the inclusion of intermodal movements in 
such transport operations.
The regulations for section 19 of the Merchant 
Marine Act, 1920, are found at 46 CFR 585 and define 
conditions resulting from actions of governments or from 
competitive methods or practices which are unfavorable to 
shipping- in the foreign trade of the US. The definition 
of thes^ conditions are quite similar to those of 46 CFR 
587.2 and create two areas of interest to ASEAN and ASEAN 
liner operators. The first is found at 46 CFR 585.3(b) 
and relates to conditions which:
"Reserve substantial cargoes to the national flag 
or other vessels and fail to,provide, on reason­
able terms, for effective and equal access to 
such cargo by vessels in the foreign trade of the 
United States."
This subparagraph would seem to recognize implicitly the
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validity of national cargo reservation regimes, if such 
regimes provide, on reaisonable terms, for effective and 
equal access to such cargo by other vessels in the 
foreign trade of the USA. It seems to indicate that only 
if cargo reservation regimes fail to or do not make such 
provision would they be considered an unfavorable condi­
tion in the foreign trade of the US. Of course, what 
constitutes "equal access to such cargo" is left to the 
FMC to define. In the present, chronically-overtonnaged 
market a mathematically exact equal access could result 
in no liner operator having a large enough load to justi­
fy economically a voyage. It should be highlighted that 
this section of the Act has been given renewed vigor and 
applied to the cargo reservation schemes of the Philippi­
nes and Venezuela, and the PMC is currently studying 
cross-trader access to the trades^between the US, and 
Argentina and Brazil. (49)
(2) Liner shipping within the European 
Community's Treaty of Rome.
For many years the principal focus of trans­
port activities of the Commission of the European Com­
munities was related to road, rail and waterway cairgo 
movements between member countries. At that time, mari­
time transport was considered to be a national matter 
governed by member states' laws, conference agreements 
and the market. However, in response-to numerous .factors 
such as non-commercial competition, overtonnaging, natio­
nal cargo reservation regimes and the United Nations Con­
vention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, 
various member states adopted the Code of Conduct toge­
ther with Council Regulation 954 of 1979, better known as 
the Brussels Package, and this became the first
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pronoun-
cement of a shipping policy for the EEC. Current efforts 
to include shipping within paragraph 2 of article 84 of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, better 
known as the Treaty of Rome, are a partial response to 
the above factors as well as an expression of EEC support 
for the US Shipping Act of 1984. The decision recently 
considered by the Commission and member countries as ele­
ments of a common shipping policy are: (50) Cl) diploma­
tic action and countermeasures against third countries 
protecting their fleets by reservation or bilateral 
agreements; (2) freedom to provide shipping services by 
all EEC nationals, with a transition period of five years 
for international trades and 10 years for cabotage; (3) 
consultation procedures between EEC members and third 
countries; (4) criteria for defining a national shipping 
line within the Code of Conduct; C5) application of the 
Rules on Competition, found at articles 85-9C of the 
Treaty of Rome, to shipping in order to counter various 
practices defined as unfair; and (6) fines against shi­
powners who charge unfair prices in EEC liner trades.
An EEC common shipping policy has numerous 
facets, but the major impact for the ASEAN would be its 
position on cargo reservation regimes. By means of the 
Code of Conduct and the Brussels Package the EEC has 
recognised the right of all countries to divide trade 
shares, as well as for regions to reserve certain aspects 
of their trade relations for themselves. • Of the above, 
the first contains measures which might be used against 
cargo reservation, but many EEC member countries have 
such regimes. As examples, France reserves the import of 
oil from Algeria for national vessels, .Greece reserves 
its inland trade to national vessels, and the other EEC 
members, while not having a formal cabotage regimes, imp-
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licitly limit access to domestic cargo movements. So 
important are these reservation schemes that they have 
become the major obstacle to the sidoption of a common EEC 
policy for shipping. As a result, it appears that cabota­
ge will be eliminated after the transition period.<515
(3) Lome III.
Beginning in 1964 the EEC has governed its trade 
development and investment relations with former depen­
dent overseas countries and territories by means of con­
ventions which are negotiated every five years. With the 
addition of new member states to the EEC, the number of 
former dependent overseas countries and territories beco­
ming contracting parties to each successive convention 
has continually increased. For example, during negotia­
tions between the EEC and the United Kingdom for its en­
trance into the EEC, Mauritius asked to accede to the 
trade convention in force at that time and was permitted 
to do so on 30 June 1973. Other countries wishing to 
accede to the convention led to the adoption of Protocol 
22, annexed to the Acts of Accession to the EEC of the 
United Kingdom, whereby the EEC offered to 21 Common­
wealth countries of Africa, the Carribean and Pacific an 
opportunity to negotiate their future relations within 
the framework of this trade and investment convention.
The fifth trade and investment convention, known 
as Lome III, was signed between 65 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific <ACP) states and the EEC on 8 December 1984. The 
financial package of this Convention totals 7,4D0 million 
European Currency Units ' <lECU=USdol lars l'.D2) and provi­
des ACP states access to EEC markets for products such as 
bananas, rum, sugar, etc. and sources of financial and
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technical assistance for projects and programmes in areaxs 
which range from trade promotion to transport and from 
environment to industry. With the entry of Portugal and 
Spain into the EEC on 1 wTanuary 1986 a number of que­
stions arise concerning the desirability of a protocol, 
similar to number 22 mentioned above, which would permit 
Latin American countries to accede to Lome III.
(4) Note 1 to Annex of the Code of Liberalization 
of Current Invisible Operations (CLIO).
The OECD was established by a Convention 
signed at Paris, on 14 December 1960, and currently has 
24 market-economy developed nations a.s members - Austra­
lia, Canada, 19 European nations, Japan, New Zealand and 
the US. This Convention provides that the OECD shall pro­
mote various economic growth and trade expansion poli­
cies, and in order to achieve these policies its members 
agree: "to pursue their efforts to reduce or abolish 
obstacles to the exchange of goods and "services" and 
current payments and maintain and extend the liberaliza­
tion of capital movements." To carry out the above agree­
ment, on 12 December 1961 OECD member countries adopted 
CLIO. Transport services within the scope of CLIO are 
enumerated at Part C of Annex A, while Note 1 provides 
guidelines for the liberalization of all international 
maritime transport services and related f.reight charges. 
Note 1 contains only three sentences, but they have a 
large potential impact on the US initiative to include 
all services, which encompass maritime transport, within 
the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). The first sentence provides that residents 
of one OECD state have an unrestricted opportunity to 
avail themselves of the international maritime transport
services offered by residents of another OECD state. This 
is followed by a requirement that international maritime 
transport services "should not" be hampered by measures 
such as exchange controls, preferential flag treatment or 
clauses in trade agreements, to ensure that normal com­
mercial considerations "should alone" determine the 
method and flag of shipment. Finally, the third sentence 
provides that; "The second sentence of this Note does not 
apply to the United States".(52)
(5) US/Consultative Shipping Group (US/CSG).
It will be remembered that the US Shipping Act 
of 1916 gave liner operators complete immunity from anti­
trust laws of that country for any activity covered by an 
agreement on file and in effect at the FMC. However, a 
series of US court decision in the 1950s and the 1960s 
eroded that immunity. Liner operators in Europe and the 
US became increasingly uncertain as to whether an agree­
ment on file with the FMC was sufficient to protect them 
from an anti-trust violation. The US/CSG discussions were 
an outgrowth of the uncertainty surrounding anti-trust 
immunity of the 1916 Shipping Act. In recognition of the 
need to clarify this situation, an important feature of 
the Shipping Act of 198A was to explicitly indicate that 
anti-trust immunity includes not only those activities in 
agreements on file with the FMC but also for those ente­
red into pursuant to such agreements. The CSG members 
include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Nether­
lands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Participa­
ting at meetings are representatives of those countries, 
as well as representatives from the EEC and the US. As a 
result of the positive US/CSG contribution to the harmo-
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nisation of European and US ocean-liner policies for 
antitrust immunity, discussions have continued to be held 
to ensure that other elements of such policies are compa­
tible. The current focus of US/CSG discussion is related 
to policies which safeguard and promote competition in 
all sectors of ocean shipping.(53) At the last review of 
the Code of Conduct regarding the eKtension of its scope 
to include non-conference operators. In the light of US/ 
CSG activities to coordinate their shipping policies to 
achieve common goals, one might ask if ASEAN and other 
Far East countries should do the same to preserve their 
national shipping policies?-
CB) Measures adopted jointly by developed and 
developing countries.
The major legislative efforts of develop&d and 
developing countries encompass four conventions negotia­
ted under the auspices of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) - a Code of Conduct for 
Liner Conferences, the International Multimodal Transport 
of Goods, the Carriage of Goods by Sea (the Hamburg 
Rules), and the Conditions for Registration of Vessels, 
as well as the discussion currently taking place at the 
GATT concerning the inclusion of services within its fra­
mework. In the light of the market, service, technologi­
cal and legal forces which are restructuring ocean-liner 
transport, three areas are of fundamental importance:
(1) liability regimes for the carriage of containers;
(2) possible topics for the 19S8 review conference for 
the Code of Conduct; and
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(3) t-he initiative to include services within the GATT 
f ramework . --
At this juncture, it is pointed out that the next 
succeeding chapter of this Study will elaborate on the 
Code of Conduct, including number 2 above.-
CC) Measures adopted individually by ASEAN coun­
tries and other developing countries.
This will be reserved for discussion also in 
the next chapter of this work.
2.1.16 CONCLUSION
It is, however, relevant to mention that the majo­
rity of merchant fleets of developing countries were 
established on the basis of the continued supremacy of 
two important pillars, that is, cargo reservation regimes 
and the liner conference system. The fundamental question 
is not whether cargo reservation regimes have assisted in 
the establishment and operation of such fleets, as they 
most certainly have, but whether the present structure of 
such regimes is appropriate in the light of changes which 
have taken place and are occurring in the industry. It 
will be recalled that the Philippines and Indonesia have 
cargo reservation regimes prepared and adopted before the 
entry into force of the Code of Conduct.
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CHAPTER 3
THE CODE OF CONDUCT 
AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
3,. 1 Background
The Code of Conduct, celebrating its Ath anniversa­
ry on 6 October 19S7, the date when it entered into force 
on 6  October 1983, could mark the beginning of a new era 
of international and regional cooperation in ocean liner 
shipping.
The Code had been adopted by the United Nations 
in Geneva on 6 April 1974, under the auspices of the Uni­
ted Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
as an international convention by a substantial majority 
of 72 votes with 5 abstentions and 7 negative votes incl­
uding those of the United States and Switzerland. (1)
The Convention, in accordance with its article 48, 
was open for signature from 1 July 1974 until and includ­
ing 30 June 1975. Since that date the Convention has been 
open for accession.
As of 1 June 1986, 67 countries had made definitive 
signatures (s), approved (app), accepted (acc), ratified 
(r), or acceded (a) to, the Convention. The countries, 
arranged in chronological order, are foun'd in Annex 1.
As noted earlier in this study, implementation of the 
Code has been lagging in developing as well as advanced 
market-economy countries. Those countries which abstained 
in the voting eventually ratified the Code. The US, howe­
ver, has been openly opposed to the Code as in the Ameri­
can opinion the Code was opposed to free trade while the
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Western European countries saw the Code as necessary to 
come to terms with least developed countries. Japan, 
which had signed the Convention, has not yet ratified the 
Code; since the question in the case of Japan was not on 
whether to ratify the Cope or not, but as to whether to 
ratify it under the terms of the Brussels Package. (2)
3.2 The Objectives and principles of the Code.
The broad spectrum of subjects and problems which 
the Code is addressing and the principles that are gover­
ning its regulations are best illustrated by the introd­
uctory preamble on objectives and principles which, be­
cause of their importance are quoted below in fulls
Ca) the objective to facilitate the orderly eKPari­
sian of world sea-borne tracle;
( b ') the objective 
regular and 
to the requir
to stimulate the development of 
efficient liner services adequ£<te 
ements of the trade concerned;
Cc) the objective to ensure a balance of interests 
between suppliers and users of liner shipping 
services;
Cd) the principle that conference practices should 
not involve any discrimination against the shi­
powners, shippers or foreign' trade of any 
country;
(e) the principle that conferences hold m'eaningful 
consultations' with shippers' organizations, 
shippers' representatives and shippers 
ters of common interest, with, upon
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on mat- 
request ,
the participation of appropriate authorities 5
<f) the principle that conferences should make 
available to interested parties pertinent 
information about their activities which are 
relevant to those parties and should publish 
meaningful information on their activities.
3.3 Structure of the Code.
The Code deals with four major groups of subjects, 
namely:
Ca) The relationship between the member lines of a 
Conference C chapters on membership, participa­
tion in trade, decision-making procedures, 
sanctions, self-policing, conference agree­
ments) ; . -
Cb) the relationship between shipping conferences 
and shippers (chapters on loyalty arrangements, 
dispensation, availability of tariffs, annual 
reports, consultation machinery);
Cc) freight rates (chapters on criteria of freight 
rate determination, conference tariffs, general 
freight increases, promotional freight rates, 
various kinds of surcharges);
(d) provisions and machinery for settlement of dis­
putes .
3.A Definition of a conference
The Code, as mentioned earlier, defines a liner 
"group of two or more vessel-operating
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conference as a
forcarriers which provides internationa.l liner services 
the carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes 
within specified geographical limits and which has an 
agreement or arrangement, whatever its nature, within the 
framework of which they operate under uniform or common 
freight rates and any other agreed conditions with res­
pect to the provision of liner services."
3.5 Flexibility.
At a number of points, flexibility is reflected in 
Code provisions indicating that certain steps be taken 
"unless otherwise mutually agreed" or "unless otherwise 
provided", as shown in Article 17<2;i.
The Code is a set of guidelinesxfor the conduct of 
liner conferences offering a considerable degree of 
built-in flexibility for the parties concerned to deviate 
from the guidelines by mutual agreement. This fact is 
often overlooked by those who criticise the Code for 
being an instrument of government regulation. <3> A num­
ber of authors (45 found the Code stipulations providing 
for flexibility. It was the flexibility (rather than the 
ambiguity) offered by the Code which strongly contributed 
to its acceptabi1ity to the EEC. (5)
3.6 Membership (Article 15.
The chapter dealing with membership in shipping 
conferences is closely connected with the guidelines in 
chapter 2 on participation in trade. Under the Code it 
will be difficult for a conference to take a one-sided 
decisions on the question of accepting or not accepting a 
member.
The Code opens the conference for "national lines"
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of those countries whose trade is served directly by the 
conference. The criteria for membership of national 1 lines 
are fairly reasonable. Applicants would, as rule, be
able to cover these criteria. As far as the admission of 
"third flag lines" is concerned, the Code contains some 
additional but realistic criteria such as the existing 
volume of the trade and its prospective growth, the 
adequacy of shipping space and the probable effect of 
admission on efficiency and quality of the conference 
service. The views of shippers .and shipper orgcinirations 
are also to be taken into account. Naturailly, admission 
of’ a third flag line would be a bit more difficult than 
admission of a na^ tional linfe.
The conference? could, howeve?r, decline admission 
only by giving convincing reasons. Moreover, the appli­
cant would have a right to ask for international conci­
liation if his applica’bion has been declined. Even with­
out such remedies, experie’nce has proved that a strong 
and efficient outsider has in the past and will also in 
the future be able to force entry into a confere’nce if he 
so wishes. But a more "closed" type of conference cur­
tails the high rate of fluctuations and gives a better- 
chance for freight rate stability and service efficiency, 
especially if a high degree of rationalisation is combi­
ned with a pool agreement. The Code thus represents a 
compromise between the two extreme positions prevailing 
so far, v i z .  the completely open conference system spon­
sored by the US legislations and the closed conference 
practised in most other areas.
3.7 Participation in Trade (Article 23.
Article 2 of the Code has time and again been mis­
construed as government-imposed cargo sharing on a
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strictly 40:40:20 formula. In actual fact, traffic rights 
or sailing agreements are to be negotiated among the mem­
ber lines and not by agreements. The lines have discre­
tion to agree among themselves on whatever shares they 
consider reasonable. In case of disagreement the Code 
offers guidelines of which the centerpiece is paragraph 
4, which reads as follows:
"... unless otherwise mutually agreed:
Ca) The group of national shipping lines of each 
of the two countries the foreign trade between 
which is carried by the conference shall have 
equal rights to participate in the freight and 
volume of traffic generated by the conference,
Cb) Third-country shipping lines, if any, have the 
right to acquire a significant part, such as 
20 per cent, in the freight and volume of 
traffic generated by that trade."
As a consequence trade normally comprises more than 
two countries and thus constitutes a multilateral ventu­
re, each national flag will participate under considera­
tion of the freight and volume of its national trade and 
of the ability and capacity of the carrier to perform 
such a service.
If more than one national carrier o.f a country are 
participating as members of a conference it is a matter 
between those carriers to agree among themselves upon the 
apportionment of their total national share. If there are 
no third-country lines, .third flag shares are to be borne 
jointly by the national carriers-of both sides of the 
trade and usually in proportion of their individual con-
71
ference shares. The enormous sums required for modern 
transport systems, like container and ro/ro services, 
normally exceed the financial capacity of single company 
and lead of necessity to stronger cooperation among ship­
ping lines of different nationalities. Without such 
international cooperation, most of the conference contai­
ner and ro/ro services that are now operating worldwide, 
would have not materialized, and ocean transport costs 
would have gone up much more steeply during the last 10 
years. Taking into account that a modern container vessel 
replaces 4 to 5 conventional vessels in capacity, a sing­
le operator normally would not have been able to continue 
with sufficient frequency to meet the requirements of the 
trade without producing over-capacities. They were thus 
forced into joint ventures with other competing lines to 
keep supply of and demand for services in balance. Ratio­
nalization and coordination here enabled transport costs 
to be kept low. It is only logical that under such-premi­
ses no single carrier would be prepared to give up his 
independence without the financial safeguards which are 
offered by a pool or cargo sharing agreement.
But a pool agreement is no life insurance for inef­
ficient lines. In most conference pools, what are known 
as "perform.ance clauses" stipulates the number of sai­
lings evenly spread over the year each line has to per­
form within the range of ports of their trading section 
as well as the quantity of cargo in cheaper categories to 
be carried in order to ensure that a,carrier is not con­
centrating only on high-traffic categories. If lines 
repeatedly under-perform, their pool—shares are reduced 
proportionately for the next pool period. (7)
The Code also establishes in Article
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(item 16)
that in any conference pooling agreement, a conference 
shall provide for appropriate measures to cover cases 
where the cargo has been shut out by a memberline for any 
reason except late presentation by the shipper. It stipu­
lates "such agreement shall provide that a vessel with 
unbooked space, capable of being used, be allowed to lift 
the cargo, even in excess of the pool share of the line 
in. the trade, if otherwise the cargo would be shut out 
and delayed beyond a period set by the conference." The 
cost advantages of full rationalization are so obvious 
take just the potential savings in fuel consumption as 
one of the major cost items - that international liner 
trades can no longer afford.to continue without such coo­
peration if they want to keep pace with other competing 
markets.
3.8 Decision-m.aking procedures (Article 3).
Article 3 contains two important provisions as fol­
lows s
(a) voting rules must not hinder the proper work of 
the conference and the? service of the trade, 
and
Cb) decisions cannot be taken on matters relating 
to the trade between two countries without the 
consent of the national shipping lines of those 
two countries.
3.9 Self-Policing (Article B).
This article constitutes an important part of the 
self-regulating principle by establishing a number of 
guidelines how to combat and control malpractices. It 
calls in particular for provision of effective self-
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policing machinery by conferences through neutral bodies, 
enlisting the full cooperation of shippers and shippers' 
organirations for the purpose of curtailing such irregu­
larities. On request, the appropriate authorities of the 
countries whose trade is served by the conference and of 
the countries whose shipping lines are members of the 
conference, are to * be informed on the action taken.
3.10 Loyalty Arrangements (Article 7).
Shippers' loyalty contracts have to se'rve two pur­
poses; firstly, they should grant loyal shippers a 
premium for having shipped the?ir cargo during the 
contract period exclusively with the conference lines. 
This financial inducements on the other hand offers 
conference lines the advantage of regular customers, 
without which they would be unable to commit themselves 
in a particular trade with high qualified tonnage in a 
long term. Secondly, the contractual rebate also means a 
fair compensation to the loyal shipper vis-a-vis his 
competitors who prefer to retain the liberty of taking 
each chance on the market whether inside or outside the 
conference. Since an outsider is never committed to the 
trade in total but always tries to skim off the best part 
on a temporary basis, only to disappear the moment this 
market has lost its attraction, conference lines hctve in 
contrast to behave like responsible partner to the trade 
and, therefore, need some sort of protection against 
these inroads. A conference line is ,in fact much more 
vulnerable, since with their employment of tailor-made 
types of ships much more money is at risk. One cannot 
expect from them a long-term commitment to the trade if 
the trade in turn is not prepared also to show its 
loyalty for this financial engagement. Loyalty can, 
therefore, never be a one-way traffic. (8) The Code fully
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recognizes the necessity for effective loyaxlty arra^ nge--
ments without restricting the commercia1 parties too much 
in their discretion to agree among themselves on the 
forms of contracts.
3.11 EJispensation (Article S> .
This article establishes guidelines for the proper 
arrangements within a conference to release a shipper 
from his loyalty obligations if within a specified period 
no conference, tonnage can be offered from or to a confe­
rence port.
3.12 Consultation maichinery (Article 11),
Article 11 on consultation machinery constitutes 
one of the principal elements in the Code, being the cen­
terpiece on self-regulation between the commercial par­
ties which has time and again proved superior to any form 
of government regulation.
Consultation has a different meaning and purpose 
than negotiation. Consultation shall be confined to mat­
ters of common interest between a conference as a whole 
and shippers' orgcinizations, which means subjects of 
over-riding significance.
Item 2 of this 
which among others, 
tions, of which only 
below:
article mentions several 
may be the subject of such 
the most important are
matters, 
consulta- 
repeated
(a) changes in general tariff conditions and rela­
ted regulations;
(b) general freight rate increase and changes
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of
rates for major commoditie
(c) imposition, and changes of, surcharges?
<d) form of loyalty arrangements and their changes;
<e) procedure for the timely supply of necessary 
information by shippers on the expected volume 
and nature of their cargoes.
The purpose of consultation is best reflected in 
item (6) of this article which reads:
"When holding consultations, the parties shall use 
their best efforts to provide relevant informa­
tion, hold timely d iscussions''and to clarify mat­
ters for the purpose of s-eeking solutions of the 
issues concerned. The parties involved shall take 
into account each other's views and problems and 
strive to reach agreement consistent with their 
commercial viability."
3.13 Criteria for freight rate determination (Article 
12) .
The Code restores discretion for commercial lines 
to determine their freight rates although establishing 
some reasonable guidelines. Its basic principle is ref­
lected in paragraph (a) which reads:
"Freight rates shall be fixed at as low a level as 
is feasible from the commercial point of view and 
shall permit a reasonable profit for shipowners."
Not only the costs but also the market dictate the
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final decision on rate levels, which time and again has 
proved the most stringent barrier against an unreaisonab- 
le tariff policy. Without intimate knowledge of the mar­
ket no effective rate-fixing is possible, a requirement 
which no government agency is able to meet. Their freight 
rate regulations must, therefore, always be an arbitrary 
exercise.
3.14 General freight increases (Article 14).
This is one of the most controversial articles in 
the Code. <9) In our inflationary times a notice period 
of not less than 150 days is an unrealistic time span, 
since at least another month or two will be required by 
the conference secretariat and the principals before any 
decision can be taken. This is certainly one of the? prov- 
sions that need to be amended during a review conference. 
What the critics, however, have overlooked is that"alter- 
native stipulation in this article which states .."or 
according to regional practice and/or agreements." Regio- 
naxl practice may mean 30 or 90 days in respect of non­
dual raite’ and dual rate conferences, respectively, in 
the US trades. In other areas the current calendar month 
plus the ensuing two months or 90 days notice constitute 
regional practice and could liekwise continue if the com­
mercial parties on both sides of the trade so agree. Item 
<5) stipulates that if no agreement is reached within 30 
days of giving notice in consultation on the level of 
freight rates, the matters shall be submitted immediately 
to mandatory international conciliation, again unless the 
parties agree on another method of settling disputes. 
Item <6) stipulates that a general freight rate increase 
may be implemented by a conference pending the concilia­
tors' recommendation. With the high percentage of fixed 
costs and out-of-pocket expenses lines cannot, of cour-
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SB, afford to wait a further couple of months in a pen­
ding dispute until they are able to recover their increa­
ses costs. It is only natural that both parties will al­
ways strive to come to an agreement and thereby to avoid 
any such time-consuming procedures. '
3.15 Promotional freight rates (Article 15).
In conferences with developing countries it has 
been a common practice in the postwar period to grant 
shippers in such countries what are known as "promotional 
freight rates" on application. These are conceded for new 
products in order to assist efforts to establish new 
industries or to introduce new crops with the aim of put­
ting national economies on a more stable basis. This is 
more valid to the ASEAN countries, especially the Philip­
pines. The Code reflects and encourages such a freight 
policy.
3.16 Surcharges (Article 16).
This article covers special surcharges such as 
fuel adjustment factors, port congestion surcharges, or 
other charges imposed by a conference to cover sudden or 
extraordinary increases in costs or losses of revenue on 
a temporary basis, except currency adjustment factors 
(CAFs) which are dealt with in Article 17. Normal charges 
in costs are recouped by conference lines once or thrice 
a year or at even longer intervals by a .general rate in­
creases. The high fixed costs of liner operation as well 
as the consirable amount of out-of-pocket expenses, which 
liner operators have to cover during each round-voyage 
give conference lines no chance of absorbing sudden ex­
traordinary cost increases like the pending escalation of 
fuel prices out of normal freight tariffs if these are to 
be kept at a reasonable level. Such extraordinary cost
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developments, therefore, have to be recouped promptly by 
means of surcharges, a principle that is also acknowled­
ged by the shipping community as the only recourse for- 
keeping tariff levels low.
In six paragraphs the Code provides under what 
circumstances surcharges may be imposed. In paragraph 3, 
it.says that notice should be given and there shall be 
consultation, upon request, in accordance with the proce­
dure of this Code, save in those exceptional circumstan­
ces which warrant immediate imposition of the surcharge. 
Even in these latter cases consultations shall be held as 
soon as possible thereafter, when requested. Prior to 
such consultations conferences are to furnish data which 
in their opinion justify the imposition of the surchar­
ges. Surcharges too are subject to mandatory conciliation 
although the final decision rests with the shipowning 
side as only they bear the financial risks. ■ -
3.-17 Currency changes (Article 17).
The Code provides for currency changes which are 
similar to those for surcharges in general. Here again 
the method and form of adjustments as a result of 
exchange rate changes, leading to changes in the aggreg­
ate operational costs and/or revenues of the shipping 
lines, is to be agreed upon between the commercial par­
ties by way of consultation.
3.18 Fighting ships (Article 18).
The only reference to outsiders in the Code - not 
to be confused with third flag carriers - is Article 18 
prohibiting the use of fighting ships by conference 
against outsiders, analogous to the provisions of the US 
Shipping Act. Conferences are required under the Code to
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publish their tariffs and conditions of carriaige and to 
adhere to them for given periods, to give notice of alte­
rations or increases far ahead etc. Certain similar rules 
will have to be applied on outsiders as well as in order 
to enable governments to judge as to whether or not an 
independent liner operator is following the principle of 
fair competition on a commercial basis.
3.19 Adequacy of service (Article 19).
No part of the Code more fully reflect the new 
spirit of close cooperation between all parties concer­
ned. in order to ensure an optimal conference liner ser­
vice at economical rates. It is also underlines the uni­
versal rule and responsibility of conferences in the new 
liner regime, which, on the other hand, they can only 
accomplish if they can count on the full loyalty of the 
trading community as well.
3.2Q Provisions and machinery for settlement of disputes
- international conciliation (Articles 23-46).
Another source of serious criticism has been that 
Part on the provisions and machinery for dispute settle­
ment. Its importance has certainly beevi emphasised. The 
critics have also failed to propose better and workable 
alternatives, suitable for inclusions in a Code with such 
world-wide application. A very important and laudable 
aspect of the conciliation rules in the Code is the fact 
that parties to a dispute are free to agree on any other 
dispute settlement procedure. No party is bound to the 
conciliation machinery in the Code where the use of some 
other dispute settlement system, including commercial 
arbitration, is mutually agreed.
Chapter
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This Section of this will deal with the
implementat-ion of the Code, as the title of this chapter 
suggests.
3.21 Implementation of the Code and Role of Governm.ents
(Article 47).
According to article 47, "Each Contracting Party 
shall take such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to implement the present Convention." Implemen­
tation of the Code, therefore, presupposes certain series 
of juridical acts. First, the state must first be a Con­
tracting State to the convention, either by definitive 
signature, approval, acceptance, ratification, or acces­
sion, of the Code. Secondly, the Contracting Party State 
shall take such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to implement the Code, purfuant to Article 47. 
Thirdly, the commercial parties shall implement the Code 
pursuant to the general framework of the national legis­
lation, and the Convention. Apart from providing the fra­
mework within which the commercial parties can play their 
proper role in administering the Code, Governments can 
directly participate in the administration in the widest 
sense through taking part in the consultation and conci­
liation procedures, albeit as observers not having a 
decisive part to play in the decision-making process.
3.22 Two approaches in the administration and implemen­
tation of the Code.
There are at least two approaches to the question 
of administration and implementation of the Code that 
appeared to evolve from various Contracting Parties to 
the Convention:
(a)Approach by majority of developing countries.
The majority of developing countries envisages re-
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latively axctive government involvement in the implemen­
tation of the Code. As part of the initial adjustment 
process, and using article 47 as a basis, the appropriate 
governmental authorities initiate the adjustment process 
by convening conference shipping lines in their trades 
and shippers' organizations to ensure that the various 
agreements conform to the applicable requirements of the 
Code as required by article 22. This supervision can 
either be carried out by the "appropriate authority" 
designated pursuant to Part One, Chapter I of the Conven­
tion or through shippers' organizations which, in turn, 
are either a subordinate authority to the reslevant 
ministry or responsible to the "appropriate authority." 
Inherent in this approach is the need to take into acc­
ount the fact that these agreements affecting national 
trades also’ affect at least one other country, i.e. the 
trading partner in each trade. Thus, Governments may wish 
to consult and are indeed consulting with the appropriate 
authorities of each trading partner in implementing the 
Code pursuant to this approach in order to avoid the app­
lication of conf1icting 'measures.
CblApproach by developed market-economy 
countries.
The second approach is preferred by developed mar­
ket-economy countries Contracting Parties to the Conven­
tion. In this approach it is left to the .parties involved 
(shipping lines, conferences, shippers, and shippers' 
organizations) to adjust their relations to conform to 
the provisions of the Code. Inherent in this approach is 
the need to create private remedies for aggrieved parties 
in the event that a conference agreement, trade partici­
pation agreement, or loyalty arrangement does not conform 
to, or is not implemented in conformity with, the provi-
sions of the Code and the dispute is not resolved during 
the prescribed conciliation procedures. Thus, Contracting 
Parties could fulfil their obligations under article 47 
by providing the right for aggrieved parties to have 
recourse to national institutions where the Code confers 
legal rights or obligations on parties in the event that 
the conciliation proceedings have either been unsuccess­
ful in resolving the dispute or where not applicable. 
Depending on the judicial and administrative system of a 
particular country, the national remedies created could 
either be in the form of providing access to the legal 
court system or the establishment of a special court or 
administrative tribunal for Code-related disputes. As far 
as the developed market-economy countries are concerned, 
the former approach of providing access to the legal 
court system has generally been chosen. (10)
3.23 National Legislation.
To-date, few Contracting Parties have adopted 
enabling legislation to implement the Code, although 
some developing countries have adopted national legisla­
tions intended to implement the cargo sharing provision 
of the Code. There are variety of reasons why many con­
tracting states have not yet implem.ented the Code, inclu­
ding the reason that many states are not clear as to 
their obligations under the Code. On the other hand, the 
UK, which had not ratified the Code until the last quar­
ter of 1985, adopted such national legislation in 1982 
(Merchant Shipping "Liner Conferences" Act of 19820. The 
Code's lack of precision and the limited governmental 
experience in many developing states in liner conference 
operations may well provide an opportunity for the UNCTAD 
Secretariat and the Registrar of the Code, to influence 
the evolution of the Code regime. The reality is that
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many governments, having become party to the Code, do not 
know what action they are permitted or required to take. 
Yet it is through national implementation, legislation, 
administrative rules, and day-to-day practice that the 
Code's ultimate character and details will be determined. 
(11 :>
3.24 Activity prior to the entry of the Code.
The Code did not enter into force for some ten 
years after its drafting and adoption by diplomatic con­
ference in 1974. During the interim period from 1974 to 
1983, various actions have been taken by a number of sta­
tes, typically with the implicit or explicit belief that 
such actions would be sanctionced by the Code. This anti­
cipatory practice is likely to color subsequent practice. 
Several countries which have ratif ied'-the Code had ear­
lier acted to reserve liner cargo for their national 
lines in anticipation of the Code's entry into force. 
Included in this group are the Philippines, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia.
(a)The Philippines. On January 19, 1982, a Presi­
dential Executive Order No. 769 which would implement the 
cargo sharing formula of the Liner Code, directed the 
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) to issue regula­
tions, reserving at least 80 per cent of the export and 
import liner trade not covered by the earlier decrees 
(Presidential Decree No. 1486,•1978),■relating to govern­
ment-impelled cargoes.
The implementation of this executive order will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this Study. It 
is stated, however, that this order was one of the most 
controversial national legislation that received a chorus
84
of protest from US, Japan, Western European countries, 
although it was initially implemented in the Philippine- 
US export and import liner trade only, until its suspen­
sion in May 1984.
Cb)Indonesia. Presidential Decree No. 18, issued
in 1982, reserved for Indonesian-flag vessels the carria­
ge of all cargoes, imports and exports, financed by the 
Indonesian Government or by state-owned or state-financed 
companies. The objective of this action seemed to be to 
reserve all such cargo so that only the remaining cargo 
would be subject to 4Q-40-20 allocation. As a result, it 
appeared that the Indonesian shipping lines could increa­
se their carriage to over 50 percent of the total trade 
of Indonesia. This decree was protested immediately by 
ten OECD countries jointly and by the”" United States and 
Jaipan individually. (12;)
(c) Malaysia. In Malaysia, an ASEAN member which
ratified the Code like the Philippines and Indonesia, the 
Ministry of Transport has given some thought to cargo 
reservation, but an official of the Department of Trade 
indicated that Malaysia was "unlikely to rush in without 
looking at the effects, and particularly how this would 
affect Malaysian trade". This cautious attitude is ref­
lected in the establishment by the Malaysian government 
of a task force for the purpose of drafting legislation 
implementing the Code. (13)
(d) Thai land. In Thailand, the chairman of the new
shippers council has cautioned that it is questionable 
whether Thailand should have a merchant marine and urged 
that careful and factual assessment be m.ade in this 
regard. This type of a,ttitude is reflected in government
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considerations in Thailand as the Director of Sea Trans­
port, Economic Division, Office of Merchant Marine Promo­
tion, has stated that governmental policy is to encouraqe 
exports as much as possible.
I'e)Singapore. Singapore is one of the three ASEAN
countries (Brunei and Thailand the othersl which has not 
ratified the Code. Singapore is essentially a transship­
ment port for cargoes to/from Thailand and Indonesia. Its 
national shipping line, Neptune Orient Lines (NOD, is 
mainly a cross-trader in liner shipping.
In 19S3, Singaporean-registered shipowners were 
advised to enter into a joint venture with the Korean or 
American shipowners in the wake of the Code's entry into 
force, to avoid them to be left out in the cold. It would 
seem that Singapore will not ratify the Code on commer­
cial reason, because of the reasons stated above, but may 
do so for political or ASEAN unity. As stated, Brunei, 
which became an ASEAN .miember in 19S4 after its indepen­
dence on December 31, 1983, has not ratified the Code. 
Brunei has the highest per capita income of ASEAN coun­
tries and is a net exporter of crude oil products.
3.25 Reservations.
A number of states which have become parties to the 
Code have done so subject to significant reservations 
which serve to modify their legal'obiigations in their 
treaty relations with other parties to the Convention.
(a) EEC. The best- known of the reservations is
embodied in the "Brussels Package" already stated in the 
previous chapter of this study, the provisions of which 
must be included in the instruments of ratification of
&6>
the member states of the European Community in accordance 
with the decision taken by the EEC Council on May I B,  
1979. This set of reservations, which was also copied by 
the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) is far reaching whereby it excluded the applica­
tion of major articles of the Code on cargo sharing, con­
ference decision-making procedures, dispute settlement, 
and the time span between general freight rate increases 
from both trade within the EEC and from trade between the 
EEC and OECD states willing to act on the basis of reci­
procity, These reservations are of great significance, as 
th'eir application will result in eliminating most- of the 
liner trade of the EEC from the'app1ication of the main 
provisions of the Code, since most of the liner trade of 
the EEC is conducted with developed states of the OECD. 
According to one estimate, the application of the EEC 
reservations will leave some 75% of the world liner cargo 
free from the allocation scheme suggested by the Liner 
Code. (15) In European Community trade with developing 
states, the developing state trading partner will be en­
titled to carriage of up to 4D% of the conference cargo 
in that trade, while the remaining 60% will be thrown 
into a common pool available for carriage by conference 
member lines of European Community states, reciprocating 
OECD states, and other developing third-flag states, on 
the basis of commercial considerations.
(b) Eastern European Accessions. The East Euro­
pean states of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German 
Democratic Republic, and the USSR, have all indicated 
that the Code will not be applied to jointly-operated 
lines created by inter-governmental agreements for joint 
conduct of bilateral trade. Given this reservation and, 
of course, the reality that liner conferences do not ope-
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rate in the East European trades, the Code, to all 
intents and purposes, will have no direct impact on liner 
shipping in these trades. Accordingly, one cannot but 
wander why these states bothered to become parties to the 
Code.(16)
In actual fact, however, East European accession 
and reservations to the Code will have limited importance 
from the persepctive of the developing world as a whole- 
since Eastern Europe is not a major trading partner with 
developing states. Because of the importance of trade 
relationships of the? developing states and the developed 
market-'-economy states, it is essential that agreement on 
shipping arrangements in these trades be settled.
3.26 The Scope of the application of the Code.
The scope of the application of the Code may be 
viewed from two elements:
(a) The application of the provisions of the Code 
taken specifically, and
Cb) The application of the Code itself taken gene­
rally.
With respect to the first, the first part of this 
Chapter had dealt with the specific provisions of the 
Code.
In respect of the second, the application of the 
Code taken generally, can be seen from the following sen­
ses :
i) Application of the Code to Contracting States
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Parties to the Convention;
ii) Application of the Code to Liner Conferences
on 1 y;
iii) Application of the Code to inter-governmental
agreements;
iv) Application of the Code to land-locked coun­
tries ;
v) Application of the Code to cooperative shipping 
agreements outside conferences; and
vi'.) Application of the Code to multimodal trans­
port.
i) Application of the Code to Contracting States ’ Parties 
to the Convention.
It would appear that the Code as such is applic­
able only between Contracting States Parties to the Con­
vention based on the Code itself, and under Article 3A of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea.ties. C17)
Assuming, however, that the Code is implemented 
between the liner trade of the two Contracting States, 
all entities operating in that particular trade will be 
covered, regardless on whether their country is a con­
tracting state of the Code. In this case, the Code is 
considered "nationality blind", for otherwise, the pur­
poses of the Code could not be accomplished.CIS)
ii) Application of the Code to liner conferences.
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There are two views as to whether the Code is 
applicable to whole liner trade of the country whose 
trade is served by the conference or to the liner cargoes 
carried by the conference only.
One interpretation preferred by the developed mar­
ket economy countries is that the Code applies to the 
cargoes carried by the conference only, especially with 
respect to participation in trade. The other interpreta­
tion held by majority of developing countries is that the
Code applies to whole liner trade and not merely to the
ca.rgoBS carried by the conference. The above views have 
significant impact due to the weakening of the conference 
system and the strengthening of the outsiders where in 
some trades the outsiders carried more than 40 per cent
of the liner trade. If the 40 percent carried by the
outsiders are excluded from the cargo sharing law, the 
40-40-20 cargo sharing provision of the Code will" apply 
only to the 60 percent liner cargo carried by the Confe­
rence. Several developing countries have taken the view 
that, in their opinion, the provisions of article 2 on 
"Participation in Trade" applies to the entire liner tra­
de. The later view has been supported by some authorities 
of note. Btutmey (19) expressed his opinion as follows:
"Article 2, in its paragraphs 1 to 16 inclusive, 
applies to the conference member lines and to the 
conference in its pooling or other sharing of the 
trade carried. Paragraph 17 catches the other tra­
de and provides that the participation of noncon­
ference lines in the carriage of the trade should 
also be covered."
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Article 2, paragraph 17 reads as follows:
"The provisions of article 2, paragraphs 1 to 
16, inclusive, concern cill goods regardless of 
their origin, their destination or the use for 
which they are intended, with the exception of 
military equipment for national defense purposes."
Sturmey argued that the sense of paragraph 17 is 
that all liner trades are, or can be, if the authorities 
at either end of the trade so wish, brought within the 
scope of 40:40:20. Thus, non-conference lines, provided 
they are third-flag ca^rriers, can be ignored so long as 
the overall share of the third-flag group does not exceed 
"such as 20%", while if such non-ccnference lines are 
national flag carriers, they can be ignored so long as 
the flag state agrees that their carryings are counted as 
part of the national quota, as in West Germany. Once the 
non-conference incursion in a trade is such, as is so 
often the case today, that these easy options are not 
open, the matter cannot be ignored and control measures 
need to be applied, if possible.
He (Sturmey) makes a major point of the fact that 
Cl) when the Code was being drafted, the words "carried 
by the conference" were deleted from Article 2(17). He 
noted that the records of the conference.(UNCTAD) do not 
indicate the reasons for the removal of these words but 
the soundest interpretation of this.omission, according 
to some authors (20), that the qualifying phrase was 
removed because it was implicit and therefore redundant; 
(2) otherwise, foreign lines could simply opt out of the 
conferences, be free of Code stipulations, and, accor­
dingly, maintain their dominance in liner shipping; and
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(3) The acceptance by the Group of 77 C21) of measures 
for the protection of the position of outsiders (non-con­
ference lines!) was based on a tacit agreement to the 
effect that such measures could be allowed to have no 
adverse effects on the rights of cargoes granted by 
Article 2.
Sturmey cited as an example, the route between 
Calcutta and Australia. He said that in 19S1, the 
outsiders were not present in this trade, but carried 37 
per cent of the cargo in 1982. Also, in Bombay, in 1982, 
68. per cent in the export and 49 per cent of the 
containers in the import trades, were carried by 
foreigners. As the Indian writer puts it, "while it may 
be the essence of Hindu philosophy to contemplate and 
concentrate on zero, "shoonya", when^ talking of liner 
cargoes. Or, to put it another way, forty per cent of 
zero is exactly zero. If the non-conference lines end up 
carrying all the cargo "shoonya" would provide the only 
consolation left to the conference members. (22)
The OECD and EEC totally rejected Sturmey's inter­
pretation as being invalid and inconsistent with both the 
legislative history of the Code and its wordings. From a 
policy perspective, EEC made it clear that the continued 
role of independents (outsiders or non-conference lines) 
are a primary check on the operation of closed confer­
ences. In the case of EEC, the relevant competition law 
under the Treaty of Rome would forbid the elimination of 
outsiders from the European Community liner trades. In 
the case of OECD, they definitely want outsiders to 
remain in the liner trades and view the right of out­
siders' continued operation as obvious and implicit under 
the wordings of the Code. OECD maintained the view that
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they would became party to the Code provided that non-—  
conference lines observed the principle of fair competi­
tion on a commercial basis. This was necessary to ensure 
that a conference did not acquire monopoly positions and 
to ensure a maKimum choice for shippers. (23)
At the same time, a number of developed and socia­
list countries have the interpretation of the Code to be 
applied on conference-controlled trades only and do not 
cover the activities of non-conference shipping lines. 
They believed that limiting the activities of non- 
conference liners would lead to a limitation on the 
freedom of the shipper in choosing the ship. They declare 
that "non-conference shipping lines are not to be preven­
ted from operating as long as they compete with conferen­
ces on a commercial basis, while adheping to the princip­
les of fair competition". Some developed countries consi­
der that the interpretation of the scope of application 
to cover all liner trades would affect their anti-trust 
laws. A unified statement has been taken by OECD coun­
tries, under the "concept of coordinated resistance", for 
retaliation steps against countries restricting outsider- 
competition.
iii) Application of the Code to Inter-Governmental
Agreements.
There are different views as to whether liner ship­
ping services established on the basis of inter­
governmental agreements fall under the scope of the 
Code.This is very important to the ASEAN group if these 
countries organise and operate an ASEAN liner service 
under an agreemen'b between their Governments.
The wordings of the text of the Code definition 
contained in Chapter One should include joint shipping
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services under a bilateral agreement between Governments. 
The Code definition refers to a group of carriers
providing a liner service "has an agreement or arrange­
ment, whatever its nature, within the framework of which 
they operate...". This language, particularly with the 
use of the expression "whatever its nature" and "within 
the framework", certainly includes situations where 
government—owned lines themselves have concluded the 
bi lateral 1 agreement; rather it just states "a group
of...carriers". The agreement could thus be one imposed 
on them by Governments. The French text, on the other 
hand, would not appear to support this latter interpreta­
tion, in that it refers to "un groupe...qui a conclu un 
accord". In other words, reference is made to the "group" 
concluding the agreement, thereby making it more diffic- 
cult to argue that an aigreement concluded by Governments 
and imposed on individual carriers is"one that the car­
riers as a group "concluded". The argument could, howe­
ver, be made that the carriers constructively adopted the 
agreement by operating pursuant to it. Certainly, in the 
case of a government-owne?d line where the Government 
concluded a bilateral agreement, it would appear reaso­
nable to say that the agreement was concluded on behalf 
of, and in the name of, the line. C24)
A number of countries, however, have taken the view 
that liner shipping services established on the basis of 
inter-governmental bilateral agreements do not constitute 
"liner conferences" as defined in the Code and consequen­
tly not subject to its provisions. C25) The latent conf­
lict between such bilateral agreements and the Code beco­
mes apparent when one considers the provisions on trade 
participation of such' agreements which tend to provide 
for 50:50 cargo sharing and thereby could infringe on
94
third-flag lines' right "to acquire such as 20 percent" 
established under the Code.
iv!> Application of the Code to land-locked countries.
National shipping lines of land-locked countries 
have the right, under the Code, to participate in the 
carriage of their own national foreign trade. In order to 
secure such rights, the national shipping lines of a 
Contracting State which is a land-locked country and 
which is within the geographical scope of the conference, 
should ensure that the port/s used by such land-locked 
country is included in the geographical scope of the 
cargo sharing arrangennents 6f the Conference concerned, 
taking into account the provisions of Article 2(17). If 
the land-locked country (or specifically its port situa­
ted in another country used by the lavid-locked country as 
its own port) is outside the geographical scope of the 
conference itself, the Government concerned should nego­
tiate with the conference to have the geographical scope 
of the conference extended to include its territory (or 
port/s), in order that the rights of its shipping lines 
and of the shippers are protected in accordance with the 
provisions of the Code. (26)
For practical purposes, the implementation of the 
Code provisions on trade participation, requires deter­
mination of the origin and ultimate destination of the 
cargo. It may not always be clearly recognisable where 
the cargo originates where the port of loading is . a 
transshipment port. This is also true to cargo whose 
ultimate destination goes beyond the port of the country 
of discharge. It is only in those cases where the bills 
of lading or multimodal transport documents (Combidoc) 
are issued naming the actual origin and/or final
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destination of the cargo, that the origin/destination of 
the cargo is possible.
The provisions of Article 2 C8>, which provide for 
the possibility of redistributing cargo shares among 
national lines of a region at one end of a conference 
trade by mutual agreement, would be relevant in this 
context. Difficulties in determining the actual origin/ 
destination of cargo for purposes of allocating shares 
may be resolved by redistribution arrangements negotiated 
among the national lines concerned.
The above considerations relating to the determin­
ation of cargo shares of land-locked country/ies would 
apply to all transshipment cargoes, irrespective of 
whether the country of ultimate origin or destination is 
a land-locked country. C27)
v) Application of the Code to cooperative agreements.
A typical form of cooperative agreement is the 
consortium. The advent of containerization has brought 
about new forms of cooperation among the shipowners 
designed to share the financial burdens, the risks, and 
the economies of scale. The Code provides a rather clear 
definition of liner conferences, and generally it can be 
stated that any cooperative agreement which fulfils the 
conditions laid down in the Code would be subject to its 
provisions, irrespective of the organizational form of 
cooperation chosen. For example, a joint service arrange­
ment of the "TRIO" type - whereby three major liner ope­
rators in the Europe/Far East route have entered into a 
joint service agreement under this name - if operated 
outside the scope of the presently existing conference 
would, for the purpose of determining the applicability
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of the Code, still fall under its provisions, as it does 
in itself filfil the conditions stipulated in the Code 
definition to be classified as a liner conference The 
Code does, in fact, apply to consortia as well as any 
other cooperative arrangements including rate agreements 
that fulfil the conditions of a liner conference stipula­
ted in the Code definition, i.e.
"A group of two or more vessel-operating carriers; 
Provides international liner services for the 
carriage of cargo on a particular route or routes 
within specified geographical limits; Has an ag­
reement or arrangement, whatever its nature, with­
in the framework of which they operate; Operates 
under the uniform or common freight rates."
vi) Application of the Code to multimodal transport.
The question of the application of the Code- to 
multimodal transport relates more to issues of shippers/ 
carrier relations, level of freight rates and dispute 
settlement machinery rather than to questions of trade 
participation.
The Code in Article 11 (1) CConsultation Machinery) 
states that there shall be consultations on matters of 
common intrerest between a conference, shippers' 
organizations, shippers' representatives, etc. This 
involves also multimodal through rates established by the 
conference. Under Article 11, any "conference decision 
affecting shippers' interests appears to be subject to 
consultation and thus to the provisions of the Code.
3.27 Reallocation and redistribution of cargo shares.
The Code, in Article
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2, provides rules covering
three cases of redistribution:
i) One of the countries whose trade is carried by 
the conference has no national shipping lines 
participating in the carriage of that trade (Ar­
ticle 2(5) ;
ii) The national shipping lines of one country 
decide not to carry their full share of the 
trade (Article 2(6);
iii) Neither of the two countries have national 
shipping lines participating in the trade 
(Article 2(7)).
With slight differences in wording in each case, 
the Code provides for the uncarried trade to be divided 
between the lines participating in the trade "in p^'oport- 
ion to their respective shares". The national group which 
is not carrying its full share is given no say in how the 
part it cannot carry is to be distributed. (28)
As regards reallocation of the third—country share, 
the Code, in Article 2(3), provides that the criteria for 
the entry of third—country lines "shall not be applied so 
as to subvert" the provision of Article 2 on participat­
ion in trade. Article 2(A)(b) (which uses the expression 
"shall"), this must surely mean that from the outset, and 
even if no third-country lines are engaged in the trade, 
provision must be made to make it possible for such lines 
"to acquire a significant part, such as 20 per cent" of 
the trade. Even if they are not already carrying such a 
part, such a part must first be allocated to the third—  
country line group and then reallocated as appropriate.
98
At- the first review of shares, depending on the- criteria 
specified in the conference agreement, the third-country 
share may be reduced or even eliminated if non third—  
country lines have been admitted or the existing third- 
country lines have not increased their carryings. But 
initially, a specific "significant part" must be reserved 
for third-country lines, and provision must be made for 
the two groups of national shipping lines to give up a 
part of their share, up to a specified level, in the 
event that third-country lines obtain admission to the 
conference. (29)
In the absence of national lines in a trade, their 
share shalll be redistributed among the lines particip­
ating in the trade in proportion to their respective 
shares. Where both groups of national lines do not exist, 
their shares shall be allocated between the participating 
member lines of the third-flag countries by commercial 
negotiations between those lines. It should be noted that 
in such situation there is no provsions in the Code for 
the Government of a Contracting Party to determine which 
lines shall carry its national lines' entitlement.<30)
Once the allocation and the reallocation proced­
ures are completed, "the national shipping lines of a 
region ... at one end of the trade .... may redistri­
bute among themselves by mutual agreement the shares in 
trades allocated to them" (Article 2(S)). This redistri­
bution does not affect the allocation made with respect 
to the three groups at the conference level. It does not 
provide that within any conference covering several 
countries at each end of the route, services can be 
rationalized by trade-offs between lines. For countries 
served by conferences which cover other adjacent count-
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ries as well, the possibility of a regionail redistrib­
ution of cargo shares should always be borne in mind.(31)
3.28 CONCLUSION
The Code was elaborated prior to the structural 
changes brought about by containerisation, and, prior to 
the market, service i.e., round-the-world service, pen­
dulum service, fixed-day-of-the-week service, technolo­
gical, and legal forces which are currently restructuring 
the liner shipping industry. This is not to indicate that 
the Code is not a useful instrument, but merely that it, 
like many other legal regimes, has been largely overtaken 
by changes in the industry it seeks to regulate. Thus, 
the questions facing all Contracting States Parties are 
what changes are needed to bring the Code up-to-date and 
how can those changes as well as the Code be structured 
to ensure that it will not be rapidly overtaken again by 
future events?
In this context, it is considered that some of the 
areas which might be discussed at the 1988 Code Review 
Conference could include individual proposals by 
developed and developing countries, as well as those made 
jointly. With reference to the first, developed countries 
might propose Ca) the elimination of article 2 - partici­
pation in a trade, and <b) the right of economic 
communities to become contracting.parties to the Code. 
With respect to the second, developing countries could 
propose Ca) the allocation of cargo shares by governments 
rather than conferences, Cb) the inclusion of outsiders 
or non-conference lines within the scope of the Code, Cc) 
a definition of the role of load-center ports, intermodal
•IGD
landbridges services, large-scale vessels and their rela 
tion to the fleets of developing countries. Both groups 
of countries might make proposals related to is.) the 
separation of containers from other liner cargoes and 
their transport by chartered vessels, Cb) the broker 
activities of conference, Cc) uniform interpretation of 
the Code, and Cd) changes to the structure of the Code 
which might permit easier and more frequent modification. 
But whatever be the changes of structural form, the dia­
logue between transport operators and shippers, which the 
Code provides for, needs to continue. Even if the tradi­
tional conference were to be displaced by consortia, 
single operators or multimodal transport operators, there 
will be a need for consultations between shippers, opera­
tors, and Governments. Similarly, the need for principles 
of participation in liner trades by patiopal lines and 
third-country lines will remain.
The Code Review Conference would be the opportunity 
for countries to re-examine the provisions of the Code in 
the light of the changes that are continuing to take 
place. Under the provisions of Article 52('.l), the Review 
Conference is to be held five years after the Code comes 
into force, i.e. in the autumn of 1988. However, it is 
only through implementation of the Code that its nature 
and character will take shape. Due to the lagging imple­
mentation of the Code by both developed and developing 
countries, the Review Conference has no implementation 
experiences to rely on their works.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ASEAN PRESENT SITUATION 
WITH REGARD LINER TRADE, CONFERENCES 
AND THE CODE
4.1 BACKGROUND
ASEAN was formed in 1967,with the aim in view to 
provide active collaboration and mutual assistance in the 
economic, technical, scientific and administrative 
fields, amongst member countries ” Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and-Thailand. Starting 1984, Bru­
nei was admitted as the sixth member of the ASEAN. Up to 
1976, there were few economic achievements. However, an 
ASEAN organisation was established and personal intergo­
vernmental contacts developed. Furthermore, a major rep­
ort, prepared by a United Nations CUN) team betweeii 1970 
and 1972, provided a theoretical and policy basis for 
cooperation, notably in the field of industry. (1)
In 1976 (2), the Heads of Government concluded the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a general framework 
agreement; the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which con­
tained some fairly detailed economic and other provi­
sions; and an Agreement on the establishment of the Dec­
laration Secretariat in Jakarta. The economic part of the 
Declaration contained four main elements. These were: Cl)
cooperation in basic commodities, particularly food and 
energy - member states would give one another priority in 
periods of shortage; C2) industrial cooperation, specifi­
cally to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants; 
(3) preferential trading arrangements; instruments for 
this would include tariff preferences, long term con-
102
tracts, preference in government procurement, preferen­
tial financing and reduction in nontariff barriers; and 
(4) joint efforts to improve access to markets outside 
ASEAN and joint approaches on international economic- 
issues. (31
4.2 TRADE AND SHIPPING POLICIES IN THE ASEAN
■ll TRADE. Differences in trade policies from country 
to country influence intra - and extra - ASEAN foreign 
trade. The following trend in trade policies are deve­
loping ; (4)
— Indonesia : complementary, sometimes protective, 
strategies of both import substitution and export 
promotion.
— Malaysia : dependent on world market 'for key 
products, import substitution promotion.
— Philippines: since 1960s, shift from import subs— 
•titution towards export promotion, encouragem.ent 
to process domestic raw materials.
- Singapore : highly import-dependent and export- 
oriented, liberal policies aimed at increased 
exports and entr^port role, hardly any domestic 
industry protection.
- Thailand: export-oriented, but value still short 
of filling the trade gap, import substitution 
gaining in importance.
- Brunei: newly independent state,
•103
oil producer,
and net exporter of crude oil and petroleum 
products.
2) SHIPPING. There is no common shipping policy for 
the region. There are, however, national shipping legis-' 
lations on a country basis but affecting trade and ship­
ping in the region. This includes cargo reservation sche­
mes, cargo sharing, cabotage, shipping 1 i'^censing, and 
port controls. In addition, there are institutional and 
practical arrangements among the ASEAN countries. Regio­
nal shipping cooperation in shipping dates back to the 
formation of the ASEAN in the 60s. In terms of intitutio- 
nal and practical arrangements; <1) since 1973, annual 
meetings of the permanent committee on shipping; C2) sin­
ce 1974, the foundation of the Federation of ASEAN Ship­
pers Councils (FASO; CS) since 1975, the formation of 
the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners' Associations CFASA); 
and C4) since 1976, the establishment of the ASEAN Port 
Authorities Association CARAA) . All five countries C.5) 
now dispose of legal instruments to protect their natio­
nal shipping interests. 'Actual enforcement varies widely. 
Regional and national interests are not always compatib­
le. Though the first steps towards regionalism of ship­
ping therefore still await formalization, the institutio­
nal preparations are comprehensive. According to a plan 
now being carried out, each partner country will report 
on advisable action in main problem areas, namely: the
Philippines - joint intra-regional servi-ces; Indonesia - 
ship financing; Thailand - conference membership; Singa­
pore - ship design and newbuilding. Until further, most 
attention is directed towards deep-sea export of key com­
modities. (6)
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4.3 INTRA-ASEAN TRADE
Singe Is C7!! carried a medium scale study of intrai- 
regional shipping in ASEAN between 1977 and 1978 for the 
ESCAP. Analyzing the intra-regiona1 liner transport from 
the 1975 data, the study found that intra-ASEAN seaborne 
dry cargo trade totalled 6.4 million tonnes, of which 1.5 
million tonnes were transshipment traffic. Nine groups of 
primary products accounted for 75% of this volume of 
intra—trade, as follows! rubber lldX; logs 14%; timber 4%; 
rice 5%; maize 9%; animal feed 8%; cement 15%; oil pro­
ducts 4%; and fertilizers 2%•
Combined shares by country in cumulative loadings 
and unloadings including transit cargoes weres Thailand 
13.3%; Malaysia Brunei) 12.1%; Singapore 38.6%; Indon­
esia 31.3%; Philippines 4.5%. This annual total level of
6.4 million tonnes is expected to remain relatively 
steady at least up to 1985, with only minor shifts in the 
composition of specific commodities. A vast majo-rity of 
this intra-ASEAN trade is composed of what has become 
known as "neo-bulk" comm.odities, such as rubber, logs, 
sawn timber, rice, maize, fertilizer, cement, and oil- 
bearing seeds that can be shipped as a single homogen­
eous cargo or as part of a break-bulk shipment. The 
emphasis on bulk and neo—bulk cargoes has m.eant that most 
intra-ASEAN voyages have distinct heavy and light legs, 
which shipowners had great difficulty of balancing. (S)
The ASEAN countries and Vietnam, Hong Kong, China, 
and Taiwan, are among the world's leading traders. Under 
these circumstances regional services are difficult to 
keep regional. From a shipowner's point of view, it makes 
much better sense to use the triangular shipping route - 
Hong Kong — Manila, Sandakan — Kota Kinabalu — Hong Kong 
(which crosses interisland, regional, and extra-regional
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shipping routes) than to undertake a series of two-way 
voyages with distinctly heavy and light legs. The expan­
sion of national fleets without the rationalization of 
services among naitions would be of little use to ASEAN as 
a group. Yet the coticern of individual ASEAN shipowners 
engaged in the intra-ASEAN trade is the replacement of 
existing tonnage. There are around 250 ASEAN flag vessels 
of.around 40,000 DWT operating in the regional trade. An 
estimated 65% of these vessels are less than 2,000 DWT, 
and nearly all of themm are 15—20 years old. It is esti­
mated that Singapore alone has 320 coastal vessels of 
which 270 regularly ply the intra-ASEAN routes. If
entire fleet were uO be. replaced the price tag would
amount to something 400 million US dollars, but this 
figure could be substantially cut by the purchase of 
secondhand vessels. C9)
4.4 RATIONALIZATION OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE
It is difficult to envision either a rationalizat­
ion of shipping services or any major changes in the 
maritime relations of the ASEAN states. Thailand, Indon­
esia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are all net importers 
of shipping services, and only Singapore a net exporter 
of shipping services. The majority want the balance 
redressed. However, should ASEAN collectively desire to 
submerge individual aspirations for the development of a 
more efficient service for the group as a whole, several 
courses of action could be taken: CIO)
(i) The conventional procedure is the establish— 
nient of bilateral shipping agreements between individual 
nations. This is already happened with the agreement 
between Indonesia and Singapore, Indonesia and the
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Philippines. Such bilateral agreements could contain 
provisions on commodities, sailings, and flag composit­
ion. Knowing approKimately what level of trade is to be 
expected, shipowners could plan their fleets according- 
ly.These shipowner-shipowner arrangements could be made 
under the auspices of FASA. However, these bilateral 
agreements are not likely to be comprehensive enough and 
often are designed for the preservation of trades rather 
for its promotion.
Ciil Nearly all the interisland shipping companies 
and intra-ASEAN shipping companies ply routes that take 
their ships outside their national boundaries. For this 
reason, the problem of rebuilding an interis 1 avid fleet or 
an inter-ASEAN fleet is one and the same. As the various- 
cabotage laws illustrate, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phi- 
lippines, and Thailand are not interested in being domi­
nated by Singaporean shipping services. They do not want 
either a European monopoly for international trade or a 
Singaporean monopoly for the regional services. ASEAN 
nations are net importers of Singaporean shipping, aggra­
vated by the 1 - 1.5 million metric tonnes transshipment 
traffic that passes through the port and by use of Singa­
pore's shipyards. But the problem is to find sufficient 
items to trade intra-regionally.
(iii) The most straighforward means to rationalis­
ation would be the formation of an "ASEAN Shipping Line" 
designed to serve intra-ASEAN routes or long routes. The 
political and economic obstacles to the formation of a 
regional line are formidable, but it has been done 
before. The Pacific Forum, a regional grouping composed 
of small Pacific Island nations, Australia, and New 
A regional shipping fund was established and the
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Zealand.
in 1979three new Ro/Ro vessels that went into service 
were part of an aid scheme and were registered in Tonga, 
Samoa, and New Zealand, The company lost US$ 9 million in 
its first two years of operation. The problem was severe. 
The dilemma of trying to serve two masters - profits and 
politics - is threatening to sink the world's first- 
regional shipping line in a sea of debt, (ll.)
In the case of ASEAN, the problems would be much 
the same. The routes are difficult and politics would 
undoubtedly play a major role, but the problems are not 
insurmountable. If each ASEAN country registered four 
vessels into an ASEAN compjaTiy that operated on a profit" 
sharing basis, this would provide a solid foundation for 
building regional shipping and ultimately trade. The 
advantage that these vessels would have over other lines 
would be their efficiency based on routes. Shipping 
services in a limited regional setting constitute a 
"commons" of sorts, because all the group shares in the 
use of the vessels to promote regional trade and develop­
ment. Conceptual ly, like a c'ommons, it should be managed 
by a corporation in which the owners (ASEAN states) have 
a clearly defined share, for instance, equity capital. 
The benefit derived from international shipping, such as 
improved balance of payments, might be strengthened with 
improved services at the regional level.
4.5 SHIP FINANCE.
For regional or individual fleet expansion, finance 
is a problem. Traditionally, the main sources of ship 
finance are the shipowners' own funds, national shipping 
development funds, export credits. commercial lenders, 
bilateral assistance, grants, donations, and internatio-
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nal lending institutions. Financing small shipowners ope­
rating on the intra-ASEAN routes is difficult for most 
commercial lenders for a variety of reasons. Generally, 
the ASEAN shipowners are small, privately owned (freq­
uently family) operations with little collateral than the 
ship itself. Often the cash flow situation for such ope­
ration is precarious, because the companies are greatly 
dependent on the success of their particular trade rou­
tes. They can be easily disrupted by protective legis­
lation or bad harvests. The actual cost of new small ves­
sel ( general cargo ) is modest in comparison with the 
cost of tankers or LNG Carriers, but the cost in dollars 
per deadweight ton is very high, often exceeding 1,Q00 US 
Dollars for small general cargo vessels. This places an 
inordinately high risk value on small vessels for the 
commercial lender looks at the exposure risk of a country 
C country risk ) and the fiscal responsibility that the 
country has shown. ASEAN generally has done quite well, 
but bankers are still cautious about lending to Indonesia 
and the Philippines, both of which need funds for ship­
ping. (12) Institutional lenders like the World Bank (WB) 
and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) respond to govern­
ment programs rather than to individual shipowners. Since 
this has the tendency to promote "national carriers", 
these lenders appear to be more interested in nation—  
building. The World Bank in 1974 loaned the Philippine 
Government 20 million US Dollars for the development of 
its inter-island fleet and facilities, and Indonesia 
received a number of loans in the early 1970s designed to 
build up its inter-island fleet. (13)
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A.6 ASEAN Present Situation. The foreign trade indica­
tors of the ASEAN countries in 1985 are shown below:-
Country: Imports 
CUSD Mio)
Exports 
CUSD Mio)
Total 
CUSD Mio)
Foreign Trad 
as % GNP
Indonesia 10,259 18,590 28,SA9 A5%
Malaysia 13,987 13,917 27,90A 87
Phils. 5,261 A , 5 AA 9,805 35
Singapore 26,285 22,817 A9,102 3A
Thai land 9,2AA “ 7 16,366 A6
Source:‘UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 
1987 .
The liner trade of the ASEAN countries are discus­
sed in the following section, on a country to country 
basis, starting with Indonesia Cl), Malaysia CM), Philip­
pines CP), Singapore CS), and Thailand CT).
A.6.1 INDONESIA. The Indonesian economy is overwhelming­
ly geared to the production and export of crude oil, pet­
roleum products and natural gas, the mineral fuels sector 
of the foreign trade accounting for some 18QX of the tot­
al export traffic. Indonesian import is very much domi­
nated by capital equipment in the basic manufactures and 
machines/transport equipment categories-iron and steel, 
metal manufactures/structures and parts, construction/mi- 
ning machinery switch-gear and other electrical distribu­
tion machinery, lorries/trucks, etc. Containerised
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imports still very much predominate with 80% of the ove­
rall traffic, although containerized export cargoes which 
presently consist mainly of agricultural products such as 
tea, coffee and even rubber have progressively increased 
in the recent past and are likely to continue to expand 
in the near future as oil—based economic growth increases 
the quantity of industrial products manufactured and 
exported. Table I—I shows Indonesia's international tra­
de from 1983 to 1985 ( 1st Sem. ) and Table 1-2 shows the 
type of service:
(Table 1-1)
1983 1984 1985 ( 1st Sem
I,OOOT I,000T " IjOOOT
( Export ) 13,829 18,139 7,245 . ■
Dry cargo 12,241 11,606 4,616
Liquid cargo 1,588 6,533 2,629
< Import ) 84,906 114,091 36,978
Dry cargo 18,909 18,414 8,018
Liquid cargo 66,011 95,677 28,960
T ota 1 98,740 132,230 44,223
Source: JAMRI Report, January 1987. Sea Communications.-
II A breakdown of the above according to the type of
service is shown in Table 1-2;
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C Table I
1983 1984 1985 ( 1st Sem. )
1,OOOT 1,OOOT 1,OOOT
General/Liner 18,964 19,380 6,837
Special 79,782 112,850 73,386
Total 98,746 132,230 44,223
Source: JAMRI, January 1987. Sea Communications.
FLEET COMPOSITION. A breakdown of fleet compositiovi of
Indonesia as at end of 1983 is shown in Table 1-3:
C Table 1-3 ) '
Type Number G/T %
General cargo 678 1,044,093 53.55
T ankers 144 371 19.07
Bulk carriers 11 205,768 10.55
Containerships 4 58,937 3.02
Passenger/cargo 16 46,477 2.38
Source: JAMRI, January 1987. Sea Communications.
Lloyd's Register of Shipping Statistics.
Indonesia 's largest port is Tanjung Priok. At
present, about 90% of all Indonesian container cargo is
handled at Tanjung Priok, for transshipment to other 
destination points. Djakarta Lloyd, the national line, 
now owns and operates three-fully cellular 1,152 TEU 
vessels as well as a number of newly delivered semi- 
containerships in the 200/550 TEU size ranges on the
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the Middletrades to Western Europe, the USA, Japan and 
East. Other Indonesian lines, including Admiral, Gesuri, 
Samudera, Trikora, etc., have also deployed a similar mix 
of fully and semi-cellular vessels and, in the case of 
Gesuri Lloyd, Ro-Ro units, on much the same pattern of 
routes. Indonesian container shipping activity is likely 
to continue to expand markedly in the medium term. As can 
be seen in Table 1-3 there are currently over half a 
million deadweight tonnes of general cargo shipping 
without TEU capacity within the existing fleets, much of 
which is deployed on domestic inter-island trade. (14) 
Table 1-4 shows the Tanjung Priok Containerized 
Throughput Volumes, 1932/1986:
( Table 1-4 ) (Containerized Cargo Throughput at Tanjung 
Priok)
1982 1983
1,OOOT 1 ,'OOOT
Bulk cargo 1,441 1,765
Bags cargo 1,600 2,032
Container!-
zed cargo 1 ,246 1,298
General cargo 4,360 3,643
Liquid cargo 505 ' 562
1986
1984 1985 (Jan.-Jul)
1,OOOT 1,OOOT 1,OOOT
1 ,358 1,695 1,047
1,930 2,400 1,510
1,585 1 ,792 1 ,271
3,489 3,185 2,010
783 6)38 403
Source: JAMRI, January 1987. Port Authority of Tanjung 
Priok.
In addition to Tanjung Priok, Surabaya and Belawan 
also handle limited volumes of container traffic at pre-
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sent, general cargo berths being utilized by self-sustai­
ning vessels in the main. All other ports are being pre­
pared for significant container trz^ffic. CIS)
FLEET SHARE IN THE LINER TRADE.
Indonesia has four national flag carriers, one of 
which, Djakarta Lloyd, is a state-owned. The company ope­
rates a fleet of more than 20 vessels totalling ISO,360 
DWT to Europe, North America, the Far East, and Austra­
lia. In 1977, the national fleet share of the Indonesia- 
Europe traffic was SO percent; in the Hong Kong-Indonesia 
service it was 55.3 percent. In the Indonesia-Singapore 
traffic, it was 55:AS cargo split, and the figure is re­
versed on the opposite direction according to the agree­
ment between Singapore and Indonesia. In the Indonesian- 
Philippne trade, on a 5D-50 basis between the Port of 
Davao C Philippines ) and Menado C Indonesia ).
In 1982, Presidential Decree 18 reserved for Indo­
nesian-! lag vessels the carriage of all cargoes, imports 
and exports, financed by the Indonesian government or by 
state-owned or state-financed companies. The objective of 
this action seemed to be to reserve all such cargo so 
that only the remaining cargo would be subject to AO-AO- 
20 allocation. As a result, it appeared that the Indone­
sian shipping lines could increase their carriage to over 
50 percent of the total trade of Indonesia. The impact of 
the decree on foreign shipping in Indonesia could be en­
ormous because the government has a hand- in a large num­
ber of the imports and exports. It is estimated that it 
will directly affect A0% of the imports and lOX of the 
exports. These figure do not include shipments of crude 
oil and petroleum products, which are largely shipped on 
foreign-flag vessels. <161
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4.6.2 MALAYSIA. As net oil exporter Malaysia is a fairly 
well developed middle income country. Export of raw mate­
rials - crude oil, rubber, timber, tin ores, and concen­
trates, vegetable oils, etc., still predominate, but 
exports of processed basic manufactures and industrial 
products are increasing steadily, many of which are sui­
table for container transportation. Imports of capital 
goods (. particularly machines/transport equipment > and 
basic manufactures C iron and steel, etc. ) predominate, 
foreign trade representing no less than 87% of Malaysian 
GNP in total. Trade in 1981 with Japan was 21.7%; EEC 
12.3%; and the USA 13.0%.(17)
A 1980 study from the Prime Minister's Department 
underlined a growing concern for the--d iversion of Malay­
sian cargo through Singapore-in 1978 an estimated 25 per­
cent of Malaysian exports by value went through Singapo­
re. This included approximately 30 percent of Malaysian 
rubber, 50 percent of its timber, almost 100 percent of 
canned pineapples and IS percent of its palm oil. To 
recapture much of this traffic the report suggested a 
wide range of development options for Malaysian portsinc- 
luding new container berths at Penang, the construction 
of a new port at Pulau Lumut near Port Kelang, the fur­
ther development of Johore, etc. Whether or not signifi­
cant diversion of trade can result without a wide ranging 
and restrictive regulatory framework is o-f course an open 
question. (18)
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(. Table M-1 ) Breakdown of Malaysian Foreign Seaborne
T rade as a throughput in two Major Ports
Kelang/Penang.
Year Total Vol. Total Vol. Total Vol. Container-
of cargo of liner of contai- ized Ratio
1,000 F/T 1,000 F/T ner cargo
1,000 F/T %
1981 9,888/6,225 7,375/3,175. 2,375/7,790 32.3/24.9
1982 10,544/6,225 7,740/3,494 2,523/1,024 32.6/29.3
1983 11,534/7,643 8,541/3,895 3,046/1,392 35.7/35.7
19SA 12,357/7,961 8,666/4,371 3,836/1,604 44.3/36.7
1985 12,462/7,446 8,360/3,985 4,165/1,704 49.8/42.8
Source: JAMRI, January 1987.
MALAYSIAN LINER FLEET. The national flag carrier, Malay­
sian International Shipping Corporation < MISC ), was 
founded in 1968. MISC is 51 percent government-owned, 
with another 10 percent held by various government agen­
cies; the remaining 39 percent is privately held. The 
principal aim of MISC was to provide enough national ton­
nage to carry its foreign trade and thus save foreign 
exchange and to provide shipping service that could show
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an operational profit. The ultimate aim of the company 
and the Malaysian shipping was to provide enough tonnage 
to secure 40 percent of its trade, in keeping with the 
40--40-20 cargo sharing provisions in the UNCTAD Liner 
Code. C19) The company has been very successful in buil­
ding up its fleet. After only six years of operation the 
fleet had fifteen vessels of 420,□□□ DWT, and by the end 
of 19S2 it had expanded to forty-four vessels of 1.4 mil­
lion DWT. Under the Fourth Malaysian Plan, the fleet is 
scheduled to expand to ninety vessels of 2.B million DWT 
by 1985. With the launching of the new state shipping 
company, Perbadanar National Shipping Line CPNSL), this 
afTfbitious target might be meet. C20.') As of the end of 
1985, Malaysia's containership fleet operating on inter­
national routes totalled five vessels (7,308 TE’J) , aoi 
increase over the year before in terms of TEU of roughly 
8.5% (574 TEUs) . A breakdown by route., is 78% on Far East/ 
Europe route and 24% on Australia/Mew Zealand route. The 
number of containerships operating in Far East trade is 
six (3,058 TEUs), accounting for 29.5% of Malaysia's to­
tal capacity. All of the above containerships are owned 
by the state shipping company, Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation, BHD.
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4.6.3 THE PHILIPPINES. The item-wise breakdown of the 
principal exports and imports of the Philippines in 19S4 
is shown in Table P—1 (US Mi 1.Dollarsl.
EXPORT IMPORT
Commodity Value % Commodity Value %
Coconut Products 727 13.5 Elec.Mach. 427 7.0
Sugar & its Prod. 279 5.2 Non-Elec.M. 420 6.9
Forest Products 271 . 5.0 Transport M. 98 1.6
Metal Ore 266 4.9 Wheat 131 .-1
Fruits 3t Vegetables 133 2.5 Chemicals 617 10.2
ICa Electric Mach. 329 6.1 T extile 158 2»
Textile 603 11.2 Iron/steel 186 3.1
Cooper Ingot 111 2.1 Crude Oil 1,64-9‘- 27.2
Other non- Consumption 367 6.0
industrial goods 438 8.1 goods
Sintering Iron Ore 105 1.9 Others 2,017 33.2
Others 2,024 37.5
Total 5 ,391 100.0 Total 6,070 100.0
Source : Central Bank.
The major trading partners of the Philippiines
are shown in Table P-2; Value of Trade by Nation (1984)
EXPORT IMPORT
Nation USS (mil. ;i % Nation USB (mil.) %
U .S .A . 2.003 37.2 U .S.A. 1,629 26.5
Japan 1,043 19.3 Mid-East 887 14.6
E E C  680 9.6 Japan 815 13.4
Asean 516 9.6 ASEAN 728 12.0
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Source: Central Bank
The Philippine flag vessels' participation in the 
country's foreign seaborne trade is shown in table P-3 
below.
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Ek ports 20,568 22,637 23,506 20,586 20,5A0 20,069
Imports 14,078 14,598 15,378 15,715 14,184 12,920
Total 34,646 37,235 38,884 35,301 34,724 32,989
Phil- 6,735 7,670 9,495 7,527 8,976 9,990
flag share
Percentage 19. 20.6 24.4 21.3 25.9 iO.
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines;
National Census Statistics Office; Filipino Shi­
powners' Association Study, 1985.
Phi1ippine—registered overseas fleet are predomi­
nantly employed in tramping over the world. Data for the 
period 1975 to 1980 show that vessels engaged in tramping 
in 1975 comprised 55.0% of the entire fleet, compared 
with 27.0% in liner operations and,18.0% in semi-liner 
trade. These proportions had not changed significantly by 
1985 .
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS LINER FLEET.
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(Table P-A) Containership fleet as of January 1987.
Name Capacity (TEU) Age Route
Galaxy 224 2 Phil.-Japan
Comet 138 5 Phil.-Japan
Challenger 224 J. Phil.-Japan
Jupiter 214 10 Phil.-Japan
Ragna 872 2 Worldwide
National Dignity 650 Phil.-US West Coast
National Honor 650 6 Phil.-US West Coast
National Pride 650 6 Phil.-US West Coast
National Leader 650 6 Chartered Out
Nat.Integrity 650 6 Chartered Out
National T rust 650 6  ^Chartered out
Total 5,372
Source: JAMRI January 1937.
The Philippine container fleet accounts for 3.1% of 
the ASEAN containership fleet in terms of gross tonnage, 
and 10.4% in terms of number of ships. The " National " 
vessels is owned by the National Shipping Corporation of 
the Philippines (NSCP) which is designate.d by the Federal 
Maritime Commission as government controlled ocean common 
carrier under the U.S. Shipping Act, 1984. The "National" 
ships are operated independently in the Phi 1ippine-United 
States ( west coast only ) liner trade on a forthnightly 
interval. For US-bound voyage, 20 percent of the " Natio­
nal " vessels TEU capacity is loaded in Manila, consist­
ing mainly of foodstuffs, furnitures, and leather goods. 
A further 40% is loaded in Taiwan's strong export market.
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and the remainder in Hong Kong and Busan C Koreax ) , K'SCP 
carriage share in Philippine-US liner trade was estimated 
at 15% of value and volume in* West coast only. No service 
is provided by water to the US East coast by NSCP. The 
two other liner operators, namely: Eastern Shipping Lines 
and Cresta-Monte Shipping corporation are privately- 
owned. Both provide one to two monthly semi-container 
services on the RP-Japan route. Until its demise in 1981 
Philippine contaixier shipping was dominated by the Phi­
lippine International Shipping Corp. (PISC). The five 
container/bulk carriers operated by PISC on the Europe/- 
Far East trade, with a total 290,000 DWT, provided a con­
tainer capacity of some 5,000 TEUs, roughly 45% of the 
country's container carrying capacity at the time. The 
traditional Filipino deep sea liner operator, Maritime 
Compamy of the Philippines CMCP) , ceased cperatio’n in 
the middle of 1984. Until its bankruptcy in 1984, MCP 
operated 10 break-bulk conventional 12,000 DWT cargo ves­
sels on the Phi 1ippine-Europe route and Phi1ippine-U.S . 
Liner route. With the demise of MCP, deep sea container 
opera tions are dominated by the National Saileon Ship­
ping Corporation ( now National Shipping Corporation of 
the Philippines 1.C21!)
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4.fc.4 SINGAPORE
Singapore can be considered a developed upper mid­
dle income country. Singapore, together with the Philip­
pines, is the only ASEAN country handling significant 
volumes of container traffic in the early 1970s. Since 
this time, Singapore has experienced phenomenal traffic 
growth of containerized transshipment traffic to neigh­
boring countries. While undoubtedly benefiting from a 
particularly advantageous location and an enhanced degree 
of political stability, the progressive expansion of con­
tainerization to other developing ASEAN countries will in 
all probability see Singapore accounting for steady dec­
lining proportion of ASEAN container trade in the future. 
(21) Singapore Foreign Trade Indicators C1981) is shown 
in Table S—i , below:
Imports Exports Total
Foreign Trade as % of GNP 
Foreign Trade with;
34.0
USA 12.6 13.2 12.9
EEC 9.8 10.5 10.1
Japan 18.8 10.1 15.1
Foreign Trade in Food 6.1 5.2 5.7
Industrial Supplies 4.8 8.3 6.3
Mineral Fuels 33.7 27.3 30.9
Animal/Vegetable Oils 1.2 1.9 1.5
Chemicals 5.1 8.2 6.4
Basic Manufactures 13.8 • 8.2 11.4
Machines/Transport Equipt. 27.7 26.1 27.0
Miscellaneous Manufactures 6.5 7.1 6.7
Source: UN Yearbook of' International Trade Statistics
1981 .
SINGAPORE LINER CARGO: Singapore liner cargo is shown in 
Table S-2 below:
YEAR TOTAL VOLUME TOTAL VOLUME CONTAINER-
OF LINER CARGO OF CONTAINER IZED Ratio
(F/T) (F/T) %
1981 31,357,001 14,673,144 46.8%
1982 34,049,397 15,673,464 46.0
1983 37,471,168 18,766,676 50.1
1984 40,732,470 22,100,694 54.3
1985 36,944,064 23,861,823 64.6
Note: More than One Third of the Total Cargo are Trans-
shipment cargo.
Source: JIRGA, January 1987.
SINGAPORE MERCHANT FLEET., Singapo rean ships serving 
international routes as of the end of 198B numbered 13 
<17,3A5 TEUs), increasing by 2G.6% (2,968 TEUs) over the 
previous year. The country's share of the world's full—  
containership fleet increased to 1.6% from the previous 
year's 1.4%. Neptune Orient Lines (NOD, Singapore natio­
nal carrier, has 11 containerships or 15,803 TEUs, 
accounting for 91% of Singapore's total capacity on 
international routes. In the Far East feeder service, 
Singapore has eight containerships (3,901 TEUs), accoun­
ting for 18.4% of Singapore's total capacity. A breakdown 
of route of the disposition of Singaporean containership 
in international trade is 60% on the North American (East 
and West Coasts) route, 14.5% on the Australia/New Zea­
land route, 13.5% on the Indian route and 12% of the 
European route. (22)
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4.6.5 THAILAND. The Thai economy has been adversely 
affected by the introduction of ITC tin export quota in 
April 1982, offshore metal and concentrate exports total­
ling some 45,00G tonnes in 1983 as compared with 75,ODD 
tonnes in 1981. Weaker oil markets, growing domestic 
energy prodduction (natural gas, lignite, etc) and rela­
tively boLiyant demand in the agriculatural sector, where 
rice and maize and vegetable/fruit exports are of parti­
cular significance, have removed some of the economic 
pressures, private manufacturing investment increasing 
markedly and inflation and domestic rates declining 
sharply over 1982/83. Having exceeded the two million 
tonne level for the first time in 1931, box traffic 
increased to some 2.3 mt and 2.8 mt in 1983; 1984 expec­
tations suggest some 340,000 TEU with an aggregate ton­
nage of just 3mt will be handled. (23) Thai container 
trade volumes, while increasing rappidly, are as yet 
still mainly comprised of transshipped feeder service 
traffic, ship size limitations at the premier port, Bang­
kok, continuing to disbar the accomodation of deep sea 
vessels much above 15,000 DWT. Liner cargoes in export 
trades amounted to 2,337,000 mt in 1985, accounting for 
almost all of the export cargoes. In imports, liner car­
goes totalled 4,023,000 mt in 1985, or approximately 62% 
of the total import cargoes of 6,497, 000 mt. Containeri­
zed shipments in export trades amounted to 2,332,000 mt 
(201,000 TELis) , accounting for almost all of the export 
cargoes, while those in import trades totalled 1,549,000 
mt (119,000 TEUs), or nearly 23.8% of the total import 
cargoes. The containerized ratio of containerized cargoes 
to total liner cargoes was 99.8% for export trades and 
38.5% for import trades* (24)
THAILAND MERCHANT FLEET. State controlled shipping enti-
ties - including Jutha, Thai Maritime, Thai Internatio­
nal, United Thai, etc. - account for the bulk of the con­
tainerized fleet, much of which presently comprises small 
semi-containerships in the 50/350 TEU ranges. The greater 
proportion of these vessels is engaged on serving various 
short sea intra-South and East Asian feeder routes - par­
ticularly those to Japan and Hong Kong. Unithai, the only 
deep sea operator, currently operates a Far East/Europe 
service in conjunction with MISC, the Malaysian national 
carrier, primarily utilizing three small 352 TEU semi—  
containerships apquired in 19S2. A joint-service on the 
short haul trade to Hong Kong is also operated by the 
privately owned Thai Overseas Line in conjunction with 
OOCL.
This Section of this Chapter deals with the present 
situation of the ASEAN as regards shipping conferences.
4.8 ASEAN AND CONFERENCES .
Historically, regionalism has been an expression of 
unity against a common foe. In ASEAN shipping, the common 
enemy has been the Far East Freight Conference (FEFCl and 
other Western shipping institutions. The FEFC, probably 
the strongest conference on any of the deep sea trades, 
is a classic example of closed conference. The ASEAN 
agreed that FEFC had become too powerful an econmic force 
in ASEAN affairs. In the US, the system has been declared 
in violation of anti-trust legislation, which requires 
that a conference must be open to all shipping lines that 
wish to join. The main area of disagreement between the 
conference and ASEAN .shippers in the ,1970s was over a 
series of rate hikes. From 1971 to 1977, FEFC hikes and 
surcharges increased the freight rate by 93%. The
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shippers felt that those increases were not at all 
operational and that they were indirectly financing new 
vessel acquisition programs. During 1974 the ASEAN 
Shippers Councils formed the Federation of ASEAN Shippers 
Council (FASO to bring unity into the negotitations 
between the shippers' councils and the FEFC. The power of 
the FEFC lies in its number of sailings and the shippers' 
rebate or loyalty clause. In ASEAN, the FEFC inducted 
Neptune Orient Lines ( N O D , Malaysian International 
Shipping Corporation CMISC), and United Thai Lines 
CUNITHAL), and Djakarta Lloyd Cas associate member) - the 
national flaig carriers for Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, 
and IndonE’sia. Further, it has added OOCL, part of C.Y. 
Tung Group in Hong Kong, Cho Yang, Korean Shipping, and 
Taiwan's powerful Evergreen. This group represents both 
of the stronger political and economic liner shipping 
interests in South East Asia. (25) Maersk Line left the 
FEFC for a year, and MISC fought long and hard to 
increase its liftings. MISC had reportedly resigned from 
FEFC effective July 1987 due to its disagreements with 
FEFC. (26) Evergreen 'has also resigned amd is the 
largest independent on the Europe-Far East route. The 
large volume Europe/Far East is essentially dominated by 
the FEFC consortium - TRIO, ACE, and ScanDutch, whose 
main ports of call are in Japan. There is a considerable 
hostility between the independent and FEFC as a result of 
FAK rates reportedly 10/40% lower than the conference. 
Foreign flag operators still account for- the most of the 
fully-cellular services to Thailahd, Philippines and 
Malaysia, but domesitc lines, including Galleon Shipping, 
Philippines carrier (now National Shipping Corporation of 
the Philippines), Thai Overseas Line and MISC are making 
steady progress. MISC has only recently suspended opera­
tions on a direct Far East-US West Coast service folio-
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4.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, (a) Summary: -- ASEAN coun­
tries are still suffering from continuing substantial 
deficits in their invisible trade accounts. These situa­
tions had induced ASEAN governments to adopt cargo reser­
vations aimed at.protecting and improving the share of 
domestic shipping lines. Some of ASEAN countries had the 
policy that export cargoes have to be shipped directly 
from domestic ports to importing countries without regio­
nal transshipment. One can see conflicts arising out of 
such situation in that national interests and policies 
often do not coincide with international trends. Also, 
competition among shipping lines from different countries 
is commonly heavily distorted through access to low-inte­
rest capital and substantial subsidy Schemes available to 
carriers from some countries, while not available or to a 
much lesser extent to carriers from other countries. 
Furthermore, there are frequently substantial differences 
in the degree of maritime industry regulation and in 
development strategies and policies among trading 
nations. All these circumstances make it extremely diffi­
cult to manage trade efficiently while trying to preserve 
national aims. Potential conflicts between national 
objectives and international practices appear inevitable. 
Yet, in order to be able to market export commodities 
competitively and to reduce the cost of required imports, 
there is growing evidence that the regional economies 
would act in their best interest if they adjust to inter­
national practices and trends. Generally, there are indi­
cations that this process is taking place to some degree. 
Several governments have already adopted the view that 
the international environment determines the most effi­
cient trade and shipping arrangements which will be ulti-
wing FMC designation as a "controlled carrier(27>
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mately beneficial to all trading partners. However, this 
view necessarily implies that outside forces exert inf­
luence on decisions regarding infrastructure development, 
trade management and shipping arrangements. On the other 
hand, awareness is growing that maritime sector develop­
ment policies in all regional economies need to be inte­
grated and coordinated at national, subregional and 
regional basis. C28)
b)Conclusion: In the light of the trends and ten­
dencies in international trade and shipping, the regional 
governments of the ASEAN are faced with issues like: 
market responsive development of port infrastructure; <2) 
need to gear up for effectively adjusting national tra^ns- 
port networks to evolving shipping and cargo handling 
technology changes; (3) need to restructure cargo manage­
ment arrangements; (4) need to reorganise domestic, i.e.
interisland shipping; C5) role and degree of participa­
tion of national flag carriers in international traide; 
and C6) implied necessity to reformulate national trams- 
port policies.
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CHAPTER 5
RECOMMENDED STRATEGY.
5. 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
At the introduction of this Study it was brought 
out that the implementation of the Code of Conduct has 
been lagging in both the developed-economy countries and 
the developing states. Then it was stressed in Chapter 3 
that implementation of the Code of Conduct presupposes a 
series of juridical acts, i. e., the State must first be 
a Contracting State to the Convention, either by defini­
tive signature, approval, acceptance, ratification, or 
accession; secondly, that as Contracting Party the State 
shall take such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to implement the -Code; and thirdly, the commer­
cial parties shall implement the Code pursuant to the 
general framework of the national legislation and the 
Code. The drafting and enactment of suitable national 
legislation is, therefore, an indispensable part of any 
programme for implementing international conventions. The 
crucial importance of appropriate national legislation at 
the national level has been fully recognised by Article 
47 of the Code. It was mentioned also in Chapter-3 that 
in the ASEAN, only Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippi­
nes had ratified the Code. Brunei, Singapore and Thailand 
have not. The first three ASEAN countries have not yet 
adopted a national legislation to implement the Code. The 
problem of dealing with the foreign trading States which 
are not State Parties to the Code has been pointed out. 
Nevertheless, despite this situation whereby not all
129
ASEAN countries are Contracting Parties to the Code, and 
the fact that their foreign trading partners are non-Co- 
dist countries, this does not indicate that the Code is a 
useless instrument, because consultation will continue 
between the conferences and the shippers, shippers' orga­
nizations, and governments as provided for by the Code. 
It is only from the national implementation and practices 
that the nature and shape of the Code's regimes could be 
developed and crystallized.
In Chapter 2, it was indicated that liner shipping 
environment is continually altered, that environment in 
turn alters the potentials, realities and challenges pre­
sented to shipping operators. The probability of a ship­
ping line surviving can be enormously enhanced if the 
enterprise is transformed to reflect the constantly 
changing market, service, technological and legal forces, 
and if distribution chain activities are carried out in 
the most cost-effective manner. In an industry that has 
no exclusivity, in the sense that entry and exit barriers 
are existing, a positive disposition to changes in a per­
manently evolving, competitive environment is the only 
lasting advantage. This Study seeks to assist such deci­
sion-making by means of an evaluation of the forces which 
are changing the industry, and to provide the ASEAN 
countries with information which they might uti1ize to 
commence preparation for the deep-sea liner shipping 
policy in the future.
5.2 COMMON LINER POLICY FOR THE ASEAN- COUNTRIES.
Survival of liner operators requires knowledge, 
skills and understanding beyond the technologies of ves­
sel operations, ports infrastructure development, and
130
trained manpower. The major challenge facing the ASEAN 
countries in this time of structural change is related to 
the establishment of a common policy which they might 
coordinate their independent deep-sea liner shipping 
activities. The three principal elements of a liner ship­
ping policy are commercial, economic security, and natio­
nal defense. Almost all ASEAN countries have similar 
requirements in each of these areas, and this similarity 
permits them to consider the elaboration of a common 
liner shipping policy.
Joint actions of shipping lines of this region, 
whether to establish multina^tional companies, consortia, 
rationalize operaitions or execute slot-chartering arrang­
ements, should allow them to achieve an appropriate scale 
of operations, offer modern technologies, miaintained fre­
quencies required by cargo owners, pool technical and 
operational experience and have a wider financial base, 
all of which would contribute directly to more cost-ef­
fective services. A study carried out by Haipag-Lloyd sug­
gests that vessel capacity utilization on the North 
Atlantic could rise from 68 to 85 per cent if services 
were coordinated and that it would lead to a cost savings 
of over 2D per cent. Hapag-Lloyd began implementing the 
results of this study when it and Atlantic Container Line 
rationalized their services on two routes between Europe 
and North America. This rationalization eliminated four 
vessels, permits the sharing of equipment', and is hoped 
to save millions of US dollars for both lines. Similarly, 
the cooperation between Barber Blue Sea and ScanCarriers 
has resulted in an overall improvement of US 30 million 
dollars in the two companies' operating results. Thus, 
shipping lines can enjoy economies of scale not only 
through the acquisition of large-scale vessels, which was
131
presented at part 2.1.5 of Chapter 2, but also throuqh 
economies of cooperation. Cl)
1.Operational aspect of a common liner policy. At
present almost all ASEAN countries seek to satisfy their 
liner transport needs independently. While there are cer­
tain differences in national economic goals which are 
utilized to justify such independent operations, the 
long-term shipping crisis has made it necessary to join 
with other lines in order to rationalize service. As 
pointed out in Chapter 3, the enormous sums required for 
modern transport systems,,1ike container and ro/ro ser­
vices, normally exceed the financial capacity of single 
company and lead of necessity to stronger cooperation 
among shipping lines of different nationalities. Withy
such international cooperation, most of the conference 
container and ro/ro services that aire now operating 
worldwide, would have not materialized, and ocean trans­
port costs would have gone up much more steeply during 
the last 10 years.
With the establishment of RTW services by Evergreen 
and USL (now defurjct) and other liner operators such as 
ABC Container, Barber Blue Sea, and recent1y ,Senator 
Line of FRG using containerships of smaller TEL) capacity, 
i.e., 1,2D0 TED, many European and US ship operators as 
well as those of this region believe that they face the 
very real risk of forced rationalizations or merely pro­
viding feeder services for those operators. Until its 
recent bankruptcy USL utilized 12 very large liner ves­
sels of 4,458 TEUs in its eastbound service, while EL 
employs 20 vessels of 2,728 TEUs and two of 2,940 TEUs in 
its east and westbound services. Both of these lines 
offer traditional end-to-end ocean-feeder and inland
transport, services. While the risk appears lessened with 
the bankruptcy of USL, such is not the case. In effect, 
that risk should be considered in the broader context of 
the forces which are restructuring the liner industry. 
Whether RTWS or traditional liner services, the real risk 
facing liner operators is related to the establishment of 
intermodal distribution systems in which they do not par­
ticipate. Such distribution systems view oceanliner 
transport as merely one activity in the movement of goods 
from origin to destination. Shipping lines which are part 
of an intermodal distribution system should have greater- 
access to cargoes, probably leaiving for non—system opera­
tors only cargoes in low—volume and unbalatnced tra d^e.
In 1985 approximately 60 per cent of the exports 
and imiports by value of the ASEAN Were destined to and 
originated from; North America, Europe, and Japan. This 
concentration of trade should provide an appropriate 
basis for the establishment of distribution systems in 
those routes. For example, trans-Atlantic and trans-Paci- 
fic liner operators from other regions which seek to 
enhance loaid factors could make arrangements with cargo 
owners, land carriers, shipping companies which provide 
services between ports in North America and those of 
ASEAN region, and others to establish origin to destina­
tion distribution systems. In November 1986 the major 
intermodal operator APL began offering such a service 
from Australia to the Indian Subcontinen't and Mid-East 
Gulf. In this operation cargoes are to be carried between 
Australia and Singapore by the ANRO consortium comiposed 
of Australian National Line (AND, Indonesian Djakarta 
Lloyd, Singapore' s Neptune Orient Lines CNOLl, Nedlloyd 
and Australia Straits Container Line, for transshipment 
to APL ‘vessels. As ocean-liner transport of the future
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will be carried out in the context of distribution 
systems, liner operators of the ASEAN region should care­
fully evaluate common policies which might lead to the 
establishment of their own systems. <21
In the light of the need for liner operators to 
rationalise their operations with other similarly situa­
ted companies, ASEAN countries might wish to consider the 
elaboration of a common liner policy which could include 
coordination of the independent operating patterns of 
their fleets.
2.Institutional aspects of a common liner policy.
The structural changes occurring in ocean liner transport 
have created a pressivig need to evaluate the role accor- 
ded cargo reservation regimes by ASEAN countries. In 
addition to the institutional aspects of a common- liner 
policy presented herein above, ASEAN countries might also 
consider what modifications to reservation regimes would 
reflect the ocean-liner transport environment of the 
future and, at the same time, avoid counter-measures per­
mitted by the common shipping policy of the EEC and the 
US Shipping Act of 19SA.
5.3 CONMON POLICY IN IMPLEMENTING THE CODE.
The Code of Conduct provides a great opportunity 
for implementing the Code on a regional basis. The EEC 
transport policy under the "Brussels Package" embodied in 
EEC Council Regulations on May 15, 1979, amounts to a
free shipping zone. This principle of applying the Code 
of Conduct to a group of countries could also apply as 
well to the ASEAN because of their geography and cargo 
mix. It would require a level of unity that has not yet
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been achieved in ASEAN, but the trade is in place and the 
ships would follow the trade. The Code of Conduct, in 
Article 2, paragraph S, provides for regional coope­
ration, viz:
"The national shipping lines of a region, members 
of a conference, may redistribute among themsel­
ves by mutual agreement the shares in trades 
allocated to them, in accordance with article 2, 
paragraphs 4 to 7 inclusive.-
" Because of their importance, paragaphs 4 to 7 
are quoted in full:
" 4. When determining a share of a trade within a 
pool of individual member lines and/or groups of 
national shipping lines in accordance with 
article 2, paragraph 2, the following principles 
regarding their right to participation in the 
trade carried by the conference shall be obser­
ved, unless otherwise mutually agreed;
Cal The group of national shipping lines 
of each of two countries ,the foreign trade 
between which is carried by the conference 
shall have equal rights to participate in 
the freight and volume of traffic genera­
ted by their mutual foreign trade and car­
ried by the conference‘
Cb) Third-country shipping lines, if any, 
shall have the right to acquire a signifi­
cant part, such as 20 per cent, in the 
freight and volume .of traffic generated by
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that trade.
5. If, for any one of the countries whose trc<de 
is carried by a conference, there are no natio­
nal shipping lines participating in the carriage 
of that trade, the share of the trade to which 
nattional shipping lines of that country would 
be entitled under article 2, paragraph 4, shall 
be distributed among the individual member lines 
participating in the trade in proportion to 
their respective share.
6. If the national! shipping lines of one 
country decide not to carry their full share of 
the trade, that portion of their share of the 
trade they do not carry shall be distributed 
among the individual member lines participating 
in the trade in proportion to their- shares.
7. If the national shipping lines of the coun­
tries concerned do not participate in the trade 
between those countries covered by a conference 
between those countries shall be allocated bet­
ween the participating member lines of third 
countries by commercial negotiations between 
those 1ines."
An interesting question is whether a country with a 
right to carriage arising from negotiations under the 
Code which cannot, or does not wish to, carry, its share 
can sell, or otherwise dispose of it. There are two views 
on this question. Some of the developed market-economy 
countries <3) stated that the country cannot sell its 
right while other countries stated that they can sell
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their rights. Sturmey C4) says that in principle there is 
no reason why the country ca^nnot sell but in practice it 
is doubtful. He says that the Code has nothing to say on 
such a subject and if there is any resort to subterfuge 
anyway, it probably does not make a lot of difference 
what the considerations are involved. But if there is to 
be a reliance on the "unless otherwise mutually agreed" 
formula of paragraph A, then the knowledge that there has 
been some sort of auction may not help towards the 
attainment of mutual agreement. On the other hand, if a 
country does sell the right to carry its share, the con-- 
fe'rence cannot do anything about it. This question is 
independent of the right of a country to allow a foreign 
line to establish itself in its territory and to carry 
its share of the cargo. The Code does not touch on this 
question. This is covered by the UN Convention on the 
Conditions for the Registration of Ships, 1986. Finally, 
there is nothing to prevent a country wishing to benefit 
from its cargo rights under the Code to concede those 
rights to a foreign company in a^ ny of several ways: ?.al 
for an annual fee (that is, sale or lease); (b) in a pac­
kage deal involving the use of the national—flag and the 
rights of carriage in return for other considerations; 
(c) through a slot-chartering arrangement; or Cd) through 
a joint venture operation. (5)
The Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Councils (FASO 
has asserted that the way to take advan-tage of the Code 
is through the formation of an ASEAN' "Super Line" into 
which ASEAN cargoes would be pooled. In addition, the 
FASC can deal effectively and exert greater influence 
with the conference in Code-related matters.
5.4 SUMMARY OF COOPERATION PRACTICED BY LINER OPERATORS.
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Pressnted below in X -S In) 10 *1 X c* summary of CQopera-
tion forms practiced by liner operate rs.
Table 1. Cooperation Forms Practiced by Liner Operators:
Cooperation Cartel Syndicate Consortium Joint
Areas Venture
Service Common Common Common Common
Scheduling Operations of:
Vessels .. Common Common Common Common
Terminals. Common Common Common Common
Tariffs Common Common Common Common
Revenues Common Common Common Common
Nam.e Common Common Common Common
Marketing Individual Common Common Common
Inland Op- Individual Common Comimon Common
Management Individual part1y w O fT) (Tf 01*1 Common
Common
Investment Individual partly Common Common
p 1 ans Common
Ownership:
Vessels .. Individual Individual Individual C o fn fn Q *n
Terminals. Individual Individual Common Common
Examples -
of joint
operations. Trio Group Scan-Dutch Atlantic Overseas
Container Container
LineCACL) Ltd.COCL)
Asia Con- Austra 1 iai/ Associated
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Source
tainer Europe Con- Container
Europe CACE) tainer Ser- T ransport-
Scan Austra- vices(AECS) ation(ACT)
1 ia
Caribbean South Afri- Dart Con-
Overseas ca Group tainer Line
Line(CAROL) Atlantica,
Sp. A .
C. vonSchirach “Szmigiel, Liner Shipping
General Cargo T ransport, Stockholm Schoo
Economics, 1979.
5.5 DIFFERENT COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS DEFINED
Cooperative agreements between carriers vary-in the 
degree of cooperation involved, from simple rate agree­
ments through allocation of 
joint service agreements, and, 
right merger between liner shi
Joint service agreement 
which establishes a new and 
be operated by the parties as 
and separate service fixes 
own bills of lading, and acts 
rier.
sailings, revenue pools, 
at the other extreme, out- 
pping firms. C6)
is defined as an agreement 
separate line or service to 
a joint venture. The new 
its own tariffs, issues its 
generally as a single car-
The parties to a joint service .agreement agree to 
establish and maintain a joint cargo or a joint cargo and 
passenger service. They cooperate to supplu tonnage for 
the joint service as their owned and chartered vessels 
are available. However, profit or loss accrues and are
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borne solely by the owner or charterer of the vessel. 
Usually, each party delegates to a separate corporation 
all management and organizational responsibility of the 
joint service, such as the booking and solicitation of 
cargo and passengers, and the collection of freight and 
passenger revenues.
Although the parties participate in a joint ser­
vice, their bills of lading, dock receipts and passenger 
tickets must show the name of the party for whose account 
the vessel is operated. All these papers may be termina­
ted by mutual consent of the parties or by one of the 
parties giving the required' notice to the other pcirty and 
to the government agency involved.
Consortium. In a consortium providing liner servi­
ces, usually only the ships will remain under separate 
ownership.
Joint Venture. The closest form of cooperation bet­
ween independent liner companies, the participants joint­
ly own Cor lease! vessels, equipment, terminals, and the 
venture has its own management. Tax considerations dicta­
te that most joint ventures are among companies from a 
single country.
Merger. When two firms merge, they no longer have 
separate identity in any respect and become a new single 
entity.
The closer forms of operating agreements — joint 
service, consortium, joint venture — implicitly satisfy 
the objectives of a pool. Pools merely represent one form 
of carrier cooperation, short of a joint service.
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5.6 REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN SHIPPING.
Mention has been made about the regional cooperation 
in shipping of the South Pacific countries of Tonga, 
Samoa, Australia, and New Zealamd. There are cases howe­
ver in different parts of the world where developing 
countries cooperated in shipping on a regional basis. One 
way of enabling developing countries to participate in 
the carriage of their foreign trade could be to encourage 
this trend and to ensure that the services are operated 
on an efficient, cost-competitive basis.Examples of other 
international joint ventures involving two or more deve­
loping countries include 'two liner companies in the 
Caribbean-WISCO, which includes Trinidad and Tobago, Ant­
igua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mont­
serrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, and NAMUCAR 
which includes Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicara­
gua, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Other examples 
include one miajor oil shipping company CAMPTC) in the 
Middle East which includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates; and one major liner company CUASC) in the same 
region 'involving Bsihrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Ara­
bia, and the United Arab Emirates, and one liner company 
in the Pacific (Pacific Forum Line) already mentioned 
above. There are also a significant number of bilateral 
shipping companies involving either government or private 
interests in two developing countries Cfo.r instance, Ira- 
no/Hind Company Ltd. and Arya National Shipping Line of 
Iran; the Syro-Jordanian Shipping Company involving the 
two governments; the Jamaica Merchant Marines Ltd. invol­
ving Jamaica and Mexico; and Flota Mercante GranColombia- 
na between Colombia and Ecuador. Apart from joint ventu­
res between developing countries, there has also been in
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recent years a large number of joint ventures between 
established shipping or trading companies in developed 
market economy countries and government or private inte­
rests in individual developing countries, particularly, 
in the Middle East. The status of most of these joint 
ventures, however, is not known. In many cases these 
were new companies with direct government ownership while 
in others they involve one or more pre-existing shipping 
lines as in the case of Irano—Hind Shipping Company and 
UASC. Information is not available to evaluate the econo­
mic and financial success of the ventures, but it is 
understood that a number of the sub-regional, multinatio­
nal shipping companies have-in recent years been losing 
money. It is not known to what extent losses are due to 
initial starting up difficulties, the gestation period it 
takes for trade to build up, given particular market con­
ditions, or to poor management planning, operations or 
uncommercial policies. This reportedly has been the case 
of two multinational companies in the Middle East (AMPTC 
and UASC), and two in the Caribbean (WISCO and NAMUCAR). 
On the other hand, the Irano-Hind Shipping Company appa­
rently was profitable prior to the recent political 
events. It is also reported that WISCO's financial situa­
tion is improving after years of losses. A large number 
of regional or sub-regional technical assistance projects 
in the maritime sector in both West and East Africa were 
included in the Program of Action of the U.N. Transport 
and Communications Decade for Africa 1973-1988.t?)
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CHAPTER 6
t h e : f*hxl_x erximee c a s e :
6.1 INTRODUCTION.
The Philippines is one of the earliest developing 
States to ratify the Code of Conduct on 6 June 1976, or 
two years after the adoption by the United Nations Con­
ference on Plenipotentiaries of the Code of Conduct on 4 
April 1974. Ever since, however, no national legislation 
was enacted to implement the Code of Conduct in pursuance 
of its Article 47, requiring Contracting States to take 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
implement the Code. The Code of Conduct entered into 
force internationally on 6 October 1983 when the required 
number of ratifications and tonnage was fulfilled with 
the ratifications of the Federal Republic of Gerfi)any and 
The Netherlands on 6 April 1983.
It is assumed that the international debates in the 
early 70s on ocean shipping had influenced the government 
to focus on its maritime industry.
First, the Philippine maritime industry developed 
from the postwar era to the present largely through the 
initiatives of the private sector. But the Philippine- 
flag vessels share in the carriage of the seaborne trade 
was approximated to be over 20% only and in the liner 
ssc^tor of the seaborne trade, the share was estimated to 
be less or 15% of the volume and freight of the liner 
cargo in the Philippine-United States where the Philip­
pine national flag liner operators namely, the National 
Galleon Shipping Corporation Cnow called the National
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Shipping Corporation of the Philippines (NSCP)) and 
Maritime Company of the Philippines (now defunct since 
1984•> were active. The NSCP has been designated by the 
FMC a government—contro11ed ocean common carrier under 
the Controlled Ocean Carrier Act, 1978 as amended by the 
Shipping Act of 1984.
Secondly, to rectify the deplorable condition of 
the industry and to make it an effective instrument in 
the furtherance of the nation's economic and development 
growth, the government decided to take a djjrect hand in 
the development of the industry. Thus, the Maritime 
Industry Authority was crea'ted on 6 June 1974 by Philip­
pine Presidential Decree No. 474, to serve as government 
arm that will undertake the development, promotion and 
regulation of the maritime industry.
Thirdly, Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1466 
CP.D. 1466.) was issued on, June 1, 1978, reserving cargo 
sold to, purchased, financed, or guaranteed by, the Gov­
ernment or government-Owned or controlled corporations, 
of state financing institutions, to Philippine-flag ves­
sels.
Lastly, on January 19, 1982, Presidential Executive 
Order No. 679 <E.O. 7691 was issued reserving at least 
80% of the Philippine export and import liner cargo not 
covered by P.D. 1466 for carriage by national flag ves­
sels of the Philippines and its bilateral partner in 
equal shares, with the remaining cargo to be available to 
third-flag vessels. The rules and regulations implemen­
ting E.O. 769 became effective July 22, 1982. In separate 
Memorandum Order No. 3 issued by the Maritime Industry 
Authority (MARINA), E.O. 769 was implemented initially in
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the Phi 1ippine—US Liner trade where two Philippine liner 
operators, above-mentioned, were actively operating.
This chapter attempts to discuss the implementation 
of Executive Order No. 769 (E.O. 769) in view of the fol­
lowing considerations; Cl) E.O. 769, otherwise called as 
the Cargo Sharing Law attempted to divide the liner cargo 
similar to the cargo sharing formula of the Code of Con- 
uct; C2) E.O. No. 769 was the most controversial piece of 
national legislation intended to promote and develop the 
shipping interests of the country. A chorus of protests 
was received from the developed market—economy countries, 
both jointly from the OECD a)-id individually from US and 
Japan; and C3) the author of this study was directly res­
ponsible in the implementation of E.O. 769. A new office 
called - Liner Traffic Regulations Office CLITRO) - a 
Unit in the MARINA, with 18 staff, headed by this res­
earcher was created in 1982 to supervise and coordinate 
its implementation. The LITRO implemented the waiver 
system in the Phi 1ippine-US liner trade from 1982 to 1984 
when the Cargo Sharing Law (E.O. 769) was indefinitely
suspended. At that time, the MCP, one of Philippine liner 
operators in the RP-US liner trade met financial diffi­
culty and finally ceased operation, leaving the NSCP the 
only Philippine national•1ine in the trade.
6.2 CARRIAGE PERFORMANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE FLAG VESSELS.
Prior to the creation of the MARINA (1) in 1974, 
the participation of the Philippine flag vessels in the 
carriage of the Philippine seaborne trade was only 7.8% 
of the trade volume and.the balance of*92.2% was carried 
by foreign flag vessels. This situation improved in 1981 
when the Philippine flag vessels' share increased to
14B
15.0% of the 
(Philippine:) 
in the third 
share, the 
10% in early 
in 1979.
trade volume. In terms of value, the RP-- 
flag vessels carried 17.8%. This increased 
quarter of 1981 to 21%. In terms of freight 
Philippine flag vessels generated less than 
1970s. This freight share increased to 15.0%
In terms of trading routes, the Philippine flag 
vessels carried 18% of total trade volume in Philippine— 
Japan route; 15% in the Phi 1ippine-UB route; 10% in the 
Phi 1ippine-EEC route and 9% in the Philippine-Australia 
ro'ute by volume. Philippine external trade has always 
been predominantly moved on tramp/bulk shipping rather 
than on liner basis. In 1980, only 23% of the total trade 
volume was carried on conference liners serving Philip- 
pine/Japan trade route; 15% of the total volume moved in 
liner basis on the Phi 1ippine—US trade route; and other 
routes hardly any volume of trade was carried on liner 
basis. Such cargo movement profile is similar with the 
profile of the Philippine merchant fleet which is predo­
minantly comprised of tramp/bulk tannage. The Philippine 
economy is heavily dependent on its foreign trade. The 
trade is likewise dependent on the water transport facil- 
ilities considering that the country is separated from 
her neighbors by bodies of water. Although the Philippine 
tonnage has increased over the last ten years,the picture 
appears rather discouraging when viewed in the light of 
the Philippine flag vessels' participation in the trans­
portation of export and import cargoes. The carriage per­
formance of the Philippine flag vessels is shown in Table 
1 below: C1979 and 1980 in %)
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Trade Route Volume Freight Volume Freight
Phil./Japan 21 20 IS 17
Phil./US 21 14 15 IS
Phil./EEC 10 8 10 7
Phil./Australia 23 9 9 3
Total 20 16 15 15
Source: National Census and Statistics Office.
6.3 VALUE OF PHILIPPINE SEABORNE TRADE
The value of Philippines' seaborne trade (both imp­
ort and export) was estimate'd at US 12 billion dollars 
annually in the early 19S0s. It is sometimes assumed that 
ocean freight rates represent about 10% of the value of 
the goods transported. Such an aveirage figure for the 
ratio of freight to the value of goods is questionable as 
it varies tremendously with the type of goods transpor­
ted. For many high value, industrial goods usually car­
ried by liner services, the ten percent figure may be on 
the high side. For basic commodities and low value goods, 
freight rates may amount to as much as thirty percent or 
more of the value of the cargo.(2) There is no precise 
estimation of Philippine deep-sea freight bill in e)<ist— 
ence. Thus, while a figure of US$ billion is often quoted 
(3), it must be borne in mind that this can only serve as 
an indication of the order of magnitude. Whatever be the 
exact figure of the freight bill is, the economic cost of 
oceanborne trade is significant to the country's economy. 
Freight charges are borne by consumers and are drains to 
the foreign exchange badly needed by the country' econom­
ic growth. Therefore, the country has a stake in the 
shipping cost of the commodities transported. Transport­
ation costs do not equally affect all products in foreign
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trade. Products which have a high value per weight or 
volume may not be severely hampered by high freight 
rates. For instance, a freight charge of US$ 1,000 on a 
machine worth US$50,000 may not significantly limit its 
marketability. The same freight charge on the shipment of 
a basic commodity worth US$ 3,000 may make it uncompetit­
ive. In general, low value, standardised products tend to 
be more sensitive to freight charges than high value, 
differentiated products. It is important therefore to 
consider one country's maritime transportation policy in 
the light of the composition of its foreign trade. (4)
In the late 1770s, ‘ private enterprise through 
government-supported financing procured several "semi- 
modern” ships which were employed initially by their 
owners on the Philippine foreign tt'ade but thereafter 
again removed from the trade and employed elsewhere where 
supposedly expectation of profit is greater. Which brings 
us to another aspect of the problem - the absence of not 
too many high freight paying cargoes in the Philippines 
foreign trade. Admittedly, by the very nature of its eco­
nomy, the country is a "bulk cargo" exporting country. 
These cargoes pay low freight rates such that freight 
revenue generated is barely sufficient to cover operating 
costs. Any help from the government for say direct finan­
cial assistance will be hard to come by, to remedy the 
situation, as its main priorities lie in areas of land 
reform, country's infrastructures, i.e. highways, roads, 
ports, education, peace and order, food, health services, 
and national defense.
Today many shipping companies strapped for finance 
are reliant on the bareboat chartering scheme sanctioned 
by the government to get tonnage to operate. Although a
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provider of employment for Filipino seamen and earner of 
valuable foreign exchange, the increased use of the sche­
me has come to the renewed attention of the International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITFl, which was seriously 
considering declaring the Philippine flag a flag of con­
venience with all the repercussions that it would carry. 
(B) Priority has been given by the present administration 
to the inter-island fleet. Inter-island shipping in the 
Philippines is the major form of communication for many 
of the communities dotted around its hundreds of islands. 
The Philippines does not have an extensive, modern road 
network, and with many islands too far apart to bridge, 
ships are the most practical if not economical form of 
transport and communication. The country's inter-island 
shipping is made up of several thousand crafts, usually 
owned by companies operating one or two vessels. Most of 
these are small, wooden craft with only some 200 relat­
ively large vessels and 20 major companies.
On the foreign trade, MARINA supervised the implem­
entation of the shipowner-shipowner Log Transportation 
Agreement (LTA) entered into between the Filipino Ship­
owners' Association <FSA) and Japanese Nanyosai Freight 
Agreement CNFA) providing for 50-50 cargo sharing of the 
log exports to Japan. MARINA continued participation in 
the ASEAN Liner Service Project in coordination with 
other concerned agencies jointly with the Philippines 
ASEAN Council Action Group on Shipping, ‘aimed at estab­
lishing a network of liner services linking ASEAN ports 
and prompting intra-ASEAN trade. The project initially 
focussed on the route Davao (Philippines) — Menado (Indo­
nesia), culminating in the signing of Phi 1ippine/Indon- 
esia Memorandum of Understanding on Trade, Investments, 
Handcrafts and Shipping on the occasion of the President
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Carazon C. Aquino's State visit to Indonesia in August 
1986„ (6) This initial cooperative effort between the
bilateral parties can be extended to apply to such coop­
erative efforts in the regional implementation of the 
Code of Conduct.
6.4,Carriage Performance of Philippine Flag Vessels in 
Liner Trade in Phi 1ippine-US Route.
As shown in Chapter 4, Table P-2-, the US trade share 
in the Philippine foreign trade is 37.2 per cent of Phil­
ippine export valued at US$2,003, and 26.5 per cent of 
Philippine import valued at US$1,629 billion. The Philip- 
pine-US liner trade is therefore very important to the 
Philippine shipping in terms of volume of trade and also 
because it is in this liner trade route that the -Philip­
pines national flag carrier, the National Shipping Corpo­
ration of the Philippines (NSCP) is actively ofierating 
an independent forthnightly time schedule. As shown in 
the Table 2 below, the Philippine flag vessels' share in 
the Philippine — US liner trade is 9.8% of Philippine? 
import and 13.1% of Philippine export or a total of 11.4% 
of the total Phi1ippine-US liner trade compared to the 
other major foreign flag carriers as follows:
Table 2. PHILIPPINE-US LINER SERVICE (1985); 
(VALUES ARE IN THOUSANDS)
VESSEL FLAG IMPORTS EXPORTS
TONS % FLAG VALUE$ TONS % -VALUE$
US 115,875 33.4 363,720 147,265 43.9 199,810
31,786
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PHIL. 34,161 9.8 43,934 13.1 50,787
3RD FLAG
DENMARK 21,427 6 m ^
TAIWAN 26,092 7.5
PANAMA 2S,443 8.2
JAPAN 29,861 8.6
SING. 17,300 5.0
UK 23,966 6,9
FRG 21,980 6.3
NORWAY 1,945 .6
LIBERIA 10,007 2.9
UNKNOWN 5,793 1.7
ISRAEL 2,828 .8
S.KOREA 2,156 .6
ITALY 1,341 .4
SWEDEN 694 •*^ 1
POLAND 918 . 3
GREECE 642 . ^
HONDURAS 6 -
NETHERLANDS 429 .1
INDIA 409 .1
PERU 235 .1
BELGIUM 204 .1
ECUADOR 74 -
FRANCE 22 -
CYPRUS 40 -
VENEZUELifl1 34 -
SPAIN -
KUWAIT 18
QATAR 18
AUSTRIA 15
PROC 9
MEXICO 7
S. ARABIfS1 5
,192 28,801 8.6 90,695
, 133 21,816 6.5 20,910
, 943 11,395 3,4 11,003
,616 6,049 1.8 7,794
,282 18,469 5,5 19,661
,475 10,227 3.0 14,037
,078 6,975 2,1 6,799
,267 21,280 6.3 8,895
,899 10,535 3.1 14,099
, 144 dl .7 27,378
,583 5,029 1.5 27,378
,797 7 46
601
,688 643 686
582 - -
, 663 - - -
18 604 -
676 71 - 310
538
284
558
80
91 24 209
47
53
31 9
71
13
112
33
18
19
21
62
63
74
42
32
26
5
20
7
16
1
1
1
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ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
5.9
51
TOTAL 346,961 100 877,087.8 335,508 100 480,109
Note; Due to rounding up, the total figures may not be 
exact.
SOURCE; US MarAD; Journal of Commerce; Bureau of Census.
As shown above, Philippine total imports from US in 
1985 totalled 346,961 tons valued at US$877,087.8 and 
total exports totalled 335,508 tons valued at US$ 480, 
109.8 or overall total ojf 682,469 tons valued at US$
1,357,197.5 Phillippine foreign trade to and from US. As 
shown from the statistics above, Philippine export was of 
high volume at 335,508 tons and low value at US$480,109.8 
as compared to import of 346,961 valued at US$877,087.8. 
In other words, almost of same weight of import cargoes 
and export cargoes, the export cargoes are valued 50% 
less than the import. Assuming that the liner freight 
rates are based on measurement ton or weight ton which­
ever is higher, the Philippine export will pay freight 
rates higher than its import. This makes the Philippine 
export bulky and unattractive to the liner service. The 
US flag share of Philippine import liner trade was 33.4% 
and export trade 43.9%, as compared with Philippine flag 
share of 9.8 of import and 13.1% of export. The figures 
are very startling since in the past and in the present, 
the US Government is always against any cargo sharing as 
being contrary to free enterprise. The US flag vessels 
enjoy already the 40% of the Phi 1ippine-US liner trade. 
The US will not obviously have the incentive tb implement 
any government-sponsored cargo sharing as shown from its 
opposition to E. 0. 769. The above statistics gathered
from US agencies or sources are almost parallel to the 
statistics gathered from cargo manifests submitted to the 
Philippine Port Authority and Department of State Office 
of Maritime Affairs. <0f which cargoes for U.S. military 
bases in Philippines were carried 100% by US flag vessels 
under U.S. Flag Preference Law.’): Table 3 shows the
carriage shares of the U.S. flag vessels, the Philippine 
flag vessels, and third flag vessels.
(Table 3); 1983 Total U.S.-R.P. Liner Trade (Metric
Tons)
PORT OF MANILA(1) . (M.T.) (.%)
PHILIPPINE FLAG 154,720 13
U.S. FLAG 406,977 ^ 33
THIRD FLAG 251,233 21
812,930 67
U.S. BASES
WESTBOUND 331,406 28
EASTBOUND 63,158 5
394,564 33
TOTAL 1,207,494 100%
(1) Port of Manila figures also include US preference
cargoes, such as Eximbank, P.L. 480, and US AID.
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Source: National Galleon.
If the westbound trade is to be examined for 1983, 
the Port of Manila volume is 389,862 or 54% of the total 
trade by metric tons, and for U.S. military bases, it was 
311,406 metric tons of total westbound trade, or almost 
half. In terms of revenues, the percentages accounted for 
U.S. Bases cargo reserved for American flag carriers may 
even be higher due to the generally higher freight rates 
on military cargo compared to general cargo.
6.5 BREAKDOWN OF U.S.-R.P. LINER TRADE BY MONTH (1983-84:)
The monthly breakdown of Philippine export . and 
import liner cargoes by month for 1983 and 1st semester 
of 1984, is shown below. This trend was expected not to 
change in 1987 and for a priori implementation of the 
cargo sharing law, the breakdown will serve as an approx­
imation of the liner trade in the R.P.-U.S. trade route:
1983
January - 50,430 MT July - 76,576 MT
February- 68,996 MT August - 84,215 MT
March - 78,663 MT Sept. - 51,776 MT
April - 64,351 MT Oct. - 62,700 MT
May - 86,592 MT Mov „ - 90,627 MT
June - 76,797 MT Dec. - 46,047 MT
1984
January - 42,17-3 MT 
February - 43,184 MT 
March - 21,177 MT (1-15 only!)
6.6 ANALYSIS OF THE PHILIPPINE-US LINER TRADE
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The trade between the United States and the Philip­
pines is highly competitive. There were approximately 20 
liner operators and more than 60 sailings or Trans­
pacific crossings per month in each direction as per data 
available from the published sailing schedules in the 
80s. This sailing frequency has not changed up to 1987. 
Approximately 79 per cent of these sailings were provided 
by third flag carriers, 16 per cent by U.S. flag carriers 
and 5 per cent by Philippine flag carriers. Due to the 
bankruptcy of MCP, the Philippine share should reduce. A 
number of liner operators provide mini-landbridge service 
from US West Coast to the East Coast. Other intermodal 
services to and from inland points are also offered reg­
ularly. Among the principal commodities carried outbound 
to the United States are furnitures (wooden and rattan), 
garments, canned pineapples, woven arl:,icles, dessicated 
coconut, footwear, handicrafts, toys, gloves, foodstuffs, 
electronics, beer, canned tuna, coffee beans, and wood 
products. Major inbound commodities from the US include 
linerboards, tin plate, cotton, tobacco, resins, waste 
paper, lubricating oil, machineries, chemicals, fibers 
and car accessories.
Although the Phi 1ippine/United States liner trade 
is relatively small trade, it enjoys an extraordinary 
level of service primarily because the carriers serving 
it also serve numerous other trades on the same route. 
Existing services is competitive. The Conference operat­
ing in the trade in the early 80s, the Philippine North 
America Conference, was composed of only six carriers 
serving the trade. Only 55 per cent of the cargo moving 
in the trade was carried by the Conference members. As 
stated in Chapter 1, a "giant" conference, the TWRA and 
ANERA are dominating the liner trade in the ASEAN range.
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Five United States flag carriers serve the trade. 
Lykes, Sea-Land, and American President Lines serve the 
West Coast <US). Waterman provides limited service from 
the East Coast (.less than two per cent of the outbound 
market.) and USL, then newcomer, initiated East Coast 
service. As stated, USL is now bankrupt.
On the Philippine side, only NS CP operates five (5.') 
containerised vessels in the trade with an average capac­
ity of 550 TEUs. It was estimated that the maximum capac­
ity available on NSCP between the US West Coast/Phi1 ip-
pine was only approximately TEUs per month at a 9-day
f requency„
The Philippines has no national " shipping line to 
Europe. The Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP;),now 
defunct, used to operate five CS) conventional breakbulk 
vessels with limited TEU capacity e.g, 120 TEUs in Europe 
and same number and types of vessels at the US liner 
trade. With the bankruptcy of MCP, only NSCP serves the 
Philippine/US liner trade (West Coast). It is in this 
situation that the implementation of the cargo sharing 
law was suspended in May 1984. It was felt that the Gov­
ernment was not justified to implement the cargo sharing 
law when no Philippine tonnage adequately to carry its v/" 
forty per cent share. Other reasons could be attributed 
to the suspension, e.g. the on-going bilateral shipping 
consultation meetings in Washington in February 1983, and 
in Manila in December 1983 between the Philippine panel 
and US delegations. The next round of meetings was supp­
osed to take place in 1984. At that time, the Federal 
Maritime Commission was also taking action against the 
two Philippine flag carriers, namely, the MCP and
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National Galleon (now NSCP), under the FMC's powers to 
correct alleged unfavorable conditions in the foreign 
trade of US, under the US Shipping Act, 1916, as amended.
6.7 CONCLUSION
The present Goverment has offered for sale the 
assets of the National Shipping Corporation of the Phil­
ippines (NSCP) to the private sector under the Government 
policy of privatisation of certain government business 
enterprise. It should be pointed out, however, that the 
NSCP became a government controlled shipping corporation 
in the early 1980s when the former private owners defaul­
ted in the payments of the vessels' purchase price. The 
Government guaranteed the loan as required by the foreign 
lenders. The Philippine Government, thrtough its agency, 
the National Development Company, was forced to manage 
the shipping company to protect its exposure in the form 
of government bank guarantees. The NSCP is now profitably 
managed by a team of management experts and when it is 
finally sold, will command a better price, with the cond­
ition that a Filipino buyer continue serving the liner 
trade between the Philippine and US. This policy is 
takes into account the importance of the RP/US foreign 
trade. The privatization of NCSP will remove it from the 
FMC list under the Government-Controlled Ocean Carrier 
under the US Shipping Act of 1984. One of the operating 
disadvantages of an ocean carrier designated by the FMC 
as a Government-Controlled Common Carrier, like NSCP, is 
that its tariffs on file with FMC could be suspended by 
FMC if the tariffs were considered comparatively low. 
Also, new tariff rates will not take effect until after 
30 days from filing with FMC. Within that period, changes 
might have overtaken the one filed in FMC and would
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render it not valid. There are other operating 
disadvantages of a line designated by FMC under the 
Government-Controlled Common Carrier. Suffice it to say 
that privately-operated national shipping lines will 
offer a good alternative for the Philippine liner 
shipping.
2
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CHAPTER 7
R E : C O M M E : i x l O A . “r X O M S
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents recommendations which are 
believed to be essential to the achievement of the goals 
and objectives of the maritime interests of the ASEAN, 
and, in particular, the national interests of the 
Philippines. Each recommendation is followed by a brief 
ex-planation.
7.2 RECOMMENDATION 1
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ASEAN 
COUNTRIES TAKE STEPS TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASEAN 
CONSORTIUM FOR FULL CONTAINER CARRIERS WHEREBY EACH MEM­
BER STATE CONTRIBUTES FOUR CA) FULL CONTAINER VESSELS TO 
THE "COMMONS" TO BE OPERATED BY A SHIPPING CORPORATION 
AND EACH COUNTRY HAS EQUITY PARTICIPATION.
In Table 1 of Chapter 5, the different forms of co­
operation practiced by Liner Operaters are indicated. 
In consortium providing liner services, usually only the 
ships will remain under separate ownership. An ASEAN 
Liner Shipping Corporation will operate the "commons" 
and each member country has equity participation and 
clearly defined right of profit sharing. The management 
of the Corporationn is composed of management shipping- 
people. The crew can be on rotation-country by country 
basis. The benefits that may flow from the creation of an 
ASEAN liner fleet are: (1) improved balance of payments 
position; <21 creation of job opportunities'; <31 expans-
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and (5'.!.»ion of auxiliary services; (A) self-reliance, 
national economic security and defense.
7.3 RECOMMENDATION 2
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ASEAN 
COUNTRIES TAKE STEPS TOWARDS ADOPTION OF A COMMON LINER 
SHIPPING POLICY IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THEIR INDEPENDENT 
DEEP-SEA LINER SHIPPING ACTIVITIES.
Joint actions of shipping lines of the ASEAN region 
whether to establish multinational companies under No. 1, 
above, joint service, rationalize operations, or space or 
slot-chartering arrangements, would allow the ASEAN mem­
ber countries to achieve an appropriate scale of operat­
ions, offer modern technologies, maintain frequency of 
service, pool technical and operational experience, exch­
ange of crews, and have a wider financial base. • "
7.4 RECOMMENDATION 3
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS TAKE 
STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CODE ON A REGIONAL BASIS.
The principle of applying the Code to a group of 
countries as indicated in Item 3.27 of Chapter 3 of this 
Study could also apply as well to the ASEAN because of 
their geography and cargo mix. This requires a level of 
unity that has not yet been achieved i-n ASEAN, but the 
trade is in place and the ships would follow the trade.- 
In Chapter 5 of this Study, it was mentioned that the 
Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Councils (FASO had 
asserted that the way to take advantage of the Code is 
through the formation of an ASEAN "Super Line" into which
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ASEAN cargoes would be pooled. In addition, the FASC can 
deal effectively and exert greater influence with the 
conference in Code-related matters. In early 1983, Dr. 
Ernst G. Frankel, professor at the Massachussets Instit­
ute of Technology and now visiting Professor at the World 
Maritime University, was quoted as urging the ASEAN to 
act as one in shipping, in the wake of the UNCTAD Liner 
Code. He advised owners of Singapore-registered ships to 
consider various alternatives, including joint venture 
with Korean and American companies, to prevent being left 
out in the cold if the UNCTAD Liner Code was implemented. 
As already known, in late 1983, the Liner Code entered 
into force internationally with the ratifications by the 
Federal Republic of Germany and The Netherlands. Altern­
atively, the members of the ASEAN - Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand could act as a 
group, said Dr. Frankel. Cl) Professor Frankel pointed 
out that by joining up with Korean and US line's, no 
matter which flags the vessels flew, Singapore shipowners 
would be able to carry cargo of the three nations and 
some cargo of other nations. He said that although he had 
not studied in depth the idea of ASEAN acting as a group 
it would appear that by doing so the partners could 
correct any imbalance in trade and shipping capacity. 
Shipping Times said that of the five ASEAN countries, 
Singapore was the only one which had not acceded to the 
Code. Thq Singapore fleet is the largest in ASEAN and, on 
a per capita basis, one of the largest, in the world 
although a substantial proportion is not owned by Singap­
oreans. <2)
Cl) Times Journal, In Wake of UNCTAD Liner Code,
January 24, 1983 issue.
C2) Ibid.
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7.5 RECOMMENDATION 4
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS NEGOT­
IATE WITH THEIR MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS WHO ARE NON-CODIST 
COUNTRIES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CARGO SHARING 
PROVISIONS OF THE CODE.
The US and Japan are examples of major trading par­
tners of the ASEAN countries and which are non-Codist 
countries. The US had openly opposed the Code. With res- 
pe-Qt to Japan, the question is whether it will ratify the 
Code following the Brussels Package or not.
The US Position. - The US administrations from 
President Jimmy Carter and Presidenjb Ronald Reagan had 
been against the Code of Conduct. The official position 
as stated by the US representative to the Plenipotentiary 
Conference in 1974 was as follows:
"A. The membership provisions encourage the conti­
nuation of closed conferences. In this regard, 
Mr. President, it is ironic that the closed 
conference system, which was so bitterly 
attacked by developing countries throughout 
most previous UNCTAD shipping meetings, is now 
sanctioned on an international scale by those 
same developing countries under the auspices 
of UNCTAD.
B. The cargo-sharing provisions will cartelize 
^^®'"*sportation of trade. Such provisions 
subordinate trade to transport; they restrict 
the choice of shippers and may result in delay 
of shipments and consequent loss of trade.
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C. The provisions on freight rates freeze them 
for unduly long periods, which could strangle 
the liner industry. Rate rigidity will hurt 
shippers as much as carriers." (3)
US shipping lines conscious of their own relative­
ly low share of trade compared to the 40 per cent allowed 
in the Code have generally been in favor of accession 
without reservations; although in most cases they prefer 
straight bilateralism, which allows them more easily to 
by-pass the provisions of their own regulatory regime.
The 40:60 cargo sharing formula may be a possible 
outcome in the trades between Code and Mon-Codist count­
ries following the implementation of the Code. Consist- 
tent ly with the Code philosophy, the Cpdist country would 
unilaterally reserve 40 percent of each of its trades for 
its national carriers, if the trading partner country 
does not ratify the Code, and does not negotiate a separ­
ate allocation for its national carrier, then all carr­
iers in the trade (perhaps even including the Codist 
national carrier) would compete for the remaining 60 per­
cent .
(3) Sidney Gilman, The Competitive Dynamics of 
Container Shipping (London; Gower, University of Liver­
pool),1983, p. 118. Robert A. ElIsworth, '"Liner Confer­
ences: Evolution of US Policy",in Marine Policy, Oct.,
1983, at 254-266; Charles L. 0. Buderi, "US Policy on 
Regulation of Liner Shipping in the 1980s; A View from 
Washington", Two Parts, J. of Mar.Law & Comm., Oct. 1986, 
and January 1987.
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The RP-US liner trade is conditioned by legislations 
in both countries covering both government-impelled 
cargoes and non-government impelled cargoes. Government- 
impelled cargoes arise from U.S. Cargo Preference laws, 
e.g., Public Resolution 17 reserving US Eximbank-financed 
cargo and Public Law 664 reserving other general cargo, 
like foreign aid, for carriage by U.S. flag vessels. The 
Philippine government-impelled cargoes, those paid out of 
loans from the Government or guaranteed by government 
financial institutions, are reserved to be carried by 
Philippine flag vessels under Presidential Decree No. 
1466.
7.6 RECOMMENDATION 5
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT IN THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR REV- 
VIEW OF THE US MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT IN THE PHILIP­
PINES TO BE DUE IN 1988, THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD RENEGOT­
IATE THE AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT OR 
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT PROVISIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT 
BOTH GOVERNMENTS SHALL EXERT THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO SECURE 
FROM EACH OTHER "SERVICES" WHICH ARE AVAILABLE AT VERY 
COMPETITIVE TERMS AND CONDITIONS.
Table 3 on page 153 of this study shows the 
magnitude of cargoes for U.S. military bases in the 
Philippines. The cargoes totalled 311,406 metric tons of 
the total westbound trade, or almost half of all cargoes 
at the Manila Port. These cargoes comprised national 
defense or military cargoes Ccombatant cargoes) and 
non-military cargoes (non-combatant). The US position is 
that national defense cargoes should be reserved wholly 
and exclusively on US flag carriers. The Philippine flag
164
carriers should share in the carriage of non-combatant 
cargoes or purely civilian cargoes destined to or origin­
ated from the military bases or US facilities in the 
Phi 1 ippines.
7.7 CONCLUSION
A regional approach to Code implementation offers 
developing countries, an opportunity to overcome some of 
the natural deficiencies which limit the ability of many 
nations to take full advantage of the Liner Code. 
Regional approaches to maritime problems are not easy 
undertakings and there are. many examples of failure and 
of success.
In Southeast Asia, there has been^ considerable dis­
cussion among members of the ASEAN group (Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand! " about 
the development of a joint shipping line which would 
initially concentrate on improving liner service among 
the five-nation group. Unlike many other potential 
regional groupings of developing countries, the ASEAN 
nations have well developed merchant fleets and, with the 
exception of Singapore, are aggressive Code advocates. 
Though ASEAN plans for a joint liner company have yet to 
be put into practice, there appears to be substantial 
potential for success. (5)
<5! The Implementation of the U.N. Code of Conduct
for Liner Conferences: A Study of U.S. Options.
Volume 3, Department of Transportation/Maritime Admi­
nistration, Washington, D.C., 1981, at 91-93.
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Regionalism under the Code will be motivated chiefly 
by the economic realities of liner service. Viable liner 
service requires fleets of at least modest size, particu­
larly on the relatively long North/South trade routes 
where developing countries have the most to gain from the 
cargo sharing provisions of the Code. Even modest size 
fleets are expensive to acquire and operate.
Under a regional approach, the associated cost and 
risk burdens can be shared with like-minded partners. 
Liner fleets also need sufficient cargo volumes to keep 
their .vessels full or nearly full in both directions on a 
trade. Regionalism is one way to build cargo volume and 
perhaps balance out what could be highly imbalanced 
trades when considered on a bilateral trading partner 
basis. '
With the developing countries, the Far East and 
South East Asia would be the most critical regions from 
the U.B. point of view. These regions generate large 
cargo volumes in all their trades, including regional 
trades, and their economic growth is highly dependent on 
efficient shipping services. In any Code implementation, 
there would be a strong pressure to make their liner 
services as efficient as possible.
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STATUS OF THE CONVENTION 
DEFINITIVE SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS, ACCESSIONS, ACCEPT­
ANCE AND APPROVALS:
The Convention, in accordance with its article 48, 
was open for signature from 1 July 1974 until and includ­
ing' 30 June 1975, Since that date the Convention has been 
open for accession.
As at 1 June 1986, 67 countries had made definitive 
signatures (si Cl), approved Capp), accepted (acc), 
ratified Cr), or acceded (a) to, the Convention. The 
countries, arranged in 'chronological order, are:
Ghana 24 June 1975 r
Chile 25 June J975 s
Pakistan 27 June 1975 s
Gambia 30 June 1975 s
Sri Lanka 30 June 1975 s
Venezuela 30 June 1975 B
Bangladesh 24 July 1975 a
Nigeria 10 September 1975 a
Benin 27 October 1975 a
Tanzania 3 November 1975 a
Niger 13 January 1976 r
Philippines 2 March 1976 r
Guatemala 3 March 1976 r
Mexico 6 May 1976• a
Cameroon 15 June 1976 a
Cuba 23 July 1976 a
Indoviesia 11 January 1977 r
Cote d^Ivoire 17 February 1977 r
Central African Republic 13 May 1977 a
Senegal 20 May 1977 r
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Zaire 25 July 1977 a
Madagascar 23 December 1977 a
Togo 12 January 1978 r
Cape Verde 13 January 1978 a
India 14 February 1978 r
Kenya 27 February 1978 a
Mali 15 March 1978 a
Sudan 16 March 1978 a
Gabon 5 June 1978 r
Ethiopia 1 September 1978 r
Iraq 25 October 1978 a
Peru 21 Novemeber 1978 a
Costa Rica 27 November 1978 r
Egypt 25 January 1979 a
Tunisia 15 March 1979 a
Republic of Korea 11 May 1979 a
Chechoslovakia 4 June 1979 app
Honduras 12 June 1979 . -a
USSR 28 June 1979 acc
GDR 9 July 1979 a
Sierra Leone 9 July 1979 a
Uruguay 9 July 1979 a
Bulgaria 12 July 1979 a
Guyana 7 January 1980 a
Morocco 11 February a
Jordan 17 March 1980 a
Yugoslavia 7 July 1980 r
Guinea 19 August 1980 a
Cl) A "definitive signature" without reservation as 
to ratification is understood as having the same binding 
legal effect as a ratification. CUNCTAD/ ST/SHIP/2, 1986. 
"UNCTAD Implementation", p. 16.
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Mauritius 16 September 1980 a
China 23 September 1980 a
Barbados 29 October 1980 s.
Romania 7 January 1982 a
Lebanon 30 April 1982 a
Jamaica 20 July 1982 a
Congo 26 July 1982 a
Malaysia 27 August 1982 a
FRG 6 April 1983 r
Netherlands 6 April 1983 a
Trinidad and Tobago 3 August 1983 a
Saudi Arabia 24 May 1985 a
Denmark (except Green-
and Faroe Islands) 28 June 1985 a
Norway 28 June 1985 a
Sweden 28 June "1985 a
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern
Ireland (on behalf of. 
U.K., Gibraltar, and
Hong Kong) 28 June 1985 a
France 4 October 1985 app
Finland 31 December 1985 a
Kuwait 31 March 1986 a
X
169
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1: GOALS AND MARITIME STRATEGIES OF
THE ASEAN IN LINER TRADES.
(1) See, for example, the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, Un General Assembly Resolution 3281 
(XXIX); Development and International Cooperation, UN 
General Assembly Resolution 3362 (S-VII); and the Manila 
Declaration and Programme of action, circulated by UNCTAD 
undser■document nlumber TD/195 (12 February 1976). On
shipping in the development context see Alexandser Yeats, 
Shipping and Development Policy: An INtegrated Assessment 
(New York: Praeger, 1981). International Development
Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade 
for the Eigthies; New International Economic Order 
(NIEO), 197A.
(2) H. M. Trivedi, "National and Regional.-Shipping Poli­
cies of Developong Countries" 314-341, Indian Shipping
In Perspective, 1981. UNCTAD, Guidelines Towards the
Application of the Convention on A Code of Conduct for
Liner Conferences (UNCTAD/ST/1 Geneva,1986. The term
"UNCTAD Guidelines" will be used in these Notes.
(3) Ibid., p.ll. See, also, UNCTAD Implementation of the
United Nations Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner
for Liner Conferences. A Report by the UNCTAD.
— ------- --------------- - - --------- ----
Secretariat nu mbered (TD/B/C.4/300), 6 August 1986, p.3. 
The term "UNCTAD Implementation" will be used to refer to 
the latter report.
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(4) Ibid. , p. 11.
C5) U.S. Shipping Act of 1984. Sec. 5 of the Act stipula­
tes that each conference agreement must provide reason­
able and equal terms and equal terms and conditions for 
admission and readmission to conference membership for 
any ocean common carrier willing to serve the paraticular 
trade or route.
(Sec. SCb) C2);i.
(6) The term "ASEAN" is an acronym for association of 
South East Asian Nations originally composed of five (5) 
member states, namely: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei was admitted into the 
association late 1984 after its independence on 31 Decem­
ber 1983. The acronym "ASEAN" is accepted internationally 
and the usage ASEAN is applied in this study.
(7) The criteria for freight-rate determination are found 
in article 12, Codse of Conduct.
(.&') See, for example, Professor A.A. Monsef , "Some obser­
vations on the Code of Conduct' for Liner Conferences", 
distributed as Course Materials at the WMU, 1987. In this 
paper, the appropriate authority as such has an important 
role to play. This is as follows:
i -On recognition of national shipping line of that
country (Chapter 1 Definitions!)
ii -On recognition of shippers' organization (Chapter
I)
iii —On membership application-conference to consider
the views, among others, of appropriate authori­
ties, if they so request (Article 1 para 5)
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iv -On participation in Trade. (Article 2 para 14)
V -Malpractices. (Article 5 para 1-c).
vi -Conference agreements. (Article 6)
vi i -Avvailability of tariffs and related conditions.
viii -Annual reports. (Article 10).
ix -Consultation machinery. (Article 11 para 1.
X —Classification of commodities in the tariffs. 
(Article 13 para 2).
xi -General freight rate increase. (Article 14 para 1)
xii -Promotional freight rates, (article"15)
xiii -Surchages. (Article 16).
xiv -Currency changes. (Article 17).
XV —adequacy of services. (Article 19 para 2)
xvi -International Mandatory conciliation. (Article 28) 
Notes. All articles referred to are Code articles.
(9) UNCTAD Guidelines, supra, p.l3.
I
(10) Ibid., p.l3
f
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fe
172
(11) Laawre?nce Juda, The UNCTAD Liner Code: A Prelimina­
ry Examination of the Implementation of the Codse of Con­
duct for Liner Conferences. J". of Mar. Law and Commerce, 
Volume 16, No. 2, Aprile, 19S5, pp. 181^217 <2081.
<121 Ibid., p.209.
<13) Ibid., p.209.
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January 1986, p. 1.
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pp. 67-68.
(3) Ibid., p. 67. Drewry, supra., p. 1.
C4,‘) C>rewry, supra, p. 1.
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(6> Drewry, pp. 1-2.
(7) Drewry, p. 2.
(8) B. M. Deakin 8t T. Seward,Shipping Conferences; A 
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practices. (Cambridge University Press), 1973.
i
(9) The classical case of The Mongul S..S. Co. v. 
McGregor, Gour and Co., and others, in Lane C.
f- Kendall, The Business of Shipping. (Centrevil le,I —----  -—----  - - - ----- ----
y* Maryland: Cornell Maritime Press), 1986, pp. 301—02.
(10) S. G. Sturmey,A Workbook on the Application of The 
UNCTAD Liner Code.(Seatrade Academy Ltd., London), 
1985, p. 7.
174
(11) Croner's World Directory of Freight Conferences
<1983).
<12) Code of Conduct (Part One, Chapter 1 Definitions) 
<13) Harald Hansen, Loc. cit. 'p. 68,
(14) Drewry, supra, p. 72.
<15) Drewry, supra, p. 73.
<16) Drewry, supra, p. 73.
<17) Drewry, supra, p, 73.
(18) Drewry, supra, p. 73.
<19) Drewry, supra, p. 74.
<20) Sturmey, Loc. cit., p. pp. 40-41.
<21) Code of Conduct, Article 2. Article 7<d)<i) specifi 
cally excluded bulk cargo shipped without mark o 
count from the scope of the loyalty agreement.
<22) Sturmey, Loc. cit. , P- 41 .
<23) Sturmey, Loc. cit. , P- 41 .
<24) Sturmey, Loc. cit. , P- 41 .
<25) Lloyd's List 250 Years of Shipping, 1984, p. 175
<26) Hans J. Peters,Trends ,in Global and Pacific Trades
175
and Shipping. (Bremen:Institute of Shipping and
Logistics), 1986, p. A.
(27) Thorston Rinman and Rigmor Linden,Shipping: How It
Works. (Stockholm: Rinman and Linden, 1978), p. 15. 
Under the same authors, Yesterday and Today, 1978,
p. 12.
(28) IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1984.
(29) Maritime Transport, 1983.
(30) JAMRI Report (January 1987).
(31) Rinman and Linden, Yesterday and Today, (Gothen-
burg:Rinman and Linden AB, 1978), p. 12. T. Rinman 
and R. Brodefors,The Commercial History of
Shipping. (Goteborg: Rinman & Linden, AB, 1983), p.
44,
(32) UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, 1985
(TD/B/C. 4/299).
(33) Ibid.
(34) Ibid.
(35) UNCTAD, Trade Among Developing Countries by Main 
Groups and by Regions, p. 11.
(36) Elliot Schrier and Hans Bohme,Data on Liner Trades
Between Developed and Developing Countries, A Trade
Policy Research Centre Paper dated December 1985, 
London.
<37) Lawrence Juda,The UIMCTAD Liner Code: United Sta­
tes Maritime Policy at the Crossroads. (West-view 
Press, Boulder Colorado, 1985), p. 2.
(38) Ibid., p. 4.
(i9) Alexander Yeats, Trade Barriers Facing C>eveloping
Countries: Commercial Policy Measures and Shipping.
(London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 182. (40) Juda, 
cit., p . 7.
op.
(4D) Juda, supra.
(41) El . A. Georgandopolous, The Code of Conduct for
Liner Conferences, Lecture Materials^, WMU, 1987.
(42) Nagendra Singh, British Shipping Law, Vol. 13,
Singh & Colinvaux (London: Stevens & Sons, 1967,
1974, 1977). See also UNCTAD Conference Practices
and Adequacy of Shipping Services, A Report by the
UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B/C.4/62), January 197D.
(43)* Drewry , supra, p. 75.
(44) Drewry , supra, p. 75.
(45) Drewry , supra, p. 75.
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(AS) The measures adopted by developed maritime countries 
include the US Shipping Act of> 1984, the EEC Brus-
sels Package, the Maritime Transport Policy of the 
EEC adopted in December 1986, and the Joint Communi­
que adopted by the US/CSG on 30 April 1986. The mem­
bers of the CSG are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Fran­
ce, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the Uni­
ted Kingdom. Copy of the Joint Statement of US/CSG 
is with the author. The Joint Statement contains 
three paragraphs:
1. They (participants) will seek to maximise the 
amount of cargo subject to competitive access.
i2. Whether or not the UN Liner Code applies in their 
trades, the participants reaffirm their resolve 
to avoid the introduction of new governmental 
measures, and to resist measures introduced or 
encouraged by third countries, where their effect 
is to exclude or restrict competitive access by 
each others' shipping lines to cargoes in their 
trades. The participants will maintain the right 
of commercially operated non-conference lines to 
compete freely for liner cargoes.
3. The participants have agreed that they should 
continue to consult regularly and, where appro­
priate, to coordinate actions relating to their 
shipping policies. In particular, they intend to 
consult on: (i) the means jointly to resist harm­
ful protectionist actions; (ii) the means to 
improve competitive conditions in shipping; (iii) 
(iii) the means to overcome restrictive commer­
cial practices that have the effect of substan­
tially restricting or closing trades, especially
those practices that give effect to restrictive 
shipping policies of third countries; Civ) each 
others' regulatory practices; and Cv) the future 
direction of the consultations. With respect to 
above Council Regulations CEEC) No. 4055/S6 ; No. 
4056; No. 4057; No. 4058; and No. 4059, all dated 
22 December 1986, these are found in Official 
Journal of the European Communities L378 Volume 
29, 31 December 1986.
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